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ABSTRACT 
 
Introduction:  Since the start of the 20th Century, the conceptualisation of values has been 
evolving, with values being suggested to be amongst our most important evaluative beliefs 
(Allport, et al., 1951; Rokeach, 1973; Spranger, 1928).  Whilst values have received a lot of 
research attention within the social psychology arena, in comparison there appears to be a 
lack of research on values applied within a mental health context.  
Aims: The current study aimed to add to the existing research on values applied within a 
mental health context by exploring values, perfectionism and psychological distress; 
specifically the effects of priming the social value of Achievement on behaviour associated 
with perfectionism and self-reported anxiety and depression. To achieve these aims, the 
study utilised Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz, et al. (2012) cognitive models of basic values 
and Maio, et al. (2009) and Maio (2010) research on priming values to motivate behaviour 
change. The study also utilised Higgins (1987) theory of self-discrepancy, to consider value 
discrepancy and emotional distress.  
Methods: The study made use of a between subjects analogue design, with a sample of 90 
non-clinical participants aged between 18- 65 years old. Participants were randomly 
allocated to one of three group conditions (Experimental Group 1 (n=30), Experimental 
Group 2 (n=30), or Control Group 3 (n=30). All participants completed the HADS, MCUP and 
adapted PVQ measures, before receiving a priming or neutral task.  All participants then 
completed an experimental behavioural task. 
Results:  Higher perfectionism was related to Self-Enhancement and Conservation value 
priorities, with strongest relations to Achievement based values. These findings suggest that 
perfectionism was related to value priorities that promote the self and the existing status 
quo, whilst being self-protective and serving to cope with anxiety. Perfectionism was found 
to have both a ‘healthy/positive’ and ‘unhealthy/negative’ aspect. This appears to support 
Achievement being related to perfectionism, as Achievement values have an overlapping 
position on the self-protection/self-growth dimension of Schwartz, et al. (2012) model. 
Priming Achievement based values increased perfectionist behaviour associated with more 
‘healthy or positive’ behaviour. Results indicated that higher perfectionism was related to 
higher self-reported levels of anxiety and depression. ‘Unhealthy/negative’ perfectionism 
was related with higher actual/ought discrepancy in Achievement values, suggesting that 
perfectionism was associated with the actual pursuit of Achievement value priorities (i.e. 
success, ambition, capability, and influence) not meeting the perceived expectations of 
others.  
Conclusions: The current study provided empirical support for the inclusion of a theory and 
model of values and value discrepancy to further understand perfectionism and distress. 
The results are discussed in relation to the existing literature, applied to a mental health 
context and clinical implications. The study is then critiqued and recommendations for 
future research are offered. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
The current study aimed to add to the existing research on values applied within a mental 
health context by exploring values, perfectionism and psychological distress; specifically the 
effects of priming the social value of Achievement on behaviour associated with 
perfectionism and self-reported anxiety and depression. Chapter one begins by introducing 
the key concept of values, how values have been operationalised and measured, before 
focusing on a cognitive model of basic social values developed by Schwartz (1992). It goes 
on to discuss how values have been suggested to influence and motivate behaviour, 
discussing research on priming social values and behavioural change (Maio, et al., 2009; 
Maio, 2010). Higgins (1987) model of self-discrepancy will be introduced as a framework for 
exploring value discrepancy and emotional distress. The chapter then moves on to focus on 
Achievement based values and the construct of perfectionism in relation to psychological 
distress and clinical interventions. A systematic review aims to review current literature on 
perfectionism and experiences of anxiety.  The chapter ends by outlining the rationale for 
the current study and main hypotheses. In chapter two, the methodology used in the 
current study is detailed including the sample, design, measures and procedures. Chapter 
three discusses the data management, before outlining the descriptive and inferential 
statistical analyses and results of the study relative to the hypotheses. Lastly, chapter four 
offers a summary of the study results relative to the literature on priming social values, 
value discrepancy, perfectionism and experiences of anxiety and depression. The 
implication and clinical relevance of the current study is considered before the study is 
critiqued by a consideration of strengths and limitations. The chapter concludes by 
regarding implications for future studies. 
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1.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
‘The value concept, more than any other, should occupy a central position . . . able 
to unify the apparently diverse interests of all the sciences concerned with human 
behaviour.’ (Rokeach, 1973, in Schwartz, 1992, pp. 1) 
 
Since the start of the 20th Century, the conceptualisation of values has been evolving, with 
values being suggested to be amongst our most important evaluative beliefs (Allport, et al., 
1951; Rokeach, 1973; Spranger, 1928).  Governments have also indicated the importance of 
values, including them as concepts in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the 
European Convention on Human Rights (1950), and the Human Rights Act (1998). Within 
these documents, in their most basic form, human rights are suggested to come from our 
‘shared values’.  
 
More recently, the Department for Education published guidance on ‘promoting British 
values’ in schools to support young people to leave school prepared for life in Britain 
(Department for Education, 2014). This guidance stated that as well as the previously 
required respect for British values, all schools had a ‘duty to actively promote’ the 
‘fundamental’ British values of: democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, mutual 
respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs. These values were initially 
set out by the British government in the ‘Prevent Strategy’ (HM Government, 2011). 
 
Despite researchers, governments, and the Department for Education promoting the 
importance of values, studies on the application of values appear to have been limited by: a 
lack of a clear and robust definition of values; limited evidence for their contents, 
structures, relations; and a lack of empirical tools to capture and measure them.  
 
The concept of values has been investigated in several areas of social psychology, for 
example moral reasoning and development (Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996), self-affirmation 
theory (Steele & Liu, 1988), and decision making (Tanner, et al., 2008). Values have also 
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been explored in sociology (Inglehart, 1997) and economics (Ben-Ner & Putterman, 1998). 
Whilst values have received a lot of research attention within the social psychology arena, in 
comparison there appears to be a lack of empirical research on values applied within a 
mental health context. Despite this lack of research, conceptualisations of values have been 
integrated in to several psychological therapies, including Person Centred Therapy (Rogers, 
1951, 1961),  Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT; Beck, 1979), Narrative Therapy (White & 
Epston, 1990), Positive Psychology (Seligman & Csikszentimihalyi, 2000) and more recently 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, et al., 2003, 2012; Hayes, et al., 2006; 
Hayes & Smith, 2005).  
 
The current study aimed to add to the existing research on values in a mental health 
context, by exploring the effects of priming specific social values on behaviour and 
psychological distress in a non-clinical population. Specifically, the study aimed to explore 
the effects of priming the social value of Achievement on behaviour associated with 
perfectionism and self-reported anxiety and depression. To achieve these aims, the study 
utilised Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz, et al. (2012) empirically researched cognitive models 
of basic values and Maio, et al. (2009) and Maio (2010) research on priming values to 
motivate behaviour change. The study also utilised Higgins (1987) theory of self-
discrepancy, to consider value discrepancy and psychological distress. The study outcomes 
aimed to inform further research exploring the application and efficacy of empirically 
researched models of values (Maio, 2010; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, et al., 2012) applied to 
clinical populations and psychological therapies. 
 
Chapter one will begin by introducing social values; focusing on how they have been 
defined, conceptualised, measured and empirically researched. Cognitive models of basic 
social values developed by Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz, et al. (2012) will be discussed 
with regard to how social values may motivate behaviour and relate to one another.  A 
model of value activation developed by Maio (2010) will be presented along with research 
in to activating social values by priming and consequent behavioural change will also be 
explored. The application of Higgins (1987) theory of self-discrepancy will be applied to 
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values and the impact of value discrepancy on anxiety and depression will be discussed. The 
chapter will then move on to focus on the Self-Enhancement based Achievement value 
priorities, and the construct of perfectionism. The construct of perfectionism will be 
discussed, including definitions, measurement, and relevance within a mental health 
context. A systematic review will review the current evidence on perfectionism and anxiety 
in adults.  
 
Schwartz (1992) basic model of social values will be discussed as a framework for the 
current study and priming social values to motivate behaviour change will be discussed as a 
methodology for exploring the effect of the social value of Achievement on perfectionist 
behaviour whilst considering value discrepancy, anxiety and depression. The chapter will 
conclude by declaring the specific hypotheses of the current study. 
 
1.3 VALUES 
 
1.3.1 Early Conceptualisations of Values  
 
Rokeach (1973) published a culmination of over two decades of research on the 
conceptualisation of values in his book titled ‘The Nature of Human Values’. In this work, he 
criticised previous research by Allport, et al. (1951, 1960) for reducing the concept of a value 
to the level of a preference and for not considering the relationships between values. 
Instead, Rokeach (1973) proposed that a value was more similar to an idealised standard 
and it was not a value considered alone that was important but the priority of one value in 
relation to another value (In Schwartz, 1996, in Seligman, et al., 1996) 
 
Rokeach (1973) suggested that values were standards that guided several processes 
including: action, attitude, attribution of causality, argument, judgment, choice, evaluation, 
exhortation, and rationalisation.  He proposed 36 values that could be placed in to a 
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hierarchy of importance for each individual. The values given highest importance were 
termed ‘central’ values and were suggested to be connected to an individual’s ‘core self’, 
acting as internal ‘standards’. Whilst the values given least importance were termed 
‘peripheral’ values and were suggested to be connected to the values shared with other 
individuals in society, acting as ‘ought’s’. Central values were described as being stronger in 
guiding an individual’s thoughts and behaviours compared to peripheral values. Rokeach 
(1973) also introduced the constructs of ‘instrumental’ and ‘terminal’ values. ‘Instrumental’ 
values were suggested to motivate preferable behaviours that enable an individual to 
achieve their ‘terminal’ values. ‘Terminal’ values were described as values an individual may 
want to achieve during life to accomplish a desired end of life position.  
 
Rokeach (1973) suggested that it was value conflict and resolution over time that developed 
an individual’s value hierarchy i.e. if two values were in conflict, one needed to be chosen 
over the other to resolve the conflict. He proposed that it was possible to predict an 
individual’s behaviour using their value hierarchy by measuring the ‘relative ranking’ of their 
values. These ideas consequently led to an interest in empirical research regarding the 
concept of values, the development of models of values and their application to behaviour.  
 
 
1.3.2 Value Models  
 
The role of values on subsequent behaviour has attracted research attention, with early 
research suggesting values guide all behaviour (Allport, et al., 1960; Rokeach, 1973), and 
later research suggesting values rarely guide behaviour and not for most people 
(McClelland, 1985; Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996). Whilst Allport et al. (1960) and Rokeach 
(1973, 1979) offered definitions of values that differentiated between values and 
hypothesised on their relevance to motivating behaviour, neither definition offered a 
description of how values may relate to one another.   To further understand values and 
their role in behavioural phenomenon, researchers have proposed models of values.   
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1.3.3 Schwartz (1992) Model of Basic Values 
 
Schwartz (1992) set out to overcome the limitations he had identified in prior research 
including previous research having focused on one culture, a single value, an absence of a 
comprehensive set of values within a broader theory, and research having neglected value 
relations (Schwartz, 1996, in Seligman, et al., 1996).  Schwartz (1992) initiated the 
development of a model of basic human values to build a cross cultural theory of multiple 
values considering their motivations and relations. Initially, Schwartz (1992) reviewed 
empirical research that had been collated using a value survey with forty sample groups 
(students, teachers, general and factory workers) diverse in culture and language, from each 
of the inhabited continents – using 20 different countries in total. The data was then 
analysed using correlations and Small Space Analysis (SSA) to identify the relations and 
distances between values.  This method produced a basic model of values with cross 
cultural consensus of values similarly understood across cultures in terms of their features 
and compatibility. The identified values were arranged so that conceptually similar values 
were positioned closest to one another and opposing values were positioned furthest away.  
This positioning created a circular model of values that not only differentiated values but 
also organised them according to their relative position to other values; Schwartz (1992) 
titled this model a Model of Basic Values.  
 
1.3.3.1 Defining Values 
 
Schwartz (1992, 1994) developed a definition of values as desirable ‘trans-situational goals, 
varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social 
entity’ (Schwartz, 1992, pp. 17, 1994, pp. 21). Schwartz, et al. (2012) discusses how values 
are different to concepts of attitudes, beliefs, traits, or norms, as these concepts vary on 
another scale and are consequently measured differently, e.g. attitudes evaluate things on a 
positive or negative scale. Schwartz, et al. (2012) considered values to have six main 
defining features: 1) Values are beliefs linked inextricably to affect; 2) Values refer to 
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desirable goals that motivate action; 3) Values transcend specific actions and situations; 4) 
Values serve as standards or criteria; 5) Values are ordered by importance; and 6) the 
relative importance of multiple values guides action (Schwartz, et al., 2012, pp. 3-4).  As well 
as defining values by their shared features, Schwartz (1992) defined values by their 
motivational drives. These drives included values functioning to meet the needs of: 
individuals as biological organisms; the conditions of coordinated social interaction; and the 
survival and welfare needs of groups (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). 
 
1.3.3.2 Differentiating Values 
 
Utilising his definition of value features and motivations (as detailed above), Schwartz 
(1992, 1994) collated data from across 41 different countries and conducted an exploratory 
factor analysis and multidimensional scaling of the values recognised across cultures. The 
values collated were found to be related, there were values that appeared to often be 
prioritised at the same time, and there were values that were found to not be prioritised at 
the same time. The values were mapped according to these relationships; values were 
placed close together if it was likely that they would both would be of similar importance to 
the same individual. In contrast, values were placed furthest from one another if it was less 
likely that they both would be seen as important to the same individual.  Schwartz (1992) 
suggested that it was not that individuals could not hold opposing values, or hold one value 
and not another, but that individuals are motivated by all 10 values to differing extents and 
generally tend to prioritise one value over another. This process produced 10 motivationally 
distinct value priority groups: Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, 
Security, Conformity, Tradition, Benevolence, and Universalism. Table 1.1 presents each of 
the 10 values, defined by their central motivational goal and the single values that represent 
them. 
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Table 1.1: Schwartz (1992, 1994) basic social values; their central motivational goals and 
single values (adapted from Schwartz 1996, in Seligman, et al., 1996, pp.3). 
 
 
1.3.3.3 Mapping Value Relations 
 
Schwartz (1992, 1994) proposed that the 10 values were related to one another in terms of 
shared underlying motivations (see Table 1.2) and did not occur randomly. 
 
Value Motivational goal, single values that represent these goals 
Power Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. 
  Social power, Authority, and Wealth. 
Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards. 
  Successful, Capable, Ambitious, and Influential. 
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself. 
  Pleasure and Enjoying Life. 
Stimulation  Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. 
  Daring, a Varied Life, and an Exciting Life 
Self-Direction Independent thought and action choosing, creating, exploring. 
  Creativity, Freedom, Independent, Curious, and Choosing own Goals. 
Universalism 
Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people 
and for nature. 
  
Broadminded, Wisdom, Social Justice, Equality, a World at Peace, a World of Beauty, 
Unity with Nature and Protecting the Environment. 
Benevolence 
Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is frequent 
personal contact. 
  Helpful, Honest, Forgiving, Loyal, and Responsible. 
Tradition 
Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture 
or religion provide the self. 
  Humble, Accepting my Portion in Life, Devout, Respect for Tradition and Moderate. 
Conformity 
Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and 
violate social expectations or norms. 
  Politeness, Obedient, Self-Discipline, Honouring Parents and Elders. 
Security Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of self. 
  Family, Security, National Security, Social Order, Clean, and Reciprocation of Favours. 
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Table 1.2: Schwartz (1992) basic social values and their shared motivational goals (adapted 
from Schwartz 1996, in Seligman, et al., 1996, pp. 4; Schwartz, et al., 2012, pp. 9-10). 
 
When the 10 values are positioned in terms of their shared motivational orientations they 
form a motivational continuum arranged as a ‘circumplex’ structure, with the positioning of 
a value representing its relation to the other values in the model. When represented on the 
circle, values adjacent to one another are most similar and share similar motivational goals. 
Values furthest away from one another at opposing ends are least similar and have 
conflicting motivational goals.  
 
Figure 1.1 presents Schwartz (1992, 1994) circular model of values with the two dimensions 
positioned on the circumference. These dimensions are referred to as being four ‘quadrants’ 
within the model with motivations organised across two dimensions. The first dimension 
has Self-Enhancement at one end and Self-Transcendence at the opposing end. Values 
positioned at the Self-Enhancement end promote the self i.e. Achievement and Power, 
whilst values positioned at the Self-Transcendence end promote transcendence of the self 
to promote others i.e. Benevolence and Universalism. Self-Transcendence and Self-
Enhancement value priorities may be considered to be alike the concepts of ‘extrinsic 
Values Shared Motivational Orientations 
Power and Achievement Both emphasise social superiority and esteem. 
Achievement and 
Hedonism 
Both emphasise self-centeredness. 
 
Hedonism and 
Stimulation 
Both emphasise a desire for affectively pleasant arousal. 
 
Stimulation and Self-
Direction 
Both involve intrinsic motivation for mastery and openness to change. 
 
Self-Direction and 
Universalism 
Both express reliance upon one's own judgement and comfort with the 
diversity of existence. 
Universalism and 
Benevolence 
Both involve concern for enhancement of other and transcendence of 
selfish interests. 
Benevolence and 
Tradition/Conformity 
Each promotes devotion to one's in group. 
 
Tradition/Conformity and 
Security 
Each emphasise conservation of order and harmony in relations. 
 
Security and Power 
  
Both involve avoiding or overcoming the threat of uncertainties by 
controlling relationships and resources. 
 
 
Page 24 of 335 
 
values’ centred on external approval or rewards (Self-Enhancement) and ‘intrinsic values’ 
centred on inherent rewards (Self-Transcendent). The second dimension has Conservation 
at one end and Openness to Change at the opposing end. Values at the Conservation end 
promote the existing non changing status quo i.e. Tradition, Security and Conformity, whilst 
values positioned at the Openness to Change end promote change and potential uncertainty 
i.e. Self-Direction and Stimulation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: A model of basic values (Schwartz, 1992, pp. 45, 1994, pp.24; Schwartz et al., 
2012, pp. 9).  
 
1.3.3.4 Hierarchy of Importance 
 
Although some research has indicated that there are individual differences in value 
priorities (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Schwartz, et al., 2012), and that value priorities are 
capable of change as individuals pursue value priorities that are open to them whilst casting 
aside and downgrading values when their pursuit is blocked (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997), more 
generally across cultures there appears to be a consensus for value priorities (Schwartz, et 
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al., 2012). Value priorities appear to be similar across cultures, with values being organised 
in the following way: high priority - Benevolence, Self-Direction and Universalism; medium 
priority - Achievement, Conformity, Hedonism, Security and Tradition; low priority - 
Stimulation and Power. This cross cultural consensus enables a baseline ‘norm’ to which 
other hierarchies may be compared. Schwartz, et al., (2012) suggested such a cross cultural 
consensus may exist due to the shared importance individuals place on maintaining 
societies. Consequently, values which promote behaviours that maintain a society are 
considered to be more important than values that promote behaviour that may 
compromise society.  
 
1.3.3.5 Model Validity  
 
Schwartz (1992, 1994) model has been utilised to analyse data collated from numerous 
cross culture samples (Schwartz, 1996; 2006; Schwartz, et al., 2001; Schwartz, & Bardi, 
2001) and has been validated for use across such diverse demographic samples (Bilsky, et 
al., 2011; Davidov, 2008; Peng, et al., 1997). Research has found some differences in value 
priorities across cultures; however the core structure underlying value priorities appears to 
be consistent (Schwartz, 1994; 1999). The circular structure of motivational orientations has 
also been supported in a number of studies (Cieciuch & Schwartz, 2012; Schwartz, 1994; 
Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Vecchione, et al., 2009). Researchers have also applied the 
model in empirical studies exploring value priming effects (Maio, et al., 2009), value change 
(Bardi & Goodwin, 2011), and psychological distress (Sortheix, et al., 2013). As well as having 
construct (Cieciuch & Schwartz, 2012; Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Sortheix, 
et al., 2013; Vecchione, et al., 2009) and cross cultural (Schwartz, 1996, 2006; Schwartz, et 
al., 2001; Schwartz, & Bardi, 2001) validity, the model offers a framework on which research 
may form and test predications about values and behaviour such as predicting the effects of 
value relations (Maio, 2010; Maio et al, 2009), value discrepancy (Parsons, 2013; Rees & 
Maio, 2009), priming values and behaviour (Maio, 2010; Maio, et al., 2009; Woodfield, 
2014) and impacts on emotional distress (Sortheix, et al., 2013).   
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1.3.4 Schwartz, et al. (2012) Revised Model of Basic Values 
 
Research utilising Schwartz (1992; 1994) model of values suggested that some of the values 
proposed were conceptually broad and were constituted from a number of distinct value 
aspects (Caprara, et al., 2006; Vecchione, et al., 2012). In order to increase the explanatory 
power of the original model, Schwartz, et al. (2012) utilised a values survey to gather data 
from 15 samples (6059 participants in total) across 10 countries. The factor structure of the 
data was then analysed using a confirmatory factor analysis. This process produced a 
revised model that had 12 overarching values: Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, 
Achievement, Power, Face, Security, Tradition, Conformity, Humility, Universalism and 
Benevolence. Six of these values were considered to be conceptually broad and were 
further subdivided in to distinct value aspects: Self-Direction was split in to two aspects 
(Thought and Action); Power was split in to two aspects (Dominance and Resources); 
Security was split in to two aspects (Societal and Personal); Conformity was split in to two 
aspects (Interpersonal and Rules), Universalism was split in to three aspects (Nature, 
Concern and Tolerance); and Benevolence was split in to two aspects (Caring and 
Dependability). The 19 values identified have motivational goals compatible with those of 
the 10 values from the original model. Therefore, the circular continuum formed by shared 
motivational orientations is maintained in the revised model. Table 1.3 presents the original 
10 values alongside the revised 19 values and their motivational goals. 
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Table 1.3: Schwartz (1992) original 10  values alongside Schwartz, et al. (2012) revised 19 
basic social values and their motivational goals (Schwartz 1992, in Schwartz 1996, Seligman, 
et al., 1996; Schwartz, et al. 2012, pp. 669). 
Schwartz (1992) Schwartz, et al. (2012)   
Original Value Revised Value Motivational Goal 
Self-Direction 
 
Self-Direction – thought 
 
Freedom to cultivate one’s own ideas and 
abilities. 
  Self-Direction – action Freedom to determine one's own actions. 
Stimulation Stimulation  Excitement, novelty and change. 
Hedonism Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification. 
Achievement Achievement Success according to social standards. 
Power 
 
Power – Dominance 
 
Power through exercising control over 
people. 
  
Power – Resources 
 
Power through control of material and social 
resources. 
  
Face 
 
Security and power though maintaining 
one's public image and avoiding humiliation. 
Security Security - Personal Safety in one's immediate environment. 
  Security - Societal  Safety and stability in the wider society. 
Tradition 
 
Tradition 
 
Maintaining and preserving cultural, family 
or religious traditions. 
Conformity 
 
Conformity – Rules 
 
Compliance with rules, laws and formal 
obligations. 
  
Conformity - 
Interpersonal 
Avoidance of upsetting or harming other 
people. 
  
Humility 
 
Recognising one's insignificance in the larger 
scheme of things. 
Benevolence 
 
Benevolence - 
Dependability 
Being a reliable and trustworthy member of 
the in-group. 
  
Benevolence – Caring 
 
Devotion of the welfare of in-group 
members. 
Universalism  
 
Universalism – Concern 
 
Commitment to equality, justice and 
protection for all people. 
  Universalism - Nature Preservation of the natural environment. 
  
Universalism – Tolerance 
 
Acceptance and understanding of those who 
are different from oneself. 
 
 
The revised model included the original dimensions of value motivations relating to one 
another across the dimensions of Self-Enhancement/Self-Transcendence and Conservation/ 
Openness to Change.  The revised model also included two additional dimensions of value 
motivations. The first additional dimension has societal social focus motivations at one end 
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and individual personal focus motivations at the opposing end. The second additional 
dimension has self-expansion and growth – anxiety free motivations at one end and self-
protection - anxiety avoidance motivations at the opposing end.  The revised model 
suggests that the values placed within the Self-Transcendence and Conservation quadrants 
serve to regulate an individual with regard to socially focused issues.  Whilst values placed 
within the Self-Enhancement and Openness to Change quadrants serve to regulate an 
individual with regard to personally focussed issues. The revised model also suggests that 
the pursuit of values within the Self-Enhancement and Conservation quadrants are self-
protective and serve to cope with anxiety. In contrast, the values within the Self-
Transcendence and Openness to Change quadrants are self-expansive and serve to express 
Anxiety-Free motivations. This configuration of value priorities suggests that people who 
prioritise values associated with Conservation and Self-Enhancement may be motivated to 
pursue behaviours associated with self-protection and trying to cope with life. The three 
dimensions arranged by motivational orientations can be seen in Schwartz, et al. (2012) 
revised model in Figure 1.2 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: A revised model of values (Schwartz, et al., 2012, pp.669). 
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In this model, the values of Humility and Achievement overlap in their motivations with 
regard to the additional dimension of self-growth/self-protection. The value of Achievement 
is of particular interest in the current study and its overlapping position on the self-
protection/self-growth dimension suggests that meeting standards may serve to self-protect 
and cope with anxiety or to promote self-growth by expressing ones competence and 
anxiety free motivations. 
 
Schwartz, et al. (2012) proposed that the revised model provides increased explanatory 
power compared to the original 1992 model, and that the revised model can be converted 
to and add to the original 1992 model without invalidating it. These proposals have not yet 
been evidenced by research.   
 
Research has explored the two additional dimensions proposed. Schwartz, et al. (2000) 
explored the dimension of socially and personally focused motivations. In their study, value 
priorities and worry related to seven societal issues were measured. The study reported that 
worry about issues such as hunger, destruction of the environment and poverty, were 
positively correlated to the values positioned on the social focus end of the dimension. In 
contrast, values positioned on the personal focus end were negatively correlated with the 
social worries. These authors also reported that worries related to personal issues that may 
serve to self-protect from anxiety such as concern about own health, safety, success and 
finances, were positively correlated to the values positioned on the Self-Enhancement 
quadrant. In contrast, values positioned on the Self-Transcendence quadrant were 
negatively correlated. These findings offer support for Schwartz, et al. (2012) revised model 
and the additional dimensions of social/personal focused motivations and anxiety 
free/anxiety protection motivations. Research has also investigated the social/personal 
dimension and how this relates to anxiety motivations utilising the values positioned on the 
quadrant dimensions of the model.  
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Bilsky, et al. (2011) analysed data collected from the European Social Survey (ESS), focusing 
on values and mood. The study reported that positive answers on mood questions were 
positively correlated with values positioned on the Self-Transcendence and Openness to 
Change quadrants and negatively correlated with values positioned on the Conservation and 
Self-Enhancement quadrants. These findings offer support for the additional dimension of 
anxiety free/anxiety protection motivations, supporting the assumption that values 
positioned on the Conservation and Self-Enhancement quadrants relate to increased anxiety 
compared to values positioned on the Self-Transcendence and Openness to Change 
quadrants.  
 
The current study utilised Schwartz (1992) model of basic values due to the models ability to 
define, differentiate and understand how values relate to one another and impact on 
behavioural motivations. The model has also been used in empirical research with diverse 
cross cultural samples and so was considered to have a good level of validity. The original 
1992 model was chosen due to the current lack of empirical research on Schwartz, et al. 
(2012) revised model. However, the revised model was also considered with regard to how 
values relate to social and personal motivations and self-expansion/anxiety free and self-
protection/anxiety avoidance motivations as previous research has supported the validity of 
these dimensions (Bilsky, et al., 2011; Schwartz, et al., 2000). The current study also utilised 
utilise the Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ) developed by Schwartz, et al. (2001). 
 
1.3.5 Measuring Values  
 
1.3.5.1 The Schwartz Value Scale (SVS)  
 
The Schwartz Value Scale (SVS; Schwartz 1992) was developed to measure the values 
identified in Schwartz (1992) basic values model. It was regarded as a measure of explicit 
values and utilises abstract, context free thinking. The SVS has been utilised in research and 
has provided support for construct and structural validity of Schwartz (1992) model 
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(Fontaine & Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Schwartz & Sagiv, 
1995).  This research also reported that samples from non-western populations were 
deviating from the theorised baseline pattern of value priorities proposed by Schwartz 
(1992, 1994).  Deviations were reported to occur most frequently and be more pronounced 
in samples from non-western and rural areas of less developed countries. Such deviations 
may have suggested that the model was not applicable to non-western, rural areas of less 
developed countries; however it was also plausible that the non-western samples may have 
differed to western samples on their use of context-free, abstract thinking on which the SVS 
was based.  In light of this, the SVS was criticised for measuring values based on a lack of 
specific concepts and a reliance on abstract thought concepts without concrete examples. 
 
1.3.5.2 The Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ)  
 
The Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ) was developed by Schwartz, et al. (2001) as an 
alternative to the SVS, to measure the values identified in Schwartz (1992) basic values 
model. The PVQ is a self-reported implicit measure of social value priorities. The PVQ was 
designed to be appropriate for individuals aged from eleven years old to elderly and for 
people with non-western backgrounds and education. It was regarded to measure implicit 
values and to be more concrete than the previous SVS with an easier to use rating scale. 
There are two versions of the PVQ available, a 40-item version and a shorter 21-item 
version.  
 
The PVQ has been utilised in research and found to have good internal reliabilities and 
convergence with the SVS (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005).  The PVQ has also been reported to 
produce the baseline pattern of value priorities proposed by Schwartz (1992, 1994) in non-
western samples (Schwartz, et al., 2001), and so confirms the limitations in using the SVS in 
non-Western samples. 
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1.3.5.2.1 The Portrait Value Questionnaire – 40 item version (PVQ - 40) 
 
The PVQ-40 questionnaire includes 40 portraits of individuals; the portraits are presented in 
two versions, as male or female (Schwartz, et al., 2001; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). The 
gender of the portraits is matched to the participant completing the measure.  Each portrait 
implicitly describes a social value held by an individual by describing what they regard as an 
important goal in life. For example, item 1 for the male portraits implicitly describes the 
social value of ‘Self-Direction’ from Schwartz (1992, 1994) by describing the following male 
portrait: ‘thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things 
in his own original way’. Participants are asked to decide how much the individual described 
is like them by choosing from one of six options: ‘very much like me’, ‘like me’, ‘somewhat 
like me’, ‘a little like me’, ‘not like me’, and ‘not like me at all’.  The participants social values 
are then inferred from their similarity to the social values implied in each of the 40 portrait 
items.  The number of portrait items for each implied social value ranges from three 
(Hedonism, Power and Stimulation) to six (Universalism). The number of portrait items for 
each implied social value is considered to reflect the conceptual breadth of the value i.e. 
universalism has the widest conceptual breadth (Schwartz, 1992, 1994).  
 
The PVQ-40 questionnaire is scored by calculating the mean score for the portrait items 
related to each of the social values. In total 10 scores are calculated, one for each of the 10 
social values (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). The 10 values are then ranked in terms of importance 
with the highest scoring value to lowest scoring value. These scores can be used to give an 
indication of social value priorities. Mean scores for each of the four value quadrants 
(Schwartz, 1992, 1994) can also be calculated. The four quadrants can then be ranked by 
priority from lowest score (highest priority) to highest score (lowest priority).  
 
The PVQ-40 questionnaire has been suggested to have good internal consistency (Schwartz, 
et al., 2001; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005), construct validity (Cieciuch & Schwartz, 2012; 
Vecchione, et al., 2009), with the quadrant structure being supported (Hinz, et al., 2005). 
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The measure has also been demonstrated to have similar meaning across cultures 
(Schwartz, 2006) and across cultures has produced the core pattern of value priorities 
proposed by Schwartz (1992, 1994) and (Schwartz, et al., 2001).   
 
1.3.5.2.2 The Portrait Value Questionnaire – 21 Item Version (PVQ - 21) 
 
The PVQ-21 questionnaire was developed specifically for the European Social Survey (ESS). 
The ESS is an academically driven survey that is now funded by the European Research 
Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC). The survey commenced in 2001 and is conducted once 
every two years across Europe. The aim of the survey is to measure the attitudes, beliefs 
and behaviour patterns of people living across Europe.  
 
The PVQ-21 includes short verbal portraits of 21 different individuals; the portraits are 
presented in two versions, as male or female (Schwartz, et al., 2001; Schwartz & Rubel, 
2005). As in the PVQ-40, each portrait implicitly describes a social value held by an individual 
by describing what they regard as an important goal in life. Participant’s value priorities are 
inferred from their self-reported similarity to other individuals being described implicitly in 
terms of their values. The PVQ-21 has fewer portrait items compared to the PVQ-40 and so 
there are fewer items corresponding to each social value. There are two portrait items 
related to each social value, with the exception of the social value of ‘universalism’, which 
has three items to represent its wider conceptual breadth compared to the other values. 
The PVQ-21 questionnaire uses the same scoring methods as the PVQ-40. Davidov (2010) 
expressed limitations with regards to the internal consistency of the PVQ-21, however the 
construct validity and quadrant structure has been supported (Bilsky, et al, 2011; Verkasalo, 
et al., 2012) 
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1.3.5.2.3 The Adapted Portrait Value Questionnaire - 40 Item Version (Adapted PVQ - 40) 
 
The PVQ-40 has been adapted for use in studies exploring social value discrepancy (Parsons, 
2013; Rees & Maio, 2009). This adaption aimed to incorporate Higgins (1987) model of self-
discrepancy into the measure.  The PVQ-40 instructions and rating scales were adapted to 
incorporate actual/own, ideal/own and ought/own self-state representations. These 
adaptations aimed to measure actual/ideal discrepancies or actual/ought discrepancies 
between social value priorities. Instructions were adapted and participants were asked to 
think about how much each portrait described a person that ‘is actually like you’, ‘is ideally 
like you’, and ‘is what you should be like’. The rating scale was adapted so that participants 
answered these three questions for each portrait item: ‘How much are you like this 
person?’, ’Ideally, how much would you be like this person?’, and ‘How much should you be 
like this person?’. The rating scale was also adapted to: ‘Not at all (1)’, ‘2’, ‘somewhat (3)’, 
‘4’, and ‘very much (5)’. The current study utilised the Adapted PVQ-40 (Parsons, 2013; Rees 
& Maio, 2009) as a measure of social values due to its ability to measure values relative to 
Schwartz (1992, 1994) model, whilst also measuring value discrepancy. 
 
1.3.6 Activating Values 
 
1.3.6.1 A Cognitive Representation of Values 
 
Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) suggested that values were organised as unconscious cognitive 
structures that can be retrieved from memory when needed. This conceptualisation of 
values as cognitive structures that can be activated appeared to be congruent with earlier 
theorised concepts of cognitive structures that could be activated via a process of ‘spreading 
activation’ (Collins & Loftus, 1975). This process suggests that the activation of one concept 
then cognitively spreads to activate other related concepts.  
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Later, Maio and Olson (1998) suggested that often values operate as ‘truisms’; they are 
often assumed to be self-evident and not questioned. They proposed that individuals do not 
tend to consider their reasoning behind a value and often do not have evidence for a 
particular value being important. Consequently, they also suggested that values are so 
widely accepted and deeply held without query that individuals may not be conscious of 
them. Maio (2010) proposed that values may be considered as mental representations that 
are available to us under certain circumstances, such as when we think about them or when 
they are activated. These value mental representations were suggested to operate at a 
system level, a value level, and an instantiation level (see Figure 1.3). Schwartz (1992) model 
of basic values would fit within the system level of this representation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: A schematic diagram of the levels of mental representation of values (Maio, 
2010, pp. 10). 
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Using this mental representation of values, Maio (2010) related each level to understanding 
the concept of values and how they function. Motivational relations between values at the 
proposed ‘system level’ are suggested to have implications for understanding six processes 
including: relations between values; the accessibility of values; judgements of value 
relations in rhetoric; feelings of ambivalence; effects of value priming on behaviour; and 
value change. At the proposed ‘value level’, values are suggested to be connected to 
emotions and the type of emotion experienced is thought to be dependent on value 
discrepancy i.e. value-ideal self-guides versus value-ought self-guides. At the proposed 
‘instantiation level’, values are suggested to be accessed, contemplated and applied though 
value directed behaviour. It is at the ‘instantiation level’ that research has based the 
exploration of priming values and influences on subsequent behaviour. 
 
1.3.6.2 Activating Values by Priming 
 
Schwartz and Bardi (2001) report that further research investigating values and their 
influence on behaviour before there can be research on establishing and changing values to 
consequently change behaviour e.g. via media campaigns, education programmes, or health 
interventions.  Whist existing research has investigated values and behaviour (Bond & Chi, 
1997; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996), this research has been criticised for focusing on 
single values and their relationship with a single factor, for example exploring how one 
value priority relates to one behaviour, attitude, or socio-cultural factor e.g. social class, 
ethnicity (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 1997). The research has also received criticism 
for having low reliability,  lacking a broader theoretical model of a comprehensive set of 
values, and ignoring the more widely held assumption that it is competing values relating to 
one another and not one single value that impacts on behaviours (Schwartz, 1992).  
 
Three main levels of activating values have been put forward by researchers; these include 
priming values using conscious, unconscious or subliminal methods (Bardi & Goodwin, 2011; 
Maio & Thomas, 2007; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Conscious methods include processes that 
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use persuasion or ask people to consider reasons for or against a value they hold 
(Karremans, 2007; Maio, et al., 2009). Unconscious methods include processes that involve 
implicit priming tasks where an individual is asked to complete puzzles or word tasks 
themed around a specific value (Bargh, et al., 2001; Hart & Albarracin, 2009; Verplanken & 
Holland, 2002; Maio, et al., 2009). Lastly, subliminal methods involve asking people to 
complete a task on a computer with subliminal primes flashed onto the screen (Neuberg, 
1988; Smeesters, et al., 2009). Each of these method levels have been supported to not only 
to activate values but also result in value congruent behaviours. When a conscious, 
unconscious, or subliminal process has occurred to attempt to cognitively bring the value to 
mind, the value may be considered to have been activated through priming. 
 
Maio, et al. (2001) tested the process of activating values to investigate whether priming 
methods that involve making reasoning for values salient (e.g. asking individuals to list 
reasons for and against a value) are more effective that priming methods that do not make 
reasoning for values salient (e.g. solving anagrams of value related words and rating 
importance of the value, or rating feelings towards a value). The study found that when 
participants considered reasons for their values, their value congruent behaviour changed 
more than those who had not considered their reasoning. The study supported Maio and 
Olsen (1998) previous work suggesting individuals tend to hold values as truisms and behave 
congruently with their values.  However, suggested that values can be activated more 
effectively by using priming methods that make them available for consideration. This 
process of consideration was suggested to have an impact on subsequent behaviour i.e. if 
an individual considers a value, subsequent value congruent behaviour increases.  
 
In a series of five experiments Maio, et al. (2009) further explored whether priming values 
influences behaviour, specifically whether priming a value increased behaviour that 
supported the value motivation whilst decreasing behaviour that supported an opposing 
value motivation. For example, in experiment number five, 112 undergraduate participants, 
were primed to either Achievement or Benevolence values utilising a sorting task 
(participants asked to sort either Achievement values or Benevolence values from items and 
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adjectives) and consequent behaviours were investigated. Participants in the Achievement 
condition showed more Achievement motivated behaviour (completing puzzles) than 
participants in the Benevolence condition. In contrast, participants in the Benevolence 
condition showed more Benevolence motivated behaviour (volunteering for another 
experiment without payment) than participants in the Achievement condition. Therefore, 
the study found that priming values increased behaviour that was relevant to the values, 
while it decreased behaviour that was relevant to opposing values. Maio, et al. (2009) 
discussed what has been referred to as ‘the see saw effect’, in that values on opposite sides of 
Schwartz (1992) model circumplex are rarely held strongly by the same person i.e. when a 
value is primed, opposing values and their associated value-congruent behaviours tend to 
be suppressed.  Other researchers have also reported that priming values increases 
behaviour relevant to the values, while decreasing behaviour relevant to opposing values 
(Bargh, et al., 2001; Karremans, 2007; Verplanken & Holland, 2002).  
 
1.3.6.3 Typical Representations of Values and Value Congruent Behaviour 
 
A number of studies have found that typical instantiations of values i.e. more widely 
recognised examples are more likely to lead to value congruent behaviour than atypical 
instantiations. Maio, et al. (2009) primed participants with a typical instantiation or an 
atypical instantiation of the value equality and reported participants primed with a typical 
instantiation were more likely to engage in value congruent behaviour i.e. allocating points 
fairly between groups, than participants primed with an atypical instantiation.  Maio, et al. 
(2009) concluded that priming typical instantiations may have led to higher levels of value 
congruent behaviour because the instantiation concept had previously been considered in 
relation to equality and therefore ‘spreading activation’ to other related concepts of 
equality may have occurred more readily. In contrast, the atypical instantiation may not be 
an instantiation concept that the participant had previously considered in relation to 
equality and therefore ‘spreading activation’ to other related concepts occurred less readily. 
As well as value accessibility being linked to typical instantiations, research has suggested 
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accessibility to be linked to centrality (Verplanken & Holland, 2002) and importance (Bardi, 
2000).   
 
The current study utilised priming methods aimed to elicit salient consideration of a value 
(Maio, et al., 2001) to activate values at the system level (Maio, 2010) in order to further 
explore the effect of priming social values on behaviour.  
 
1.3.7 Summary of Values 
 
In summary, values have been conceptualised in many ways. Schwartz (1992) offers a model 
of basic social values that defines and differentiates values, mapping value relations. 
Schwartz, et al. (2012) has revised this model, adding further value motivational dimensions. 
Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz, et al. (2012) have also developed the PVQ tool to measure 
value priorities. Research has suggested that value’s act as truisms unless activated, and 
various priming strategies have been explored (Maio, et al., 2009). Maio (2010) proposed a 
mental representation of value activation that maps on to Schwartz (1992) model of values. 
Using this model, Maio, et al. (2009) and Maio (2010) have proposed that priming social 
values impacts on behaviour, increasing value congruent behaviour.  
 
1.4 SELF-DISCREPANCY 
 
Higgins’ (1987) theory of self-discrepancy proposes a framework to support the 
understanding of different types of emotional distress experienced by people who hold 
discrepant self-guides. Within this theory there are three types of evaluations of self: actual 
self, ideal self, and ought self. There are also two perspectives on these types of self: the 
own and the other. These six self-state representations are presented in Table 1.4.  
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Table 1.4: Six self-state representations (adapted from Higgins, 1987, pp. 320-321). 
  Actual  Ideal  Ought 
Own  Self-Concept  Self-Guide Self-Guide 
Other Self-Concept  Self-Guide Self-Guide 
 
 
Higgins (1987) proposed that a person’s self-concept is composed of the actual/own and the 
actual/other, and that the other four representations are considered self-guides. These self-
guides are suggested to be internal standards that an individual is motivated to reach i.e. 
being in a position where a self-concept matches a self-guide.  Individuals may evaluate 
their self based on their perception of discrepancy between their self and self-guide. Higgins 
suggested that it was the discrepancy between these state representations would result in 
an individual experiencing distress and that the distress would differ depending on the type 
of discrepancy. Discrepancy between actual/ideal self representations were thought to 
increase emotional distress associated with low mood whilst discrepancy between 
actual/ought self representations were thought to increase emotional distress associated 
with anxiety. Higgins, et al. (1986) developed the self-discrepancy questionnaire to measure 
self-discrepancies. In this measure, individuals are asked to list up to ten qualities that they 
believe they actually have, would ideally like to have or believe they ought to have. 
Discrepancies are scored by subtracting the total number of matching qualities across the 
three lists from the mismatching qualities.  
 
Higgins (1997) Regulation Focus Theory (RFT) proposed that the motivation of an individual 
impacts on the way that they behave to pursue goals (see Table 1.5). The pursuit of a goal 
may be positive or negative, with individuals being either motivated to pursue goals through 
a promotion system focused on gains (e.g. gain of hopes, accomplishments)  or a prevention 
system focused on losses (e.g. loss of safety, security, responsibility). Higgins suggested 
these motivational orientations were not fixed and could be primed.  
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Table 1.5: Higgins (1997) motivational systems and behavioural strategies to achieve goals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Later, Higgins (1998) suggested that when an ideal self-guide motivates a promotion 
‘gain/no gain’ focus an individual may be more sensitive to positive outcomes, and when an 
ought self-guide motivates a prevention ‘loss/no loss’ focus an individual may be more 
sensitive to negative outcomes. Higgins (1999) also proposed four factors that impact on 
how discrepancy relates to emotions, these included: the magnitude of a self-discrepancy; 
the accessibility of a self-discrepancy; the applicability and relevance of a self-discrepancy in 
context; and the importance of a discrepancy to an individual. 
 
RFT lead to the development of Regulatory fit theory (Higgins, 2000) (see Table 1.6) that 
suggested that when the motivation to pursue a goal, the behaviour to pursue the goal and 
the reward matched, this resulted in an individual experiencing ‘rightness’ about the 
motivation, increasing engagement in  the behaviour.  This experience of regulatory fit is 
suggested to maintain the individuals own values. When individuals experience the 
‘rightness’ of fit, they will be satisfied about what they are doing, and the way they are 
doing it. If an individual experiences a ‘non fit’, they will not experience satisfaction and 
what they are doing and the way they are doing it will not ‘feel right’ (Higgins, 2005). 
Higgins, et al. (2001) developed the Regulatory focus questionnaire to measure these 
concepts.  
  
                                                    
Motivation  Focus 
  
Promotion Prevention 
  
Advancement  Safety 
   Approach Growth Security 
Behaviour    
"Gain" "Non loss" 
Strategy 
 
Deprivation Danger 
   Avoidance 
Stagnation Threat 
    
"No-gain" "Loss" 
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Table 1.6: Motivational systems and reward structures (adapted from Higgins, 2000, pp. 
1223-1225). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4.1 Model Validity 
 
Higgins (1987) theory of self-discrepancy has been researched and supported by several 
research studies, with many studies being conducted with populations with physical health 
(e.g. cancer, Heidrich, et al., 1994; chronic back pain, Kinderman, et al., 2011) and mental 
health diagnoses (depression, Vergara-Lopez & Roberts, 2012; social phobia, Strauman, 
1989; eating disorders, Wonderlich, et al., 2008).  
 
Research has supported the concept of self-discrepancies applied to values, reporting that 
when an individual’s values do not match the values perceived as being dominant in their 
environment, this discrepancy can result in emotional experiences of anxiety and low mood 
(Savig & Schwartz, 2000; Lonnqvist, et al., 2009). 
 
Rees and Maio (2009) investigated values and self-discrepancies in an undergraduate 
population, reporting that value with high priority were associated with ideals rather than 
ought’s, whereas the least prioritised values were associated with ought’s rather than 
ideals. The study also investigated violation of values and the impact on emotional distress. 
  
                                              
Motivation  Focus 
  
Promotion Prevention 
  
     
  Gain Regulatory 'fit' Mismatch 'non fit' 
Reward   
    
Structure   
    
  Loss 
Mismatch 'non fit' Regulatory 'fit' 
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The study reported that when participants were required to violate a highly prioritised value 
in a public and private context they reported experiencing more dejection than when 
violating a least prioritised value in the same contexts. When participants were required to 
violate a least prioritised value in a public context they reported experiencing more 
agitation than when violating a highly prioritised value in the same context. Maio (2010) 
considers this research in support of the ‘value level’ of his mental representation of values, 
and the role of prioritised and more peripheral values on discrepancy and emotional 
experiences. 
 
Parsons (2013) investigated values and self-discrepancies in a clinical population. The study 
reported that the largest value discrepancies were found in values of Hedonism, 
Stimulation, Achievement, Security, Self-Direction, and Power. The clinical population with 
experiences of mental health difficulties were reported to have larger value discrepancies in 
these values than the non-clinical population sample. The study also reported that 
actual/ought value discrepancies were found to be greater than actual/ideal value 
discrepancies when looking at the clinical groups.  The study also aimed to investigate 
whether value discrepancies were related to distinct experiences of emotional distress i.e. 
anxiety and depression. Actual/ideal value discrepancies were not specifically associated 
with depression, and actual/ought value discrepancies were not specifically associated with 
anxiety.  However, correlations were found between value discrepancies and both anxiety 
and depression.  This study appears to support the value motivational structure of Schwartz 
(1992) and Schwartz, et al. (2012) model of values and aspects of Higgins (1987) theory of 
self-discrepancy, supporting the concept of self-discrepancy but not that discrepancy 
between actual/ideal self representations increase emotional distress associated with low 
mood whilst discrepancy between actual/ought self representations increase emotional 
distress associated with anxiety. 
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1.4.2 Summary of Self-Discrepancy 
 
In summary, Higgins (1987) model of self-discrepancy has been used to understand value 
discrepancy and experiences of psychological distress (Parsons, 2013; Rees & Maio, 2009). 
This research has proposed that value-discrepancy may be associated with increased levels 
of psychological distress. 
 
1.5 VALUES IN A MENTAL HEALTH CONTEXT 
 
This section will explore the previously discussed conceptualisations of values (Maio, 2010; 
Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, et al., 2012) and value discrepancy (Higgins, 1987) applied to 
psychological distress and interventions within a mental health context. Research has 
proposed that there are links between values and psychological distress (Maio, 2010; Maio, 
et al, 2009; Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz, et al., 2012), suggesting that values and 
emotional experiences are linked more strongly than values, cognitions and behaviours 
(Maio, et al., 2009).  This section will consider how further research on empirically grounded 
conceptualisations of values and value discrepancy may further develop our understanding 
of psychological distress and inform clinical interventions.   
 
1.5.1 Value Motivations and Psychological Distress 
 
Schwartz, et al. (2012) further proposed that value priorities may motivate individuals to 
avoid anxiety promoting behaviour to attain self-protection, or values may motivate 
individuals to be ‘anxiety free’ promoting behaviour to attain self-growth. Within this 
framework, Schwartz suggests that an ongoing motivation to avoid anxiety when this 
experience is inevitable may have a negative impact on wellbeing.  Schwartz, et al. (2000) 
investigated value priorities and experiences of personal and societal anxiety. The study 
reported that value priorities positioned on the Self-Transcendence quadrant were 
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positively correlated to societal worries as individuals were more likely to be focused on 
others. Value priorities positioned on the Self-Enhancement quadrant were positively 
related to personal worries, as individuals are more likely to be focused on the self.  Value 
priorities positioned on the Openness to Change quadrant were negatively correlated to 
personal worries as individuals were less concerned about uncertain personal 
consequences. With regards to values on the Conservation quadrant, security values were 
positively correlated to personal and societal worries about safety and health, as individuals 
were concerned about these issues for the self and others. This research supported the 
value quadrants and motivational dimensions of Schwartz (1992) value model. 
 
Using Schwartz (1992) theory of values, Silfver, et al. (2008) proposed that the values 
Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition and Conformity were positively correlated to 
emotional experience of guilt and empathy, whilst the values of Power, Hedonism, 
Stimulation and Self-Direction were negatively correlated to experiences of guilt and 
empathy. The study concluded that value priorities positioned on the Self-Transcendence 
and Conservation quadrants were associated with pro-social emotional experiences, whilst 
value priorities on the Self-Enhancement and Openness to Change quadrants were not. 
Lonnqvist, et al. (2009) reported that values positioned on the Openness to Change and Self-
Enhancement quadrants were positively related to self-esteem, whilst values positioned on 
the Conservation and Self-Transcendence quadrants were negatively related to self-esteem. 
More generally, values positioned on the Self-Transcendence quadrant, concepts of 
acceptance and connection have been reported to enhance well-being whilst values 
associated with Self-Enhancement and concepts of success have been reported to have a 
negative impact on well-being (Kasser & Ahuvia, 2002; Vansteenkiste, et al., 2006).   
 
1.5.2 Value Discrepancy and Psychological Distress 
 
In the theory of self-discrepancy, Higgins (1987) suggested that it was discrepancy between 
self state representations that may result in an individual experiencing distress and that the 
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distress may differ depending on the type of discrepancy. Discrepancy between actual/ideal 
state representations were suggested to increase distress associated with low mood whilst 
discrepancy between actual/ought state representations were suggested to increase 
distress associated with anxiety. Research has investigated discrepancies in relation to 
values, supporting Higgins (1987) theory. Maio (2010) proposed that values are connected 
to emotions and the type of emotion experienced is dependent on value discrepancy i.e. 
value actual/ideal self guides versus value actual/ought self guides. Schwartz, et al. (2000) 
defined the whole experience of worry as being defined by the experience of discrepancies 
in values. In this research, worry was defined as an ‘emotionally disturbing cognition’ 
regarding whether a personal or societal focused goal in life will start, remain, or become 
increasingly discrepant from its ‘desired’ status.  It has also been suggested that when an 
individual’s values are perceived to be consistent with the dominant values in their 
environment, individuals experience positive well-being (Lonnqvist, et al., 2009; Sortheix, et 
al., 2013).  These studies appear to support Higgins (1987) value discrepancies hypothesis 
regarding the relationship between value discrepancy and distress. 
 
Higgins (2005) suggested that the experience of ‘regulatory fit’ between values and 
behaviour led to an individual experiencing satisfaction. In contrast, experiences of ‘non fit’ 
between values and behaviour were suggested to lead to an individual experiencing a lack 
of satisfaction. Research has investigated discrepancies and reported that the experience of 
value discrepancies is uncomfortable for an individual and may cause an adverse affective 
response (Rees & Maio, 2009). Specifically, when researchers provided false feedback to 
individuals regarding the presence of discrepancies between the values the individual 
thought were important to them and the values the researchers reported were important to 
the individual, individuals were reported to experience feelings of sadness or agitation (Rees 
& Maio, 2009). 
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1.5.3 Values and Psychological Therapies 
 
There are a several psychological therapies  that incorporate a conceptualisation of values in 
their understanding of psychological distress, including: Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT; Hayes, et al., 2003), Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT; Festinger, 1957; 
Beck, 1979), Narrative Therapy (White & Epston, 1990), Person Centred Therapy (Rogers, 
1951, 1961), and Positive Psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). These 
approaches all appear to be motivated to support individuals to identify values so that they 
can be utilised to reduce psychological distress and enhance wellbeing. 
 
Whilst there are several therapeutic models that utilise a concept of values to support 
people experiencing psychological distress, these models all lack a theoretical and 
empirically researched model of values. Each approach utilises differing conceptualisations 
of values, differing processes of identifying values and different ways of utilising values in 
interventions. Further research exploring empirically grounded conceptualisations of values 
and value discrepancy in relation to psychological distress may further develop an 
understanding of how values relate to psychological distress and inform the application of 
value concepts in clinical interventions.  
 
1.5.4 Summary of Values in a Mental Health Context 
 
In line with Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz, et al. (2012) proposal that values may be 
associated to psychological distress, several psychological therapies appear to identify and 
utilise concepts of values to reduce psychological distress.  Schwartz (1992), Schwartz, et al. 
(2012), and Maio (2010) conceptualisations of values as motivational orientations appear to 
be consistent with the conceptualisation of values in ACT and Positive Psychology.  Both ACT 
and Positive Psychology utilise values and ‘character strengths’ to motivate individuals to set 
behavioural goals to work towards initiating change and living life in a meaningful way 
(Hayes, 1994; Hayes, et al., 1999; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).  Person Centred 
Therapy also proposes several values that an individual may pursue in an ongoing process of 
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self-development (Rogers, 1951, 1961). Whilst narrative therapies utilise conceptions of 
values generated by the individual, values also appear to be used in this therapy to motivate 
change through alternative perspectives (White & Epston, 1990). 
 
Utilising Higgins (1987) theory of self-discrepancy, research has suggested that value 
discrepancies result in an individual experiencing psychological distress (Parsons, 2013; 
Maio & Rees, 2009). In line with this research, CBT suggests that discrepancies in thoughts, 
beliefs and values result in a person experiencing psychological distress termed as cognitive 
dissonance. Individuals are suggested to be motivated to reduce any cognitive dissonance 
and to pursue cognitive consistency (Beck, 1979). Person Centred Therapy also suggests that 
discrepancy between values, self-concepts and experiences may result in psychological 
distress and individuals are motivated to pursue an internal consistency. (Rogers, 1951, 
1961). Whilst Positive Psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) encourages the 
pursuit of value congruent behaviours. 
 
The research literature and several psychological therapies in practise appear to have 
common links in how values are being conceptualised. Despite these commonalities, there 
are discrepancies in how research and practise are conceptualising and utilising values. In 
practise, it was suggested that there was no ‘good science’ that could inform how 
practitioners could access the relative importance of values and utilise them within 
interventions (Wilson & Murrell, 2004). Consequently, it appears that understandings of 
values have developed from practise and there is a lack of joining these developments with 
empirical research.  
 
The current study will aim to utilise the existing empirical research on values to explore the 
application of a specific conceptualisation of values within a mental health context.  
Research on specific conceptualisations of values applied to psychological distress may 
further develop an understanding of how specific value conceptualisations relate to 
psychological distress and inform clinical interventions. The current study will begin to 
explore Schwartz (1992), Schwartz, et al. (2012), and Maio (2010) conceptualisation of 
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values applied to behaviour and distress in a non-clinical sample.  Specifically, the study will 
explore the effects of priming values on behaviour and distress, considering value 
discrepancies (type and size). The research outcomes will then be discussed and used to 
inform future research exploring the application of these specific value conceptualisations in 
clinical samples and practise – i.e. future research looking at the effects of priming different 
clinical samples to think about different values and identifying value discrepancies in 
therapy. 
 
1.6 PERFECTIONISM  
 
Achievement value priorities appear to share similar characteristics with conceptualisations 
of perfectionism. Achievement value priorities have been defined in terms of their central 
motivational goal of personal success through demonstrating competence according to 
social standards, emphasising success as being judged by the standards of an individual’s 
culture (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). Perfectionism has been defined as comprising a cognitive 
aspect of high standards for personal performance and a behavioural aspect of striving to 
meet these standards (Frost, et al., 1990). In addition to cognitive high standards and 
behavioural striving, Stoeber and Childs (2010) added the aspect of overly critical self-
evaluations and concerns regarding others' evaluations. It appears that existing definitions 
of Achievement value priorities and perfectionism have both been suggested to include the 
pursuit of standards and being judged as successful by others.  
 
1.6.1 Achievement Values  
 
Schwartz (1992; 1994) defines the Achievement value priorities in terms of the central 
motivational goal of personal success through demonstrating competence according to 
social standards, emphasising success as being judged by the normative standards of an 
individual’s culture.  Achievement value priorities are suggested to encompass several single 
values including being: successful, capable, ambitious and influential. These value priorities 
were also proposed to be positioned within the self enhancement quadrant of Schwartz 
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(1992) model, suggesting these value priorities are associated with the pursuit of personal 
status and success.  
 
In Schwartz, et al. (2012) Achievement value priorities were considered for revision in terms 
of whether Achievement value priorities were comprised of two separate aspects: personal 
success (mastery) and demonstrating competence (performance motivation). This 
consideration occurred due to individuals completing the SVS expressing that some items 
appeared to refer to mastery. On the SVS, three items do not indicate whether success is to 
be judged internally or externally (e.g. successful/achieving goals, ambitious/aspiring, 
capable/ competent) and one item appears to be closer to the definition of power value 
priorities (e.g. influential/having an impact on people and events). In contrast, all five 
portrait items related to Achievement on the PVQ appear to refer to an external judgment 
of success. Through the factorial analysis, Achievement did not appear to have two sub 
factors, and a reanalysis of SVS data produced one factor on which all items loaded. These 
findings reinforced the impression from the original analyses that Achievement value 
priorities can be defined as a single value priority (Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). However, 
Schwartz, et al. (2012) narrowed the definition of Achievement to the pursuit of being 
judged as successful according to social standards, dropping the concept of competence. 
 
1.6.2 Defining Perfectionism 
 
Over the past 20 years there has been an increased interest in research focused on defining 
perfectionism, the development of perfectionism scales and perfectionism’s adaptive and 
maladaptive function and impact on wellbeing (Frost, et al., 1997). The definition of 
perfectionism has developed to consider perfectionism as a multidimensional concept. 
Frost, et al. (1990) proposed perfectionism consisted of six distinct concepts: concern over 
mistakes, doubts about actions, parental criticism, parental expectations, personal 
standards, and organization. Hewitt and Flett (1991) also proposed a multidimensional 
concept of perfectionism, suggesting three distinct concepts: self-orientated perfectionism, 
other orientated perfectionism and socially prescribed perfectionism.   A self-orientated 
 
 
Page 51 of 335 
 
motivation to strive to meet high standards of success may be useful for directing an 
individual’s behaviour in such a way that they achieve their goals.  However, this motivation 
may also be problematic when the individual sets high standards of success that are 
unrealistic and less useful for directing their behaviour as they will never be able to achieve 
their goals.  An individual may also have other orientated motivations, setting high 
standards for others and there may be consequences when others do not achieve these 
goals.  Lastly, individuals may have socially prescribed motivations, perceiving that others 
expect high standards for them and that there are consequences for not achieving the 
expected goals. Perfectionism has also been suggested to have stable trait like 
characteristics (Rice & Aldea, 2006).  
 
Sedikides and Luke (2007) have suggested that the characteristic tendency to self-enhance 
and self-criticise can be either adaptive or maladaptive depending on the function of the 
tendency. Self-enhancement and self-criticism are suggested to be adaptive when they 
function symbiotically i.e. when they have a mutually beneficial relationship resulting in self-
improvement, adaptive outcomes, sense of control, self-efficacy, higher optimism, self-
esteem, or life satisfaction. Self-enhancement and self-criticism are suggested to be 
maladaptive when they function either parasitically (one undermining the other) or 
antisymbiotically (one preventing the other e.g. in perfectionism self-criticism may prevent 
self-enhancement), resulting in lower self-esteem, pessimism, and lower life satisfaction. 
 
Research has suggested that differing aspects of perfectionism differentially related to 
intrinsic–extrinsic motivation (Mills & Blankstein, 2000), however studies have been 
criticised for being ambiguous (Stoeber, et al., 2009). Stoeber, et al. (2009) re-investigated 
how perfectionism related to intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and aspects of 
multidimensional test anxiety: emotionality, interference, lack of confidence, total anxiety, 
and worry. The study reported that self-oriented perfectionism was positively related to 
intrinsic motivations, and also positively related to worry, but negatively related to 
interference and lack of confidence. Socially prescribed perfectionism was positively related 
with extrinsic motivations, and also positively related to total anxiety, interference and lack 
of confidence. The study concludes that self-oriented perfectionism may be considered to 
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be an ambivalent form of perfectionism associated with intrinsic motivation and both higher 
and lower anxiety, whereas socially prescribed perfectionism may be considered to be a 
maladaptive form of perfectionism associated with extrinsic motivation and higher anxiety. 
These studies have focused on anxiety in an academic context and there is a lack of research 
in to anxiety in a mental health context. 
 
Periasamy and Ashby (2002) investigated the relationship between perfectionism and locus 
of control. The researchers found that adaptive perfectionists and maladaptive 
perfectionists had significantly higher internal locus of control scores than non-
perfectionists and that maladaptive perfectionists had significantly higher external locus of 
control than both adaptive perfectionists and non-perfectionists. Applied to Stoeber, et al. 
(2009) study an internal locus of control may be associated with intrinsic motivations and an 
external locus of control may be associated with extrinsic motivations, suggesting 
maladaptive perfectionists may higher external locus of control and so be motivated by 
extrinsic factors. Mathew, et al. (2014) supported the notion that maladaptive perfectionists 
demonstrate overall higher levels of agency than non-perfectionists. 
 
There is an increasing body of research exploring perfectionism and interpersonal 
orientations and attachment (Ainsworth, 1973). Flett, et al. (2003) investigated 
perfectionism and unconditional self-acceptance, reporting that perfectionists evaluate 
themselves in terms of conditional sense of self-worth, and so are vulnerable to 
psychological distress if they experience conditions that do not reinforce their self-worth. 
Later, Flett, et al. (2012) explored perfectionism and feelings of not mattering to others to 
further understanding interpersonal pressures to be perfect. The study reported that 
perfectionists may be at risk of perceiving that they don’t matter to others and an 
interpersonal pressure to be perfect. Research has proposed that perfectionism is related to 
interpersonal orientations in self-presentation as perfectionists seek validation as a means 
of proving themselves, and are hypersensitive to interpersonal cues indicating failure and 
lack of acceptance from others (Flett, et al., 2014). Greenspon (2014) utilised clinical 
observations of thirty-five years in clinical practice to develop an understanding of 
perfectionism, attachment relationships, affect regulation and the meanings ascribed to 
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mistakes. Greenspon (2014) proposed that perfectionism occurs when an individual 
experiences low self-esteem and a desire to achieve perfection. An intense anxiety of 
imperfection may develop and mistakes may be perceived as evidence of personal defects 
that make an individual unacceptable. Because perfectionism develops in the context of 
conditional acceptance, Greenspon (2014) suggests that recovery from perfectionism may 
be supported by creating a context of unconditional acceptance. 
 
1.6.3 Etiological Models of Perfectionism 
 
Several researchers have proposed that perfection develops from parent-child interactions 
(Barrow & Moore, 1983; Hollender, 1965; Hamacheck, 1978; Slade & Owens, 1998). This 
research has referred to either Freud’s (1923) theory of ego development, Rogers (1951, 
1961) theory of conditions of self-worth, or Bandura’s (1986) theory of social learning. Flett, 
et al. (2002) proposed that perfectionism develops from an interaction of parental, 
temperament and environmental factors. Maloney, et al. (2014) criticised Flett, et al. (2002) 
etiological model of perfectionism for being untested and conducted a survey of the existing 
research literature to identify and collate the relevant factors that had been associated with 
the development of perfectionism. Following this process, Maloney, et al. (2014) assessed 
the identified factors using a sample of individuals seeking support for perfectionism and a 
structural equation modelling analysis was used to propose a new etiological model of 
perfectionism. The study reported a direct relationship between perfectionism, high 
Parental Expectations and Criticism. There was an indirect mediated relationship between 
perfectionism and Parental Bonding. Perfectionism and Neuroticism had both a direct 
relationship and an indirect mediated relationship. The study concluded that the process 
had produced the first etiological model of perfectionism that had been empirically tested. 
However, etiological model has not been researched with regard to its application to further 
understanding and reducing psychological distress associated with perfectionism 
psychological therapies in a mental health context. 
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Research has also started to explore the role of temperament (Kobori, et al., 1993) and 
genetics in perfectionism. Moser, et al. (2012) investigated the genetic and environmental 
factors in anxiety and perfectionism. In a sample of 292 young adult female twins’ anxiety 
and maladaptive perfectionism were both reported to be moderately genetic. Further 
multivariate analyses reported that genetic factors were primarily responsible for 
associations between anxiety and maladaptive perfectionism. This appears to be first study 
reporting to demonstrate how genetic factors relate to anxiety and perfectionism.  
 
1.6.4 Measuring Perfectionism 
 
Since the late 1970’s, several different conceptualisations of perfectionism have been 
proposed.  These differing conceptualisations have resulted in the development of several 
perfectionism measurement tools.  Stairs (2009) used the term ‘jingle jangle’ derived from 
Block (1995) to describe the issues that have arisen with the existing perfectionism 
measures, i.e. there may be instances where two constructs with the same label actually 
refer to different constructs (jingle) and instances where two constructs with two different 
labels may actually refer to the same construct (jangle).  To overcome these issues with 
existing measures, Stairs (2009) and Stairs, et al. (2012) developed the Measure of 
Constructs Underlying Perfectionism. Prior to the MCUP, at least 15 different measurement 
scales were available which reported to measure perfectionism.  In a pilot study, items from 
the existing measures of perfectionism were sorted onto the nine hypothesised underlying 
constructs of perfectionism. To examine whether items from the existing scales of 
perfectionism were reliably sorted onto the nine hypothesised constructs, intra-class 
correlations used to examine agreement between raters. Intra-class correlations for the 
nine hypothesized dimensions had a mean of .86 and   ranged from .78 (Dissatisfaction 
construct) to .95 (Order).  The items were rewritten to maximize unidimensionality and 
representativeness of the items belonging to one of the nine hypothesised construct scales. 
The resulting 86 items were used in an exploratory factor analysis. Following this, items 
which did not load highly on any construct scale, loaded highly on more than one scale, or 
detracted from the internal consistency of a scale were deleted. This resulted in a 61-item 
pool that was used in a confirmatory factor analysis. 
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The current study utilised the freely available MCUP as a measure of perfectionism due to 
its availability and its ability to differentiate constructs of perfectionism, potentially 
overcoming limitations of previous perfectionism measures. 
 
1.6.5 Perfectionism and Psychological Distress  
 
In its more negative/passive/maladaptive form, perfectionism has been associated with a 
constant pressure to meet high standards, and when these standards are perceived to not 
be met, discrepancy and psychological distress may occur and research has proposed that 
perfectionism can be associated with several mental health difficulties including depression 
(Bimanand, et al., 2013; Egan, et al., 2011; McGrath, et al., 2012), social anxiety (Al-Naggar, 
et al., 2013; Frost, et al., 2010; Levinson, et al., 2015; Mackinnon, et al., 2014), generalised 
anxiety (Egan, et al., 2011; Flett, et al., 2004; Handley, et al., 2014; Klibert, et al., 2005); 
social physique anxiety (Haase,  et al., 2002), obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (Frost & 
Steketee, 1997), body dissatisfaction (Graziano & Sikorski, 2014);  the development of 
eating disorders (Egan, et al., 2011; Fairburn, et al., 1999; Ferreira, et al., 2014; Lilenfeld, et 
al., 2006), anorexia nervosa (Lloyd, et al., 2014), and bulimia nervosa (Silgado, et al., 2010). 
 
Bieling, et al. (2004) suggest a comorbidity of perfectionism and the axis I disorders in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V, American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Kawamura, et al. (2001) further explored the relationship between 
perfectionism, depression to determine whether anxiety and depression related to 
perfectionism independently. The study reported that there appears to be an aspect of 
perfectionism that is related to anxiety independent of depression and a separate aspect of 
perfectionism that is related to depression independent of anxiety.   Rice and Aldea (2006) 
reported that perfectionist discrepancy in particular is a clear vulnerability factor for 
depression.   
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1.6.6 ‘Clinical Perfectionism’  
 
Shafran, et al. (2002) proposed a cognitive behavioural construct of ‘clinical perfectionism’. 
This construct includes a core aspect of ‘overdependence of self-evaluation on the 
determined pursuit of personally demanding, self-imposed, standards in at least one highly 
salient domain, despite adverse consequences’ (pp. 778). It is suggested that this core 
aspect is associated with three distinct characteristics: self-imposed dysfunctional 
standards; continual striving; significant adverse consequences as a result of such striving. 
Shafran, et al. (2002) also proposed that clinical perfectionism may be maintained by six 
mechanisms: failure will be reacted to with self-criticism; an absence of a positive emotional 
reaction to success; cognitive biases; the setting of strict rules and adhering to them 
stringently; avoiding challenging tasks for fear of failure; and escape from situations where 
failure may be imminent.  
 
Shafran, et al. (2003) noted that individuals rarely had a primary complaint of ‘clinical 
perfectionism’, however, often individuals presented with co-morbid diagnoses of Axis I 
disorders and clinical perfectionism. For many of these individuals, their interventions were 
often complicated by clinical perfectionism, for example, individuals diagnosed with 
anorexia nervosa pursued rigid and extreme standards for controlling their shape and 
weight, despite significant adverse consequences. In their review of the existing literature, 
Egan, et al. (2011) demonstrated increased levels of perfectionism across individuals 
diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and eating disorders. The study suggested that 
perfectionism increased vulnerability for eating disorders, and maintained obsessive–
compulsive disorder, social anxiety and depression. The study concluded the importance of 
assessment and formulation using a revised cognitive-behavioural conceptualisation of 
clinical perfectionism (see Figure 1.4) and an intervention focused on perfectionism.  More 
recently, Egan, et al. (2014) published a Cognitive Behavioural intervention for 
Perfectionism. 
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Figure 1.4: The revised cognitive-behavioural model of clinical perfectionism (Shafran, et al., 
2010, pp. 282). 
 
Research has suggested that perfectionism is related to psychological distress; both 
increasing vulnerability to and maintaining psychological difficulties. Despite Achievement 
values and perfectionism sharing conceptual similarities, research in to clinical 
perfectionism appears to not have incorporated values in to a clinical understanding of 
perfectionism. The current study aimed to further explore Achievement values, 
perfectionism and psychological distress. 
 
1.6.7 Perfectionism and Psychological Therapies  
 
Research has suggested that psychological therapies should consider perfectionism as a 
comorbid transdiagnostic process (Egan, et al., 2011; Shafran, et al., 2003) and that not 
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focusing on perfectionism early on in psychological interventions may hinder the progress of 
the intervention as individuals may set high standards for change and are excessively self-
critical (Békés, et al., in press; Blatt, et al., 1995; Egan, et al., 2011). Several psychological 
interventions have been developed  focusing on reducing perfectionism associated with 
psychological distress, including: guided and pure self-help (Pleva, & Wade, 2007; Shafran, 
et al., 2010), cognitive behavioural coaching (Kearns, et al., 2007),  cognitive-behaviour 
therapy (Glover, et al., 2007; Riley, et al., 2007), psycho-education and group cognitive-
behavioural therapy (Ashbaugh, et al., 2007; Handley, et al., 2014; Steele, et al., 2013), 
transcendental meditation (Burns, et al., 2011); web -based CBT (Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2008; 
Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012; Egan, et al., 2014; Radhu, et al., 2012) and Radically Open 
Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (R0-DBT) (Lynch, et al., 2013). 
 
There is some evidence in the literature that psychological interventions focused on 
reducing perfectionism may reduce associated anxiety, depression, eating difficulties and 
obsessive compulsive behaviours (Lloyd, et al., 2014). Despite Achievement values and 
perfectionism sharing conceptual similarities, research in to clinical perfectionism appears 
to not have incorporated values in to psychological interventions focused on perfectionism. 
The current study aimed to further explore Achievement values, perfectionism and 
psychological distress. 
 
1.6.8 Summary of Perfectionism 
 
Several researchers have suggested that there is a need for improved clarity in the 
conceptualisation of perfectionism as current conceptualisations fail to distinguish between 
perfectionism and its associated features (Shafran, et al., 2002; Shafran & Mansell, 2001; 
Tozzi, et al., 2004). Shafran, et al. (2002) suggested that the lack of clarity concerning the 
conceptualisation of perfection to date has resulted in a lack of research in to the 
application of perfectionism in psychological therapies and a mental health context. 
 
Perfectionism associated with higher levels of anxiety has been suggested to relate to 
perfectionism that is socially prescribed (Hewitt & Flett, 1991), with a higher external locus 
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of control (Periasamy & Ashby, 2002), motivated by extrinsic factors (Mills & Blanstein, 
2000).  The concept of perfectionism relating to external/extrinsic and internal/intrinsic 
motivations appears to support the notion that perfectionism may relate to the 
Achievement value priorities as defined by Schwartz, et al. (2012). In Schwartz, et al. (2012) 
revised model of values, Achievement value priorities are actually positioned in the 
personally orientated motivational dimension.  
 
The concept of perfectionism having both a positive and negative function appears to 
support the notion that perfectionism may relate to the Achievement value priorities as 
defined by Schwartz, et al. (2012). In Schwartz, et al. (2012) revised model of values, the 
value of Achievement overlap in regard to its motivational goal with regard to the 
dimension of self-growth/self-protection. Its overlapping position suggests that meeting 
standards may serve to self-protect and cope with anxiety or to promote self-growth by 
expressing ones competence and anxiety free motivations. Therefore, if perfectionism is 
motivated by Achievement value priorities, one may predict that perfectionism may serve to 
self-protect and cope with anxiety or to promote self-growth by expressing ones 
competence and anxiety free motivations. The current study conducted a review of the 
evidence regarding perfectionism and anxiety in adults. 
 
1.7. PERFECTIONISM AND ANXIETY – A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE  
 
1.7.1. The Current Systematic Literature Review 
 
A systematic literature review was conducted to further explore the relationship between 
perfectionism and Achievement value priorities. More specifically, whether perfectionism is 
accordant to Achievement value motivations that serve to self-protect and cope with 
anxiety or to promote self-growth by expressing ones competence and anxiety free 
motivations. The current systematic literature aimed to collate and critique the empirical 
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research literature base exploring the perfectionism and experiences of anxiety in an adult 
population. 
 
1.7.2. Systematic Literature Review Question 
 
What role does perfectionism have in anxiety in adults? 
 
1.7.3. Systematic Literature Review Method 
 
1.7.3.1. Search Strategy 
 
To find the relevant studies from the research literature base, several electronic databases 
were searched, these included:  PsychInfo, The Cochrane Library, PubMed, CINAHL, 
Medline, EMBASE, Web of Science, Scopus, and Science Direct.  
 
1.7.3.2. Search Terms 
 
To retrieve studies relevant to the review question, the following search terms were 
entered in to each of the above databases: 
 
Perfect* AND Anxi* 
Perfect* AND Mood 
Perfect* AND Affect 
Perfect* AND Emotion* 
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Perfect* AND Feeling 
Perfect* AND Distress* 
Perfect* AND Worry 
Perfect* AND Fear 
Perfect* AND Phobia 
Perfect* AND Mental Health 
 
1.7.3.3. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
 
To select the studies relevant to the review question, the following inclusion and exclusion 
criteria were applied: 
 
1.7.3.3.1. Inclusion Criteria 
 
 The study must be written in English. 
 The study must be published in a peer reviewed journal. 
 Participants must be adults aged over 18 years old. 
 The study must be empirical (gaining empirical evidence by means of direct and/or 
indirect observation or by experience)  
 The aims of the study must be relevant to reviewing the relationship between 
perfectionism and anxiety.*   
 The study must have been published in the last 10 years (after 2004 until 2015)   
 The study must have utilised a measure of perfectionism  
 The study must have utilised a measure of anxiety 
 The study must have utilised an experimental design 
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1.7.3.3.2. Exclusion Criteria 
 
 The study must not be based on review or opinion 
 The study must not be a book chapter, conference poster or political address 
 The study must not be a dissertation paper 
 The aims of the study must not be relevant to only reviewing the relationship 
between perfectionism and depression.* 
 
* There were two main factors that contributed to the rationale for choosing to include 
anxiety and not include depression in the review. The scope and timescale of the current 
study did not allow for the number of studies relevant to reviewing the relationship 
between perfectionism and depression to be reviewed. Reviewing anxiety also appeared 
more relevant to the current study as anxiety driven motivations are included in the revised 
cognitive model of social values proposed by Schwartz, et al. (2012). In light of these 
reasons, the current study reviewed the relationship between perfectionism and anxiety.  
 
1.7.4. Systematic Literature Review Process 
 
In total, 392 studies were identified using the initial review question, databases and search 
terms described above. These studies were then checked against the inclusion criteria, 
leaving 270 relevant studies.  
 
Next, study titles and abstracts were checked by the researcher and a sample checked by 
the research supervisor for relevance to the initial review question. This process excluded 
31 studies, leaving 239 relevant studies. These studies were limited to those published in 
the last 10 years. This excluded a further 70 studies, leaving 169 relevant studies. 
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At this point the initial review question, inclusion and exclusion criteria were amended. 
Studies that were relevant to only reviewing the relationship between perfectionism and 
depression were excluded, leaving 76 relevant studies. Posters, conference papers, and 
presidential addresses were excluded, leaving 67 studies. Next, full papers were retrieved 
and examined in more detail. Studies were checked by the researcher and a sample checked 
by the supervisor for measuring perfectionism and anxiety, this excluded 8 studies, leaving 
59 relevant studies. These were further checked by the researcher and a sample was 
checked by the supervisor for experimental design. 44 studies were excluded, with 15 
relevant studies remaining. The references of these 15 studies were reviewed for any 
further studies that met the inclusion criteria, with two studies being identified.  These final 
17 studies were eligible to be included in the systematic review.  The process of identifying 
and collating the relevant studies for the systematic review is available in Appendix 1. 
 
1.7.5. Results of the Systematic Literature Review 
 
The 17 studies identified and collated using the search methods described above were 
critiqued with key aspects of each study being reviewed, including: study focus, samples, 
methods, designs, outcomes, strengths, limitations and overall quality. The systematic 
review has been presented in a narrative format below.  A summary table of the results of 
the review is available in Appendix 2. 
 
1.7.5.1 Focus of Studies 
 
There were seven studies focused on the impact of intervention protocols relative to 
perfection and anxiety. Interventions explored included: the effects of transcendental 
meditation on experiences of stress, anxiety, depression and perfectionist thoughts (Burns, 
et al., 2011); the effect of participating in a 12-session CBT group treatment for social 
phobia on perfectionism (Ashbaugh, et al., 2007); comparing psycho-education materials 
and subsequent 8-week group CBT to a baseline waitlist in an outpatient community 
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psychiatry sample (Steele, et al., 2013); assessing a Web-based CBT for maladaptive 
perfectionism, investigating perfectionism, anxiety, depression, negative automatic 
thoughts, and perceived stress (Radhu, et al. 2012); exploring the effectiveness of a web 
based CBT intervention for perfectionism and psychological distress (Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 
2008; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012); investigating the efficacy of two formats of CBT for 
perfectionism (CBT-P), face-to-face and web based, in reducing perfectionism and 
associated psychological symptoms (Egan, et al., 2014). 
 
Four studies focused on the role of feedback relative to perfectionism and anxiety. Aldea, et 
al. (2010) aimed to explore the therapeutic benefits of providing perfectionism feedback to 
participants who scored highly on maladaptive perfectionism measures. Besser, et al. (2004) 
explored the association between trait perfectionism and cognitive and affective reactions 
in response to either positive or negative performance feedback after completing tasks that 
varied in level of difficulty. Besser, et al. (2008) also explored the association between trait 
perfectionism and cognitive and affective reactions in response to either positive or 
negative performance feedback after completing tasks that varied in level of difficulty. 
Compared to Besser, et al. (2004), Besser, et al. (2008) also had additional aims to examine 
levels of state affect, state self-esteem, state automatic thoughts, heart rate and blood 
pressure. Stoeber, et al. (2014) explored the effects of self-oriented and socially prescribed 
perfectionism on reactions to repeated negative or positive feedback, examining three 
emotions: anxiety, depression, and anger.  
 
There were two studies focused on the role of perfectionism and anxiety in a socially 
evaluated situation. Richardson, et al. (2014) aimed to explore perfectionists’ emotion 
regulation patterns and physiological reactivity in a social-evaluative stress experience. 
Laurenti, et al. (2008) explored the joint role of socially prescribed perfectionism and social 
anxiety relative to appraisal of an interpersonal situation.   
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Four studies aimed to focus on the role of perfectionism and anxiety as predictors of other 
cognitive processes and behaviours. Brown and Kocovski (2014).explored perfectionism, in 
both state and trait forms, as a predictor of post-event rumination. Cox and Chen (2014) 
explored how perfectionism contributes to social anxiety, self-perception and cognitive 
processes of post-event rumination.  Schrivjers, et al. (2010) explored the impact of 
perfectionism and anxiety traits on action monitoring in major depressive disorder. Lastly, 
Chaubaud, et al. (2010) explored the impact of perfectionism and anxiety on perception of 
procrastination behaviours. 
 
1.7.5.2 Sample  
 
The 17 studies were reviewed with regard to their sample, including: sample size, 
population type, age, gender and ethnicity. 
 
1.7.5.2.1. Sample Size 
 
The total sample sizes for the 17 studies at baseline ranged from 21 (Steele, et al., 2013) to 
200 (Besser, et al., 2004; Besser, et al., 2008). The mean sample size at baseline was 82.41. 
The total sample sizes for the 17 studies on ending ranged from 19 (Steele, et al., 2013) to 
200 (Besser, et al., 2004; Besser, et al., 2008). The mean sample size on ending a study was 
77.94. In total, nine studies retained 100% of their sample size from start to ending (Arpin-
Cribbie, et al., 2008; Ashbaugh, et al., 2007; Besser, et al., 2004; Besser, et al., 2008; 
Chabaud, et al., 2010; Cox & Chen, 2014; Laurenti, et al., 2008; Schrivers, et al., 2010; 
Stoeber, et al., 2014). Eight studies did not retain their sample sizes and this resulted in the 
differing starting and ending sample sizes. The number of people not completing a study 
ranged from 2 (Steele, et al., 2013) to 14 (Aldea, et al., 2010). The mean number of people 
not completing a study was 9.5. In total, there were five studies with more than 9.5 people 
not completing (Aldea, et al., 2010; Burns, et al., 2011; Brown & Kocovski, 2014; Egan, et al., 
2014; Radhu, et al., 2012). The sample size of the studies was examined at baseline and 
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ending because the sample size within each study will have an impact on the conclusions 
that have been drawn from the outcome data on perfectionism and anxiety. 
 
1.7.5.2.2. Population Type 
 
In total, 14 studies utilised a student sample, four utilised college student populations 
(Besser, et al., 2004; Besser, et al., 2008; Burns, et al., 2011), nine utilised undergraduate 
populations (Aldea, et al., 2010; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2008, Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012; 
Chabaud, et al., 2010; Cox & Chen, 2014; , Radhu, et al. 2012; Richardson, et al., 2014; 
Stoeber, et al, 2014), and one did not specify the type of student population utilised (Brown 
& Kocovski, 2014).  In total, four studies utilised a clinical sample; three utilised an 
outpatient sample (Ashbaugh, et al., 2007; Egan, et al., 2014;  Steele, et al., 2013), and one 
study utilised an inpatient sample (Schrijvers, et al., 2010).  
 
1.7.5.2.3. Age 
 
All 17 studies provided the age of their recruited sample. 16 studies recruited adult 
participants between the ages of 18-65 years old. One study recruited people aged between 
18 - 67 years old (Steele, et al., 2013), mean age 35.77. For all 17 studies, the mean ages 
reported ranged from 18.58 years old (Brown & Kocovski, 2014) to 39.88 years (Egan, et al., 
2014). 
 
1.7.5.2.4. Gender 
 
16 studies reported the gender of the participants in their final study sample. One study 
(Chabaud, et al., 2010) did recruit both male and female participants initially but failed to 
report the gender of the final study sample. All 16 studies reporting gender recruited both 
female and male participants. 13 studies recruited more females than males, ranging from 
 
 
Page 67 of 335 
 
78% female (Aldea, et al., 2010) to 52% female (Richardson, et al., 2014). Three studies had 
an even split of both female and male participants (Besser, et al., 2004; Besser, et al., 2008; 
Stoeber, et al., 2014). 
 
1.7.5.2.5. Ethnicity  
 
Seven studies reported the ethnicity of the participants in their final study sample (Aldea, et 
al., 2010; Ashbaugh, et al., 2007; Brown & Kocovski, 2014; Burns, et al., 2011; Laurenti, et 
al., 2008; Radhu, et al., 2012; Richardson, et al., 2014).  Of these, all seven recruited a 
majority of White or European American/Caucasian ranging from 95 % (Ashbaugh, et al., 
2007) to 34% (Radhu, et al., 2012). Ten studies did not report the ethnicity of their final 
sample (Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2008; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012; Besser, et al., 2004; Besser, et 
al., 2008;  Chabaud, et al., 2010; Cox & Chen, 2014; Egan, et al., 2014;  Schrijvers, et al., 
2010; Steele, et al., 2013; Stoeber, et al., 2014). 
 
1.7.5.3. Research Methods  
 
The 17 studies were reviewed with regard to their research methods, including: 
measurements of perfectionism and anxiety, design, manipulation variables, focus, key 
findings, strengths, and limitations. 
 
1.7.5.3.1. Perfectionism Measures 
 
All 17 studies utilised at least one measure of perfectionism. Nine studies utilised one 
measure (Aldea, et al., 2010; Ashbaugh, et al., 2007; Besser, et al., 2004; Burns, et al., 2011; 
Chabaud, et al., 2010; Laurenti, et al., 2008; Richardson, et al., 2014; Schrijvers, et al., 2010; 
Stoeber, et al., 2014), four  studies utilised two measures  (Besser, et al., 2008; Brown & 
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Kocovski, 2014; Cox & Chen, 2014; Steele, et al., 2013), two studies utilised three measures 
(Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2008; Egan, et al.,2014), and two studies utilised four measures (Arpin-
Cribbie, et al., 2012; Radhu, et al., 2012).  
 
A total of nine different measures were utilised by the studies, these included: 
 The Almost Perfect Scale-Revised (APS-R; Slaney, et al., 1996; Slaney, et al., 2001)  
 The Short version of the Almost Perfect Scale–Revised (SAPS; Rice, et al., 2014; 
Slaney, et al., 2001) 
 The Dutch version of the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS; Soenens, et al., 
2005)  
 The Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS; Frost, et al., 1990) 
o The Concern over Mistakes (CM) subscale  
o The doubt about actions (DAA) subscale  
o The Personal Standards (PS) subscale  
o Altered version of the concern over mistakes (CM) subscale (trait) (Brown & 
Kocovski, 2014).   
o Altered version of the doubts about actions (DA) subscale (trait) (Brown & 
Kocovski, 2014).   
 The Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS; Hewitt & Flett, 1991, 2004)  
o The socially prescribed perfectionism (SPP) subscale  
o The socially prescribed perfectionism (SPP) subscale (state) (Brown & 
Kocovski, 2014).   
o The self-oriented perfectionism (SOP) subscale 
 The 12-item Clinical Perfectionism Questionnaire (CPQ; Fairburn, et al., 2003)  
 The Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978). 
o The Self Criticism (SC) subscale  
 The Perfectionism Cognitions Inventory (PCI; Flett, et al., 1998)  
 Adapted version of The Perfectionism Cognitions Inventory (PCI; Flett, et al., 1998; 
Besser, et al., 2008) 
 
The use of nine different perfectionism measures across the studies limits the comparison of 
study findings. There are also several studies which utilised subscales of full measures and 
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so only sub constructs of perfectionism have been captured, potentially missing out other 
constructs. The measures utilised have also received criticism by Stairs (2009) for measuring 
different and overlapping constructs of perfectionism. 
 
1.7.5.3.2. Anxiety Measures 
 
All 17 studies utilised at least one measure of anxiety. 12 studies utilised one measure 
(Aldea, et al., 2010; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2008; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012; Besser, et al., 
2004; Besser, et al., 2008; Burns, et al., 2011; Chabaud, et al., 2010; Egan, et al., 2014; 
Laurenti, et al., 2008; Richardson, et al., 2014; Schrijvers, et al., 2010; Steele, et al., 2013; 
Stoeber, et al, 2014),  four studies utilised two measures (Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012; Brown 
& Kocovski, 2014; Cox & Chen, 2014; Radhu, et al. 2012), and one study utilised three 
measures (Ashbaugh, et al., 2007). 
 
A total of 15 different measures were utilised by the studies, these included: 
 Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis, 1993)   
o Phobic Anxiety Subscale  
 The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, et al., 1988)  
 Adapted trait version of The beck anxiety inventory (BAI; Kohn, et al., 2008) 
 The Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Reiss ,et al., 1986)  
 The Social Phobia Scale (SPS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998)  
 The Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SAIS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998)  
 The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales – 21 item version (DASS-21; Lovibond and 
Lovibond, 1995)  
 Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS) (Wople, 1969)  
 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory form Y2 (STAI; Spielberger, et al., 1983)  
 Short form of the state scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (S-STAI) 
(Spielberger, et al., 1983; Marteau & Bekker, 1992)  
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 Trait form of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, et al., 1970; Van 
der Ploeg, et al., 1980)  
 Stait Anxiety Rating (SAR; Rapee & Abbott, 2007)  
 Brief fear of negative evaluation scale–straightforward items (BFNE-S; Rodebaugh, et 
al., 2004; Weeks, et al., 2005)  
 The Sixteen Personality Factors’ Questionnaire (16PF; Cattell, Cattell, & Cattell,1993)  
o The Anxiety and Self-Control subscales  
 Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) (Albersnagel, 1988)  
 
The use of 15 different anxiety measures across the studies limits the comparison of study 
findings. There are also several studies which utilised subscales of full measures and so only 
sub constructs of anxiety have been captured, potentially missing out other constructs. 
 
1.7.5.3.3 Design 
 
In total, seven studies utilised a design to evaluate an intervention protocol. Three studies 
utilised a within design (Ashbaugh, et al., 2007; Burns, et al., 2011; Steele, et al., 2013), one 
study utilised a mixed design (Radhu, et al., 2012), and three studies utilised a mixed RCT 
design (Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2008; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012; Egan, et al., 2014). There were 
10 studies that utilised an experimental design. Seven studies utilised a mixed experimental 
design (Aldea, et al., 2010; Besser, et al., 2004; Besser, et al., 2008; Chabaud, et al., 2010; 
Richardson, et al., 2014; Schrijvers, et al., 2010; Stoeber, et al, 2014), and three studies 
utilised a within-subjects  experimental design (Brown & Kocovski, 2014; Cox & Chen, 2014; 
Laurenti, et al., 2008). 
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1.7.5.3.4 Manipulation Variables 
 
Seven studies manipulated intervention protocols: transcendental meditation (Burns, et al., 
2011), group cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) (Ashbaugh, et al., 2007), psycho-
educational materials with subsequent group CBT (Steele, et al., 2013), online CBT 
compared to no intervention (Radhu, et al., 2012), online CBT compared with general stress 
management and no intervention (Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2008; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012), 
online CBT for perfectionism (CBT-P) compared with individual face to face CBT-P and no 
intervention (Egan, et al., 2014). All interventions were investigated for efficacy in 
decreasing levels of perfectionism and psychological distress including experience of 
anxiety.   
 
There were 10 studies that manipulated exposure to experimental variables. Four studies 
involved exposure to feedback manipulations (Aldea, et al., 2010; Besser, et al., 2004; 
Besser, et al., 2008; Stoeber, et al., 2014), four studies involved exposure to impromptu 
speech tasks (Brown & Kocovski, 2014; Cox & Chen, 2014; Richardson, et al., 2014) or 
exposure to anticipation of a speech task (Laurenti, et al., 2008), one study involved 
exposure to a computer task (Schrijvers, et al., 2010) and one study exposure to an 
behavioural perception task (Chabaud, et al., 2010).  
 
1.7.5.3.4.1 Exposure to Feedback 
 
In total, four studies used exposure to feedback as a manipulation variable. Aldea, et al. 
(2010) provided verbal feedback to participant during a conversation with an interviewer.  
Interviewers informed participants of their scores on emotional reactivity and psychological 
symptom measures and offered opportunity for questions.  Stoeber, et al. (2014) asked 
participants to complete a mental rotation task, before they received repeated feedback on 
their performance (success or failure). Similarly, Besser, et al. (2004) asked participants to 
complete a computerized Choice Reaction Time (CRT) task. This attention demanding task 
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required participants to carry out the task as quickly and as accurately as possible. Task 
completion was followed by participants having either positive or negative feedback. The 
feedback received was independent of participants’ objective performance, performance 
reactions and affective reactions. Besser, et al. (2008) asked participants to complete tasks 
varying in difficulty (high versus moderate level of difficulty) before giving participants 
feedback independent of their actual level of performance (positive or negative).  
 
1.7.5.3.4.2 Exposure to and Anticipation of Speech Tasks  
 
Four studies involved exposing participants to impromptu speech tasks or anticipated 
speech tasks.  Richardson, et al. (2014) asked participants to complete the 'Trier Social 
Stress Test' (TSST; Kirschbaum, et al., 1993). The TSST required participants to imagine they 
were participating in an interview in which they were giving a five-minute presentation 
speech about themselves to get a job.  They were told they would be evaluated on personal 
characteristics, recorded and analysed by experts. The five-minute speech was completed in 
front of a small audience of three people before participants were asked to complete a five- 
minute maths task.  Brown and Kocovski (2014) also required participants to deliver a three-
minute impromptu speech, where they were asked to stand up and introduce themselves in 
front of the researcher.  Cox and Chen (2014) required participants to deliver a three-
minute impromptu speech about a chosen topic to a video camera (for example e.g. my 
favourite book, my first pet, or university life). The participants were told that the video of 
their speech would be evaluated by an audience after the session.   
 
Laurenti, et al. (2008) exposed participants to anticipatory anxiety by asking them to 
prepare to be introduced and to have a conversation with a stranger of the other sex. After 
completing all of the studies measures, the participant was informed that the interaction 
would not occur. 
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1.7.5.3.4.3 Exposure to a Computer Task 
 
Schrijvers, et al. (2010) asked participants to complete a computer task, pressing a button 
with either their left or their right index on a central letter (H or S) in a congruent (SSSSS or 
HHHHH) or incongruent (SSHSS or HHSHH) letter string. In the task instructions, equal 
emphasis was placed on speed and accuracy and the stimulus–response mappings were 
counterbalanced.  
 
1.7.5.3.4.4 Exposure to Behaviour Task 
 
Chabaud, et al. (2010) exposed participants to a behavioural task. Participants were 
required to place several hypothetical procrastination scenarios in to a hierarchy depending 
on which would interfere least to most with achieving a proposed goal. 
 
1.7.5.4. Key Findings 
 
The 17 studies focused on several key areas of perfectionism and anxiety, including 
discrepancy, intervention, biological responses, the effects of feedback, moderators, 
rumination and procrastination.  
 
Laurenti, et al. (2008) reported that Socially Prescribed Perfectionism (SPP) and social 
anxiety were both related to larger discrepancy scores, with SPP moderating the 
relationship between social anxiety and discrepancy. Lower levels of social anxiety were 
associated with negative discrepancy scores i.e. others standards were rated lower than an 
individual’s own efficacy, regardless of SPP and so individuals thought they could match or 
exceed others expectations. In contrast, higher levels of social anxiety were associated with 
positive discrepancy scores i.e. others standards were rated higher than an individual’s own 
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self efficacy, increasing with SPP and so individuals thought they could not meet the 
expectations of others. Later, Aldea, et al. (2010) reported that individuals scoring highly on 
maladaptive perfectionism reported higher discrepancy and distress scores. Findings 
indicated that it was not how high individuals standards were but how much they believed 
they were failing to meet these standards that contributed to experiences of distress.  
 
The efficacy of interventions for perfectionism and anxiety have been explored: CBT 
interventions have been associated with improvements in levels of self-reported 
perfectionism and anxiety (Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2008; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012; Ashbaugh, 
et al., 2007; Egan, et al., 2014; Steele, et al., 2013) and changes were maintained at a three 
month (Steele, et al., 2013) and six month follow up (Egan, et al., 2014) . In all studies 
changes in perfectionism were associated with changes in anxiety.  Radhu, et al. (2012) also 
found that a CBT intervention reduced anxiety and perfectionism scores in maladaptive 
perfectionists, however, waitlist group also reduced perfectionism scores.  Aldea, et al. 
(2010) suggested that maladaptive perfectionists who received feedback about their 
perfectionism as an intervention were less distressed two weeks later than those who had 
not received feedback.  Burns, et al. (2011) investigated a meditation based intervention, 
finding that this intervention may reduce trait anxiety but not perfectionism. 
 
 
Biological responses to perfectionism and anxiety have been explored. Schrijvers, et al. 
(2010) suggested that increased perfectionist doubts about responses were associated with 
larger amplitudes than those who were less doubtful, however trait anxiety was not 
associated with amplitudes as expected – this was explained to be due to the measure not 
being valid tool to measure anxiety. Richardson, et al. (2014) reported that maladaptive 
perfectionism was associated with lower cortical response to multiple stress events that 
elicit anxiety, as self-criticism takes its toll on physiological reactivity to multiple stress 
events.   
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The impact of exposure to single and repeated failure on perfectionism and anxiety has 
been explored by several researchers. Stoeber, et al. (2014) reported that SPP associated 
with anxiety following single failure, however, Self-Orientated Perfectionism (SOP) predicted 
increased anxiety following multiple failures. The study concluded that SOP was associated 
with individuals being highly self-critical and that repeat failure may be perceived as a threat 
and so increase anxiety. Besser, et al. (2004) also found that SPP was associated with pre 
and post task anxiety, whilst SOP was associated with increased post task anxiety, regardless 
of feedback type (positive or negative), task difficulty (easy or hard) and actual 
performance.   
 
 
Besser, et al. (2008) found that PCI and trait perfectionism were both associated with 
increased anxiety. Specifically, higher levels of SPP were associated with increased anxiety in 
individuals with lower confidence who received positive feedback and in individuals who 
had higher confidence but who received negative feedback. Whilst higher levels of SOP 
were associated with increased post task anxiety in individuals who had low performance 
level and low confidence, and lower levels of SOP were associated with post task anxiety in 
individuals who had high performance level and low confidence. The study concluded that 
confidence moderates the relationship between perfectionism and anxiety. 
 
 
Several researchers have also looked the role of perfectionism and anxiety as impediments 
to self-development or learning through the processes of rumination and procrastination. 
Cox and Chen (2014) reported that SPP and DA perfectionism subscales directly influenced 
anxiety and indirectly influenced rumination and self-perception through anxiety. Brown 
and Kocovski (2014) also found that higher levels of social and state anxiety were related to 
post event rumination and that trait and state perfectionism predicted post event 
rumination two days after a speech.  The study suggested that if a socially anxious individual 
was concerned about having made mistakes during a social event then the individual was 
more likely to dwell on the event at a later time, in contrast to an individual who did not 
think others were expecting perfection and so did not dwell. The study concluded that 
perfectionism may influence social anxiety and lead to increased post event rumination. 
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Investigating procrastination, Chabaud, et al. (2010) found that individuals who scored more 
highly on trait anxiety and perfectionism measures identified three groups of behaviour: 
non procrastinator, procrastination and self-handicapping, compared to individuals who 
scored lowly on measures  identifying and two groups of behaviour: non procrastination and 
combined self-handicap and procrastination. Individuals scoring more highly on maladaptive 
perfectionism measures considered perfectionism behaviours to be more self-handicapping. 
The study concluded that maladaptive aspects of perfectionism were associated with 
increased procrastination.  
 
1.7.5.5. Quality Review 
 
All 17 studies were reviewed with regard to their quality using the Specialist Unit for Review 
Evidence (SURE) 2013 framework (see Appendix 3). This is a framework adapted and 
updated from the former Health Evidence Bulletins Wales (HEBW) checklist with reference 
to previous versions of the Critical Appraisals Skills Programme (CASP) and the NICE Public 
Health Methods Manual. Several review frameworks were considered by the researcher and 
research supervisor before the SURE framework was chosen due to its capacity to review 
qualitative studies with experimental designs, including intervention based designs, and its 
free availability via Cardiff University. 
 
The SURE framework consists of 14 questions; one question has four reviewed aspects and 
13 questions have one reviewed aspect, totalling 17 aspects. The questions review both 
design and reporting aspects of each study. Each study was reviewed with regard to 
whether it could be judged to meet each of the 17 aspects; if an aspect was judged to be 
met it was marked ‘yes’, if it was unclear that an aspect was met it was marked ‘can’t tell’, 
or if the aspect was not met it was marked with a ‘no’. Each study was then scored based on 
all 17 aspects; aspects that had been met were allocated a score of 2 points, aspects that 
were unclear were allocated a score of 1 point, and aspects that were not met were 
allocated a score of zero points. The maximum score one study could be allocated was 34 
(17x2). This score was regarded as the studies quality score rating. A sample of the studies 
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was also reviewed by the supervisor for reliability regarding scoring. The quality review has 
been presented in a narrative format below.  A summary table of the quality review is 
available in Appendix 4. 
 
The median quality score of all 17 studies was 22, with a mean score of 21.71, ranging from 
16 (Burns, et al., 2011) to 27 (Egan, et al., 2014). The nine studies scoring above the median 
appear to have several features in common – the majority had comparison or control 
groups, despite some randomisation the majority lacked description of the randomisation 
methods. The eight studies scoring below the median appear to also  have several features 
in common –the majority lack of control or comparison groups, lack of randomised group 
allocation due to single group within subjects designs, despite transparency of sample 
demographics they lacked a  comparison group. All 17 studies appeared to have features in 
common – they all lacked published trial protocols, the majority had small sample sizes, a 
lack of reported effect sizes and a lack of reported confidence intervals within data analysis.  
 
1.7.5.6. Strengths 
 
In total, 11 of the 17 studies explicitly reported strengths including aspects of the measures, 
designs, manipulation variables, and data analysis utilised.  All 17 studies outlined their 
contribution to the existing literature base. These strengths are considered below, using the 
current studies quality review of each study. 
 
1.7.5.6.1 Measures 
 
Brown and Kocovski (2014).reported that a strength of their study included the attempted 
measurement of both state and trait perfectionism. These measures enabled a participant’s 
typical (trait) perfectionism scores to be analysed with their temporarily changed (state) 
perfectionism scores, exploring a novel aspect of perfectionism. The quality review 
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identified that all studies appeared to utilise appropriate measures of anxiety and 
perfectionism.  
 
1.7.5.6.2 Design 
 
Eight studies fully reported their ethical approval process, suggesting these studies had 
followed approved ethical designs. Strengths identified with regard to the designs utilised in 
the studies included 11 studies reporting having utilised a control group, with eight of these 
studies reported utilising randomisation to allocate participants to group conditions. Two 
studies also reported utilising follow ups at three and six months (Steele, et al., 2013; Egan, 
et al., 2014, respectively).  One study also reported using a mixed clinical sample design 
(Egan, et al., 2014). These designs were considered to have increased internal validity and 
the reliability of the interpretations of causal influences suggested within the study findings. 
 
1.7.5.6.3 Manipulation Variables 
 
Several manipulation variables were identified as strengths, including having a task that 
examined a range of reactions to explicit manipulations of positive vs. negative task 
feedback (Besser, et al., 2004), checking feedback manipulations for effectiveness (Besser, 
et al., 2004), assessing not only cognitive and affective reactions, but also state changes in 
self-esteem and physiological responses (heart rate and blood pressure) (Besser, et al., 
2008) and exploring the impact of tasks that expose a person to repeated failure or 
repeated success (Stoeber, et al., 2014). Steele identified exploring the efficacy of a group 
intervention to be a strength.  
 
In the quality review, 15 studies were identified as having clearly outlined their 
manipulation variables that appeared appropriate, whilst two were considered to have 
unclear aspects and one was regarding to not have outlined the variables. Clarity regarding 
 
 
Page 79 of 335 
 
manipulation variables was considered to increase transparency of the study and reliability 
of the interpretations of causal influences suggested within the study findings. 
 
1.7.5.6.4 Data Analysis and Results 
 
Arpin-Cribbie, et al. (2008) identified structural modelling as a data analysis method that has 
enabled evaluation of whether the level of therapeutic intervention provided to participants 
was predictive of the amount of improvement in perfectionism and psychological distress, 
as well as whether the amount of improvement in perfectionism was related to the amount 
of improvement in psychological distress. Egan, et al. (2014) reported to be the first RCT 
with the statistical power to compare face to face, online, and a no intervention control 
group.  
 
All 17 studies reported their data analysis methodology, with seven studies providing 
increased levels of detail regarding data analysis, confidence limits and effects sizes. 16 
studies also reported clear results, indicating any conflicts of interests that may have 
impacted on results and conclusions. 
 
1.7.5.7 Limitations 
 
There were 16 studies that explicitly reported limitations including aspects of the measures, 
designs, manipulation variables, and data analysis utilised. Besser, et al. (2008) did not 
explicitly report limitations; however, they did report recommendations that future 
research could take forward. These limitations will be used to further discuss limitations 
using the current studies quality review of each study. 
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1.7.5.7.1 Measures 
 
Studies reported several limitations with regard to the measures used in the studies, these 
focused on the utilised measures’ process of completion, content, and validity. The absence 
or lacking of relevant measures was also reported. Process of completion limitations 
included:  the use of self-report measures with a lack of objectivity (Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 
2008; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012; Cox & Chen, 2014; Radhu, et al., 2012; Schrijvers, et al., 
2010); the possible impact of desirability effects on how samples may have completed 
measures (Besser, et al., 2004; Radhu, et al., 2012); and some measures did not require 
participants to complete them with a specified time frame in mind and so the measured 
aspect may not reflect the level of the aspect during the actual study time frame (Ashbaugh, 
et al., 2007). Content limitations included: measuring limited aspects of perfectionism (Cox 
& Chen, 2014; Besser, et al., 2004; Stoeber, et al., 2014) or anxiety (Cox & Chen, 2014; 
Schrijvers, et al., 2010). Brown and Kocovski (2014) reported a lack of a well validated 
assessment tool for state perfectionism. Relevant measures noted to be absent or lacking 
included: direct measures for therapist and participant interactions (Aldea, et al., 2010); 
measures for how samples and therapists utilised study materials and adhered to protocols 
(e.g. frequency, duration, use of specific aspects) due to limited assessment of protocol 
adherence (Radhu, et al., 2012) or questionable adherence measure validity (Arpin-Cribbie, 
et al., 2008; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012; Egan, et al., 2014); and measures for perceived 
meaningfulness of the experimental situation (Besser, et al., 2004).  
 
Studies reported several recommendations for improving measures in future research, 
these focused on increased use of already utilised measures, use of additional measures 
that capture different aspects of perfectionism, anxiety or other experiences, and use of 
additional objective measures.  Increased use of utilised measures included: to have 
baseline measures prior to any manipulation (Stoeber, et al., 2014); multiple data collection 
points to measure the process of change (Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012; Besser, et al., 2008; 
Cox & Chen, 2014).  Additional measures included: to measure other forms and dimensions 
of perfectionism (Stoeber, et al., 2014); to measure the quality of the relationship between 
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experimenter/ therapist and participant (Aldea, et al., 2010; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012); to 
measure maladaptive appraisal processes elicited by a social situation separate to anxiety or 
perfectionism (Laurenti, et al., 2008); to measure credibility and effectiveness of feedback 
(Stoeber, et al., 2014); to measure other emotional experiences (Schrijvers, et al., 2010); 
and to measure and compare different perceptions of target ‘others’ e.g. persons of 
authority (Laurenti, et al., 2008) . Additional objective measures included: to have additional 
objective measures e.g. clinician rated measures (Cox & Chen, 2014; Schrijvers, et al., 2010); 
to have multiple measures of  physiological responses e.g. measuring blood pressure, to 
allow for further distinctions in physiological mechanisms (Richardson, et al., 2014), to have 
continuous measures of  physiological responses e.g. heart-rate and blood pressure (Besser, 
et al., 2008); more refined monitoring technology (Besser, et al., 2008); and to measure 
physiological responses in naturalistic contexts e.g. measuring ambulatory blood pressure 
(Besser, et al., 2008).  
 
In total, nine different perfectionism measures and fourteen different anxiety measures 
were utilised by the studies. This limits the comparison of findings between the studies as 
each may be considered to be measuring different constructs of anxiety and perfectionism. 
 
1.7.5.7.2 Design 
 
Studies reported several limitations with regard to the designs used in the studies, these 
focused on: recruitment; samples; control/comparison groups; allocation to groups; use of 
waiting list controls; and follow up. Recruitment limitations included a lack of random 
sample recruitment with samples often being selected based on baseline measures 
(Richardson, et al., 2014) and a lack of neutral control groups as selected participants often 
self-reported high levels of perfectionism and this level was expected to improve, resulting 
in possible expectation effects (Radhu, et al., 2012). Sample limitations included: small 
sample sizes (Aldea, et al., 2010; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2008; Burns, et al., 2011; Chabaud, et 
al., 2010;  Cox & Chen, 2014; Radhu, et al., 2012; Richardson, et al., 2014); female 
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dominated samples (Aldea, et al., 2010); student dominated samples (Aldea, et al., 2010; 
Richardson, et al., 2014); samples being recruited from single locations e.g. one university 
(Aldea, et al., 2010); whole samples having high levels of perfectionism (Steele, et al., 2013). 
Such limitations were discussed as resulting in restricted exploration of sub group variation 
(Richardson, et al., 2014), a limited ability to generalise findings to ‘pure’ clinical sample 
(Egan, et al., 2014; Steele, et al., 2013) or to wider populations beyond the samples used 
(Aldea, et al., 2010).  Control/comparison group limitations included a lack of control and/or 
comparison groups (Ashbaugh, et al., 2007; Brown & Kocovski, 2014; Burns, et al., 2011; 
Laurenti, et al., 2008; Steele, et al., 2013). Allocation to group limitations included a lack of 
randomisation or limited randomisation details (Ashbaugh, et al., 2007; Burns, et al., 2011). 
Use of waiting list control limitations included: participants being aware that they were 
waiting for a future intervention and expectations for the future intervention possibly 
having an impact on change process and findings (Egan, et al., 2014); and a lack of a control 
group at follow up due to participants having left the waiting list to commence intervention 
(Egan, et al., 2014).  Follow up limitations included:  a lack of follow up opportunity 
(Ashbaugh, et al., 2007, Burns, et al., 2011); and follow up periods being too short (Arpin-
Cribbie, et al., 2012; Egan, et al., 2014). 
 
Six studies did not utilise a control group. In total nine studies did not report randomising 
participants to group conditions, and six of those that did failed to clearly define the 
randomisation methods used. 16 of the studies did not report clear concealment and all 17 
failed to report any blinding of allocation to groups. 
 
1.7.5.7.3 Manipulation Variables 
 
Studies reported several limitations with regard to the manipulation variables used in the 
studies, these focused on: the treatment of groups; anticipated tasks; therapist variables; 
and accumulative effects. Group treatment limitations reported included: variance between 
groups in addition to the intended manipulation e.g. one group being exposed to time with 
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a therapist in addition to intended manipulation i.e. receiving feedback - the variance in 
time spent with a therapist between control and experimental groups may have a possible 
impact on the construct validity of the study (Aldea, et al., 2010).  Anticipated task 
limitations included the use of anticipated conversation rather than actual conversation 
resulting in a limited ability to generalise findings to non-anticipated events (Laurenti, et al., 
2008) and to a more naturalistic setting (Besser, et al., 2004). Therapist variable limitations 
included: the use of peer, student, and different therapists due to differences in age, 
experience and competence (Egan, et al., 2014). Accumulative effect limitations included: 
the possible impact of information being offered before an intervention as the information 
alone may have increased participants’ readiness to partake in intervention and may have 
had an effect on intervention outcomes (Steele, et al., 2013); the impact of stress 
management being offered in combination with CBT as the stress management aspect may 
have effected participants use of the CBT and so may have had an effect on intervention 
outcomes  (Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2008; Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012).  
 
Studies reported several recommendations for improving the manipulation variables of 
future research, these focused on:  treatment of groups; additional manipulation variables; 
therapists; exploration of accumulative effects; and comparison of manipulations. 
Improvement to treatment of groups included having an ‘active’ control group whereby 
participants in the non-experimental group participate in a neutral intervention e.g. talk 
about their weekend with a therapist or orally answer stimulus questions (Aldea, et al., 
2010). Additional manipulation variables included:  the experimental manipulation of 
perfectionism (Brown & Kocovski, 2014); and exploration of time management tasks – 
structure of time management may be more complex and multifaceted than initially 
expected (Chabaud, et al., 2010).  Studies recommended future research utilised 
professional therapists (Aldea, et al., 2010). Exploration of accumulative effects suggested 
by examining the effectiveness of a CBT intervention when this type of intervention is the 
sole intervention and is not combined with a stress management component (Arpin-Cribbie, 
et al., 2008). Recommendation for comparisons included: speech versus social interaction 
tasks (Brown & Kocovski, 2014; Cox & Chen, 2014); web versus face to face intervention 
(Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2012), individual versus group intervention (Burns, et al., 2011), 
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different therapy models (Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2008), and different therapy session 
frequencies and durations (Arpin-Cribbie, et al., 2008; Burns, et al., 2011). 
 
1.7.5.7.4 Data 
 
There were 14 studies that appeared to have appropriate sample sizes from which to collect 
data, however they did not clearly state any power calculations to determine sample size 
efficiency. The remaining three studies did not appear to have appropriate sample sizes.  
 
Studies reported limitations with regard to the data collected in the studies, these focused 
on the high participant dropout rates (Brown & Kocovski, 2014; Radhu, et al., 2012) and lack 
of intention to treat analysis (Ashbaugh, et al., 2007).  In total, there were eight studies 
were participants were considered to not be clearly accounted for either by a high dropout 
rate, lack of intension to treat analysis or lack of follow up. 
 
1.8 THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
1.8.1 Rationale for the Current Study 
 
The current study aimed to explore the relationship between social values and perfectionist 
behaviour, considering value discrepancy and self-reported anxiety and depression. The 
study had an analogue design that utilised a ‘non-clinical’ population in controlled 
conditions and was intended to explore the potential efficacy of a theory and model of 
social values and value discrepancy applied to perfectionism in a mental health context. 
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Influenced by Rokeach (1973) and Kluckhohn (1951), Schwartz (1992) defined social values 
as desirable, transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in 
people’s lives. The concept of values has been investigated in many areas of social 
psychology (Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996; Rohan & Zanna, 1997; Steele & Liu, 1988; Tanner, et 
al., 2008). Values are also considered to be relevant to many different psychological 
theories, including the theory of clinical depression (Beck, 1979) and theory of emotion 
(Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992).  Whilst values have been greatly researched in the social 
psychology arena, there is a comparative lack of research of values applied to a mental 
health context. Despite this lack of research, concepts of values have become integrated in 
to several psychological therapies, including Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; 
Hayes, et al., 2008), Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT; Beck, 1979), Narrative Therapy 
(White & Epston, 1990), Positive Psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), and 
Person Centred Therapy (Rogers, 1951, 1961).  
 
The research literature and psychological therapies do appear to have common links in how 
values are conceptualised. Despite these commonalities, there are discrepancies in how 
research and practise are conceptualising and utilising values. In practise, the 
conceptualisation and utilisation of values appears to have developed from practise based 
research and there is a lack of empirical research in values and their application to 
psychological therapies (Wilson & Murrell, 2004). The current study will aim to utilise the 
existing empirical research on values to explore the application of values to psychological 
therapies and a mental health context. 
 
Schwartz (1992) proposed a basic model of social values that offers an understanding of 
value priorities and motivational relations. The model offers a framework on which research 
may form and test predications about values and behaviour such as predicting the effects of 
value compatibility and conflict, value discrepancy, value motivated behaviour and impacts 
on emotional distress.  The model has also been used in empirical research with diverse 
cross cultural samples and so was considered to have a cross cultural and construct validity 
(Bardi & Goodwin, 2011; Blisky, et al., 2011; Cieciuch & Schwartz, 2012; Davidov, et al., 
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2008; Maio, et al., 2009; Peng, et al., 1997; Schwartz, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2006; Schwartz, et 
al., 2001; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Vecchione, et al., 2009). Therefore, Schwartz (1992) 
was considered to have potential use in exploring values, behaviours related to 
psychological distress in a mental health context. The current study utilised Schwartz (1992) 
model of basic values due to the models ability to define, differentiate and understand how 
values relate to one another and impact on behavioural motivations. The original 1992 
model was chosen due to the current lack of empirical research on Schwartz, et al. (2012) 
revised model. However, the revised model was considered with regard to how values 
relate to social and personal motivations and self-expansion/anxiety free and self-
protection/anxiety avoidance motivations.  
 
Maio (2010) proposed mental representation of values is compatible with Schwartz (1992) 
model and offers further understanding of values, emotions and behaviour.  This model 
offers a framework on which research may form and test predictions about priming values 
to influence behaviour, specifically whether priming a value increases a behaviour that 
supports the value motivation whilst decreasing behaviour that support an opposing value 
motivation. The model has been in empirical research and was considered to have construct 
validity (Bargh, et al., 2001; Verplanken & Holland, 2002; Karremans, 2007). The priming 
methodology utilised by Maio, et al. (2009) and Maio (2010) to activate values was 
considered to potentially be a useful methodology to explore values, behaviour, and 
psychological distress in a mental health context.  
 
Higgins (1987) proposed a theory of self-discrepancy that offers an understanding of how 
self-discrepancies may impact on psychological wellbeing. This may be a useful theory to 
consider exploring value discrepancy in relation to emotional distress. Higgins (1987) theory 
of self-discrepancy has been utilised in empirical research in both physical (Heidrich, et al., 
1994; Cantor, et al., 2005; Kinderman et al., 2011) and mental health populations (Alatig et 
al., 2010; Ferrier & Brewin, 2005; Strauman, 1989; Van den Broeck, et al., 2012; Vergara-
Lopez & Roberts, 2012; Wonderlich, et al., 2008). More recently, this model has been 
applied to value discrepancies (Parsons, 2013; Rees & Maio, 2009). The application of 
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Higgins (1987) theory to value discrepancies was considered to have potential use in 
exploring values and behaviours related to psychological distress in a mental health context. 
 
The current study will utilise existing research on social values, the process of priming social 
values, and self-discrepancy to explore how social values relate to behaviour change, 
considering the role of value discrepancy and psychological distress. The study will 
specifically focus on Achievement value priorities that may be associated with the 
presentation of perfectionism. Perfectionism has been suggested to relate to Achievement 
values, discrepancy and the experience of psychological distress. However, the effect of 
priming social values on perfectionism, considering the role of value discrepancy and 
psychological distress has not been researched.   The current study had several hypotheses; 
each hypothesis is outlined in the following section. 
 
1.8.2. Hypotheses  
 
The current study had four main hypotheses that aimed to explore the effect of priming 
social values on behaviour associated with perfectionism, whilst considering value 
discrepancy and distress.  
 
Hypothesis 1 focused on perfectionism, social value priorities, behaviour associated with 
perfectionism and distress. The aim of this hypothesis was to review the use of the MCUP in 
measuring perfectionism in relation to the PVQ, behavioural measures and HADS. 
 
Hypothesis 1a - It is predicted that participants who score higher on the 
perfectionism measure will give higher ranking to the values within the Self-
Enhancement quadrant of Schwartz (1992, Schwartz, et al., 2012) circular model. 
Additionally, the value of Achievement will have a higher relative rank with this 
quadrant.  
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Hypothesis 1b – Participants scoring higher on the perfectionism measure will be 
more likely to display the behaviours related to perfectionism than those who score 
lower on the measure. 
 
Hypothesis 1c– Participants scoring higher on the perfectionism measure will be 
more likely to self-report experiences of anxiety and depression on the HADS. 
 
Hypothesis 2 focused on the effects of priming social values on behaviour. The aim of this 
hypothesis was to explore the effect of priming Achievement value priorities on behaviour 
associated with perfectionism.  
 
Hypothesis 2a– Participants who are primed with the Achievement value within the 
Self-Enhancement quadrant of Schwartz (1992) circular model will demonstrate 
increased behaviour associated with perfectionism compared to those who primed 
on opposing value of Benevolence within the opposite Self-Transcendence quadrant 
on the circular model.   
 
Hypothesis 2b – It is predicted that those participants who score higher on the 
perfectionism measure and who value Achievement within the Self-Enhancement 
quadrant, will show the largest increase in behaviour when Self-Enhancement values 
are primed.   
 
Hypothesis 3 focused on value discrepancy and social value priorities. The aim of this 
hypothesis was to explore the amount and type of value discrepancies in Achievement and 
benevolent value priorities. 
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Hypothesis 3a – It is predicted that those participants who give higher ranking to 
values within the Self-Enhancement quadrant of Schwartz (1992) circular model will 
have larger actual/ideal discrepancy between values rather than actual-ought 
discrepancy between values.  
 
Hypothesis 3b – Furthermore, those participants who give higher ranking to values 
within the Self-Transcendence quadrant will have larger actual/ought discrepancy 
between values rather than actual-ideal discrepancy between values. 
 
Hypothesis 4 focused on value discrepancy and emotional distress, specifically, anxiety and 
depression. The aim of the last hypothesis was to explore amount and type of value 
discrepancies relating to self-reported anxiety, depression and perfectionism. 
 
Hypothesis 4a –As per Higgins’ (1987) theory, it is predicted larger discrepancy in 
values will relate to higher scores for anxiety and depression.  
 
Hypothesis 4b –Furthermore, the type of value discrepancy will relate to the type of 
emotional distress reported. Based on Higgins (1987) theory, it is predicted that those 
participants who have larger actual/ideal discrepancy between values will report 
lower mood and those participants who have larger actual/ought discrepancy 
between values will report higher anxiety.  
 
Hypothesis 4c – Those who score more highly in helpful perfectionism will differ to 
those who score more lowly in helpful perfectionism – with higher scores in helpful 
perfectionism relating to smaller discrepancy. Whilst those scoring more highly in 
unhelpful perfectionism will differ to those who score more lowly in unhelpful 
perfectionism – with higher scores in unhelpful perfectionism relating to larger 
discrepancy. 
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Hypothesis 4d – Those who score more highly in unhelpful perfectionism will differ to 
those who score more lowly in unhelpful perfectionism – with higher scores in  
unhelpful perfectionism relating to larger actual/ought discrepancies and anxiety. 
 
1.9 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 1 
 
In summary, values have been conceptualised in many ways. Schwartz (1992) offers a model 
of basic social values that defines and differentiates values, mapping value relations. 
Schwartz, et al. (2012) has revised this model, adding further value motivational dimensions. 
Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz, et al. (2012) have also developed the PVQ tool to measure 
value priorities. Research has suggested that value’s act as truisms unless activated, and 
various priming strategies have been explored (Maio, et al., 2009). Maio (2010) proposed a 
mental representation of value activation that maps on to Schwartz (1992) model of values. 
Using this model, Maio, et al. (2009) and Maio (2010) have proposed that priming social 
values impacts on behaviour, increasing value congruent behaviour.  
 
Higgins (1987) model of self-discrepancy has been used to understand value discrepancy 
and experiences of psychological distress (Parsons, 2013; Rees & Maio, 2009). This research 
has proposed that value discrepancy may be associated with increased levels of 
psychological distress. This appears to be in line with Schwartz (1992), Schwartz, et al. 
(2012), and Maio (2010) proposals that values may be associated to psychological distress. 
 
Several psychological therapies appear to identify and utilise concepts of values to reduce 
psychological distress.  Schwartz’s (1992), Schwartz, et al. (2012), and Maio (2010) 
conceptualisations of values as motivational orientations appear to be consistent with the 
conceptualisation of values in ACT and Positive Psychology.  Both ACT and Positive 
Psychology utilise values and ‘character strengths’ to motivate individuals to set behavioural 
goals to work towards initiating change and living life in a meaningful way (Hayes, 1994; 
Hayes, et al., 1999; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).  Person Centred Therapy also 
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proposes several values that an individual may pursue in an ongoing process of self-
development (Rogers, 1951, 1961). Whilst narrative therapies utilise conceptions of values 
generated by the individual, values also appear to be used in this therapy to motivate 
change through alternative perspectives (White & Epston, 1990). 
 
Utilising Higgins (1987) theory of self-discrepancy, research has suggested that value 
discrepancies result in an individual experiencing psychological distress (Parsons, 2013; 
Maio & Rees, 2009). In line with this research, CBT suggests that discrepancies in thoughts, 
beliefs and values result in a person experiencing psychological distress termed as cognitive 
dissonance. Individuals are suggested to be motivated to reduce any cognitive dissonance 
and to pursue cognitive consistency (Beck, 1979). Person Centred Therapy also suggests that 
discrepancy between values, self-concepts and experiences may result in psychological 
distress and individuals are motivated to pursue an internal consistency. (Rogers, 1951, 
1961). Whilst Positive Psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi,  2000) encourages the 
pursuit of value congruent behaviours. 
 
The research literature and several psychological approaches in practise appear to have 
common links in how values are being conceptualised. Despite these commonalities, there 
are discrepancies in how research and practise are conceptualising and utilising values. In 
practise, it was suggested that there was no ‘good science’ that could inform how 
practitioners could access the relative importance of values and utilise them within 
interventions (Wilson & Murrell, 2004). Consequently, it appears that an understanding of 
values has developed from practise based research and there is a lack of empirical research 
on values and their application within mental health context. The current study will aim to 
utilise the existing empirical research on values to explore their application within a mental 
health context. 
 
Perfectionism associated with higher levels of anxiety has been suggested to relate to 
perfectionism that is socially prescribed (Hewitt & Flett, 1991), with a higher external locus 
of control (Periasamy & Ashby, 2002), motivated by extrinsic factors (Mills & Blanstein, 
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2000).  The concept of perfectionism relating to external/extrinsic and internal/intrinsic 
motivations appears to support the notion that perfectionism may relate to the 
Achievement value priorities as defined by Schwartz, et al. (2012). In Schwartz, et al. (2012) 
revised model of values, Achievement value priorities are actually positioned in the 
personally orientated motivational dimension.  
 
The concept of perfectionism having both a positive and negative function appears to 
support the notion that perfectionism may relate to the Achievement value priorities as 
defined by Schwartz, et al. (2012). In Schwartz, et al. (2012) revised model of values, the 
value of Achievement overlap in regard to its motivational goal with regard to the 
dimension of self-growth/self-protection. Its overlapping position suggests that meeting 
standards may serve to self-protect and cope with anxiety or to promote self-growth by 
expressing ones competence and anxiety free motivations. Therefore, if perfectionism is 
motivated by Achievement value priorities, one may predict that perfectionism may serve to 
self-protect and cope with anxiety or to promote self-growth by expressing ones 
competence and anxiety free motivations. The current study conducted a review of the 
evidence regarding perfectionism and anxiety to further understand the role of 
perfectionism in anxiety. 
 
The current study will utilise existing research on social values, the process of priming social 
values, and self-discrepancy to explore how social values relate to behaviour change, 
considering the role of value discrepancy and psychological distress. The study will 
specifically focus on Achievement value priorities that may be associated with the 
presentation of perfectionism. Perfectionism has been suggested to relate to Achievement 
values, discrepancy and the experience of psychological distress. However, the effect of 
priming social values on perfectionism, considering the role of value discrepancy and 
psychological distress has not been researched.   Chapter 2 will discuss the current study 
methodology. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will focus on the methodology used in the current research study. The chapter 
will cover ethical considerations, study design, recruited participants, details of the 
measures used, study procedures and data analysis. 
 
2.2 ETHICAL APPROVAL 
 
The study made use of both an undergraduate and community pool sample population at 
Cardiff University.  Therefore, ethical approval for the study was sought from Cardiff 
University Ethics Board (see Appendix 5). Ethical approval was granted before the study 
commenced (see Appendix 6).  
 
Several aspects of the study were given particular ethical consideration, including the 
opportunity to provide informed consent, participant’s wellbeing, confidentiality and 
anonymity, and revealing deception.  
 
2.2.1 Informed Consent 
 
All participants received an information form (see Appendix 7) and were asked to then 
complete an informed consent form (see Appendix 8). A participant’s ability to provide 
informed consent was determined through informal assessment of their capacity, in line 
with the Mental Capacity Act for England and Wales (2005). There were no concerns with 
regards to capacity to consent to participate within the sample being recruited from.  
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All participants were made aware of their right to withdraw from the study at any time 
without giving a reason. Participants were informed that there would be no adverse 
consequences if they did withdraw and that any information collected from them would not 
be used in the research and destroyed. 
 
Following completing the study, all participants were given a debriefing form (see Appendix 
9) this included: the value of their participation; a summary of what the study was aiming to 
investigate, information about the mild deception used in the project and the reasons for 
this; contact details for the members of the project team for any queries; and the REC 
contact details if they needed to contact them about the ethical conduct of the study. 
Participants were also provided with how they could request a summary of the findings of 
the project. Participants were also offered an explicit opportunity to ask questions or 
comment. 
 
2.2.2. Wellbeing 
 
Participants were informed that all measures being used, whilst clinically relevant, were not 
diagnostic tools and not used to form the basis of a clinical diagnosis for any 
psychological/mental health condition.  It was made clear that it was expected that 
individuals within the general population would display a wide distribution of responses to 
these measures.  It was not anticipated that there would be any adverse reactions from 
participants with regards to the measures used. However, there was a possibility that a 
participant may have experienced distress at any time during the study. If this had 
happened, participants were free to withdraw from the study and would have been given 
time to speak to the researcher and offered the contact details of the research supervisor. 
Participants would also have had been offered signposting to appropriate services.  
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2.2.3. Confidentiality and Anonymity  
 
Participants were informed that their confidentiality would be maintained through all data 
being anonymous. All information collected about participants during the course of the 
research was strictly confidential and only accessible to the lead researcher.  Consent forms 
were the only paperwork that identified participants by name and so consent was sought 
prior to participants being asked to complete any measures.  The consent forms were 
available only to the lead researcher and they were stored separately from all other data in 
a locked filing cabinet.  
 
Each participant was allocated a participant identification number which was used to ensure 
that all data collected could be kept confidentially but could still be identified as coming 
from a particular participant. This allowed any information to be made anonymous at the 
point of collection and for data to be matched and analysed accurately. 
 
2.2.5. Revealing Deception 
 
There was some mild deception used in the design of the study.  Before starting the study, 
participants were not informed that the study was investigating links between priming 
values, perfectionism, anxiety and depression.  Therefore participants were not informed 
that they were being primed for different values as this could have had an impact on their 
responses to the tasks.  Participants were also not told that their behaviour was being 
measured.  This deception was necessary in order to gain a valid measurement of their 
responses. If the participants had been aware that they were being primed and their 
behaviour was being measured this could have impacted on the way they behaved.  
Following the completion of tasks, participants were asked if they had thoughts about the 
hypothesis of the study and they then received a debriefing sheet which explained the mild 
deception used in the study and clearly stated why it was necessary.  If any participant had 
reported being unhappy with the use of this mild deception, they would have been 
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reminded that they had the right to withdraw from the study and have their data removed 
and deleted.  
 
2.3 POWER ANALYSIS 
 
To determine the sample size required for the current study, a power analysis was 
conducted using a freely available resource programme G-Power Version 3.1.9.2 (Faul, et 
al., 2007).  
 
With reference to the systematic review, reported Cohen d effect sizes had a range of 1.95 
(min .25 - max 2.20) and median value of 1.08 (mean 1.15, SD: .60873). Using these effect 
sizes, a MANOVA power analyses was conducted using the input: the median effect size 
=1.08, α=.05, Power/1-β = 0.95, number of groups = 3, response variables = 21 (MCUP 
scales, HADS scales and PVQ scales). This calculation gave a total sample size of 39. To allow 
for enough participants per group when groups were split in to high/low parts, this was 
increased to 90 to allow for 30 participants in each group and to allow for any missing 
participant data being excluded for errors. This sample size is similar to previous studies that 
have investigated effects of priming values (90, Woodfield, 2014) and explored 
discrepancies in values (90, Parsons, 2013).  
 
2.4 INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
 
To be included in the study, participants had to have fluent English, be aged 18 years old or 
above, have completed education to a Secondary School level, and have access to the 
Experimental Management System (EMS) at the selected University. Participants were 
assumed to have the capacity to provide their informed consent.   
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Participants were excluded from the study if they did not meet the inclusion criteria. 
 
2.5 RECRUITMENT, PAYMENT AND LOCATION 
 
All student participants were recruited through Cardiff University Experimental 
Management System (EMS). The EMS is an online programme which enables researchers to 
advertise a study and participants to sign up to participate. Students at any stage of their 
studies, in any school within the university have access to the EMS programme. The current 
study was advertised with a brief study title, the time the study should take to complete, 
inclusion criteria, the payment offered (cash or course credit), timeslots available, study  
location, and researcher contact details. Students booked themselves to participate in the 
study. On attending their booked timeslot, they were given an information sheet about the 
study and then had the opportunity to decide whether or not they wanted to participate in 
the study. 
 
All community participants were recruited through Cardiff University Community Research 
Pool. The researcher approached the community research pool co-ordinator to enquire 
about participants who may want to participate in the study. The researcher then 
completed short form outlining the studies ethical approval, brief study title, and inclusion 
criteria. A list of 100 community research pool members who met the inclusion criteria was 
emailed to the researcher. The researcher then emailed all 100 potential participants with a 
brief study title, the time the study should take to complete, inclusion criteria, the payment 
offered (prize draw entry for £25), timeslots available, study  location, and researcher 
contact details. Community participants booked themselves to participate in the study by 
responding to the email and selecting an available timeslot. On attending their booked 
timeslot, they were given an information sheet about the study and then had the 
opportunity to decide whether or not they wanted to participate in the study. 
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Student participants could choose from either payment in cash or course credit. Students 
chose their payment type at the point of booking a timeslot. 68 students opted for cash 
payment, receiving minimum wage and 12 students opted for course credit payment. All 
community participants were entered into a prize cash draw for £25. 
 
All study participation took place in a room in the School of Psychology at Cardiff University.  
 
2.6 PARTICIPANT SAMPLE 
 
The current study had an analogue design that utilised a ‘non-clinical’ population. The 
participant sample included 90 English speaking adults aged 18 years or above (Mean 22.08, 
Range: 18-62 years, SD: 7.238).  Participants were recruited from either a student (sample 
size 80) or community research pool (sample size 10) population at Cardiff University. 
Participants were randomly allocated (see procedure section below) to one of three groups: 
Experimental Group 1, Experimental Group 2 or a Control Group. Each group included 30 
participants; participant demographics for these groups are shown in Table 2.1 below: 
 
Table 2.1: Participant demographic information across group conditions. 
 
Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 
Age (Years)       
Mean  21.53  21.7  23 
Range (SD)  18-51 (5.877)  18-62 (7.848)  18-50 (7.957) 
Gender   87% Female   90% Female   87% Female 
   13% Male  10 % Male  13% Male 
Ethnicity 
 
 
 80% White 
10% Mixed  
7% Other 
3% Not Stated 
 93% White 
3% Asian or Asian 
British 
3% Mixed 
 73% White 
10% Chinese or Chinese British 
10% Mixed 
7% Asian or Asian British 
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2.7 DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire regarding their demographic 
identity; data collected included each participant’s age, gender, and ethnicity (see Appendix 
10). 
 
2.8 QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURES 
 
The questionnaire measures were the independent variables in the current study. The study 
made use of three freely available questionnaire measures: an adapted version of the 
Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) (Parsons, 2013; Rees & Maio, 2009) (see Appendix 11), 
the Measure of Constructs Underlying Perfectionism (M-CUP) (Stairs, et al., 2012) (see 
Appendix 12), and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983) (see Appendix 13).  
 
2.8.1 Adapted Portrait Values Questionnaire 40 Item Version (PVQ-40)  
 
All participants completed the Adapted PVQ-40 (Parsons, 2013; Rees & Maio, 2009) (see 
Appendix 11). This measure was utilised to obtain a measure of participant’s self-reported 
social value orientations/priorities and discrepancies.  The PVQ was initially developed by 
Schwartz, et al. (2001) a self-reported implicit measure of social values.  There are two 
versions of the PVQ available, a 40-item version and a shorter 21-item version. The 21-item 
version was developed specifically for the European Social Survey (ESS).  The 40-item 
version includes 40 portraits of people; the portraits are presented in two versions, as male 
or female (Schwartz, et al., 2001). The gender of the portraits is to the participant 
completing the measure i.e. a male participant would receive 40 male portraits.  Each 
portrait implicitly describes a social value held by a person by describing what they regard as 
an important goal or desire in life. For example, item 1 for the male portraits implicitly 
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describes the social value of ‘Self-Direction’ from the ‘Openness to Change’ Quadrant of 
Schwartz (1992) model, by describing the following male portrait: ‘thinking up new ideas 
and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way’. 
Participants are asked to decide how much the person described is like them by choosing 
from one of six options: ‘very much like me’, ‘like me’, ‘somewhat like me’, ‘a little like me’, 
‘not like me’, and ‘not like me at all’.  The participants social values are then inferred from 
their similarity to the social values implied in each of the 40 portrait items.  The number of 
portrait items for each implied social value ranges from three (Hedonism, Power and 
Stimulation) to six (Universalism). The number of portrait items for each implied social value 
is considered to reflect the conceptual breadth of the value i.e. Universalism has the widest 
conceptual breadth (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, et al., 2012).  
 
The PVQ 40-item measure is scored by calculating the mean score for question items related 
to the social value. In total 10 scores are calculated, one for each of the 10 social values. The 
10 values are then ranked in terms of importance with the highest scoring value to lowest 
scoring value. These 10 scores can be used to give an indication of social value priorities. 
Scores for each of the four value quadrants (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, et al., 2012) can also 
be summed and averaged. The four quadrants can then be ranked by priority from lowest 
score (highest priority) to highest score (lowest priority). This method was suggested to 
provide a robust structure of value priorities across the four quadrants (Verkasalo, et al., 
2012).  
 
The PVQ 40-item measure has been suggested to have good internal consistency include 
with alpha measures of internal consistency ranging from .37 (Tradition) to .79 (Hedonism) 
(PVQ median .55) and test-retest reliabilities ranged from moderate .66 (Self-Direction) to 
high .88 (Security) (Schwartz, et al., 2001). The measure has also been demonstrated to 
have near equivalence of meaning across cultures (Schwartz, 2006) and evidenced to have 
strong fit to Schwartz model in the countries in which it has been used (Schwartz, et al., 
2001).  The PVQ has supported construct validity (Cieciuch & Schwartz, 2012), with the 
quadrant level structure being specifically supported (Hinz, et al., 2005). 
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The PVQ 40-item version was adapted by Rees and Maio (2009) and Parsons (2013) for use 
in research exploring social value discrepancy. This adaption aimed to incorporate Higgins 
(1987) model of self-discrepancy into the measure.  The measure instructions and rating 
scale were adapted to incorporate participants’ actual/own, ideal/own and ought/own self-
state representations. The adaptations aimed to measure actual ideal discrepancies or 
actual ought discrepancies between participants’ social value priorities. Instructions were 
adapted and participants were asked to think about how much each portrait described a 
person that ‘is actually like you’, ‘is ideally like you’, and ‘is what you should be like’. The 
rating scale was adapted to so that participants answered these three questions for each 
portrait item: ‘How much are you like this person?’, ’Ideally, how much would you be like 
this person?’, and ‘How much should you be like this person?’. The rating scale was also 
adapted to: ‘Not at all (1)’, ‘2’, ‘somewhat (3)’, ‘4’, and ‘very much (5)’. These adaptations 
are shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Adapted PVQ 40-item measure: adapted instructions and rating scale (Parsons, 
2013; Rees & Maio, 2009). 
 
Question Answer         
1) Thinking up new ideas and being creative is   
Not at 
all   Somewhat   
Very 
much 
important to him. He likes to do things in his  1 2 3 4 5 
own original way.           
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you like to be like 
this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
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To score the Adapted PVQ 40-item measure the social value priorities are calculated in the 
same way as the PVQ 40-item measure utilising the actual question item scores (i.e. how 
much are you like this person?) (see Appendix 11). Mean scores are calculated for question 
items related to the social value. In total 10 scores calculated, one for each of the 10 social 
values. Value importance is then ranked in the same way as the PVQ 40-item measure. The 
10 values are ranked in terms of importance with the highest scoring value to lowest scoring 
value, this was done for each individual. Scores for each of the four value quadrants 
(Schwartz, 1992) can also be summed and averaged. The four quadrants can then be ranked 
by priority from highest score (highest priority) to lowest score (lowest priority). 
 
Actual/ideal and actual/ought discrepancy scores were calculated using a method from the 
regulatory focus strength measure (Higgins, et al., 1997). Actual/ideal scores were 
calculated by subtracting the actual mean item value score form the ideal mean item value 
score. Actual/ought scores were calculated by subtracting the actual mean item value score 
from the ought mean item value score.  
 
The current study utilised the adapted PVQ-40 (Parsons, 2013; Rees & Maio, 2009) to as a 
measure of social values due to its ability to measure values relative to Schwartz (1992) 
model, whilst also measuring value discrepancy. 
 
2.8.2 Measure of Constructs Underlying Perfectionism (M-CUP) 
 
All participants completed the Measures of Constructs Underlying Perfectionism (MCUP) 
(Stairs, et al., 2012) (see Appendix 12). This measure was utilised to obtain a measure of 
participant’s self-reported experience perfectionism.  In a pilot study, items from existing 
measures of perfectionism were sorted onto the nine hypothesized underlying constructs of 
perfectionism and intra-class correlations used to examine agreement between raters. 
Intra-class correlations for the nine hypothesised dimensions had a mean of .86 and ranged 
from .78 (Dissatisfaction construct) to .95 (Order).  The items were rewritten to maximize 
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unidimensionality and representativeness of the items belonging to one of the nine 
hypothesized construct scales. The resulting 86 items were used in an exploratory factor 
analysis. Following this, items which did not load highly on any construct scale, loaded highly 
on more than one scale, or detracted from the internal consistency of a scale were deleted. 
This resulted in a 61-item pool that was used in a confirmatory factor analysis.  
 
The final MCUP has 61 items; each item is a statement about a person. Participants are 
asked to read each item and then rate on a scale of 1-5 how much they agree, are neutral or 
disagree with the statement.  For example, item 1 states ‘I am a person who sets high 
standards for myself’ and participants can choose from the options: ‘strongly disagree’, 
‘somewhat disagree’, ‘neutral’, ‘somewhat agree’, or ‘strongly agree’.   Each item is scored 
on a rating scale of 1-5 (e.g. ‘strongly disagree’ = 1, ‘somewhat disagree’ = 2, ‘neutral’ = 3, 
‘somewhat agree’ – 4, ‘strongly agree’ = 5’. Scores can range from 61 and 305. 
 
Each item relates to one of nine subscales: Order, Satisfaction, Details and Checking, 
Perfectionism Towards Others, High Standards, Black and White thinking about Tasks and 
Activities, Perceived Pressure from Others, Dissatisfaction and Reactivity.  The number of 
items for each subscale ranges from four (Back and White Thinking about Tasks and 
Activities) to nine (Order, Satisfactions, Dissatisfaction).  The nine subscales are scored 
separately and then summed to give a total score of perfectionism and total factor scores. 
As there were differing number of items for the subscales, scores were aggregated by 
calculating the mean score for items related to each subscale. In total nine mean subscale 
scores were calculated. The subscale scores were then summed for a total scale score.  
 
The internal consistency of the MCUP was investigated using Cronbach’s coefficient (alpha), 
scoring above .80, with five scales above .90. Test-retest reliability was examined using a 
range of intervals between administrations: 2 to 11 days, 12 to 25 days, and 38 to 46 days, 
47 to 67 days, and 68 to 91 days.  Overall, results indicated good test-retest reliability. 
Intercorrelations between the M-CUP sub scales were consistent with the results of the 
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initial factor analyses. Relationships between the MCUP nine subscales and existing 
measures of perfectionism were investigated using inter-correlations. Results indicted high 
convergent validity and lower discriminate validity as expected due to existing measures of 
perfectionism not having less construct homogeneity compared to the MCUP i.e. including 
multiple constructs within one subscale. Results indicate the MCUP has good internal 
consistency, good test-retest reliability, and strong convergent and discriminant validity. 
Statistics for test-retest reliability and inter-correlations between scales were generally 
similar to findings for existing scales measuring perfectionism. In support of construct 
validity, the M-CUP scales were related to conceptually similar scales on other measures of 
perfectionism. 
 
The MCUP proposes that there are two higher order factors in the construct of 
perfectionism: ‘Ego-Syntonic’ and ‘Ego-Dystonic’ factors. Researchers have utilised the term 
‘Ego-Syntonic’ to refer to the needs and goals of the ego being consistent with an 
individual’s self-image, whilst ‘Ego-Dystonic’ has been used to refer to needs and goals of 
the ego being dissonant or conflicting with an individual’s self-image (Freud, 1914; 
Hartmann, 1939). In the MCUP, the ‘Ego-Syntonic’ factor was comprised of the subscales 
Order, Satisfaction, Details and Checking, Perfectionism toward Others, and High Standards. 
These ‘Ego-Syntonic subscales were suggested to represent a ‘healthy or positive’ aspect of 
perfectionist thinking. Conversely, ‘Ego-Dystonic’ factors comprised of Black and White 
Thinking about Tasks and Activities, Perceived Pressure from Others, Dissatisfaction, and 
Reactivity to Mistakes. These subscales were suggested to represent more negative aspects 
of perfectionist thinking that may be related to experiences of emotional distress. The 
subscales related to each higher order factor were also summed and mean factor scores 
calculated.  
 
The ‘Ego-Syntonic’ and ‘Ego-Dystonic’ factors were supported when the MCUP was 
correlated with relevant personality measures, including aspects of the NEO Personality 
Inventory Revised (NEOPI- R; McCrae & Costa, 2004) and the UPPS-P (urgency, 
premeditation, perseverance, sensation seeking, and positive urgency) (Whiteside & Lynam, 
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2001). In these analyses, measures of anxiety correlated with Satisfaction, High Standards, 
Perceived Pressure, Dissatisfaction, and Reactivity to Mistakes. Depression measures 
correlated with Black and White Thinking, Perceived Pressure, Dissatisfaction and Reactivity 
to Mistakes.  The MCUP was also correlated with relevant psychosocial measures, including 
the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, et al., 1988) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, 
Beck, et al., 1996). In these analyses, the BAI significantly correlated with Black and White 
Thinking (r=.25), Perceived Pressure (r=.15), dissatisfaction (r=.33) and Reactivity to 
Mistakes (r=.38). The BDI significantly correlated with Black and White thinking (r=.31), 
Perceived Pressure (r=.20), Dissatisfaction (r=.48) and reactivity to mistakes (r=.45). 
 
2.8.3 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS)  
 
All participants completed the HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) (see Appendix 13). This 
measure was utilised to obtain a measure of participant’s self-reported experience of 
anxiety and depression.  
 
The HADS was developed by Zigmond and Snaith (1983) as a self-report measure of brief 
state anxiety and depression. The measure was initially developed to measure anxiety and 
depression in people who were presenting with physical health difficulties in hospital. Since 
its initial development, the HADS has been used in a wide range of both physical and mental 
health settings. It has also been found useful for non-hospital populations (McDowell, 
2006).  
 
Originally the HADS consisted of 16 items, it had eight items aimed to measure anxiety and 
eight items aimed to measure anxiety. Initial findings indicated that one of the items on the 
depression subscale was weak and it was removed. To keep the items in the subscales 
equal, the weakest item on the anxiety subscale was also removed. The final HADS is a 14 
item measure; it has seven items aimed to measure anxiety and seven items aimed to 
measure depression. Each item describes a feeling and participants are asked to decide how 
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closely this item describes how they have been feeling over the past week, choosing from 
four options.  For example, item one describes the feeling ‘I feel tense or ‘wound up’’ and 
participants can choose from the following four options: ‘not at all’, ‘from time to 
time/occasionally’, ‘a lot of the time’, and ‘most of the time’.  
 
Each item is scored on a rating scale of 0-3: (e.g. ‘not at all’ = 0, ‘from time to 
time/occasionally’ = 1, ‘a lot of the time’ = 2, and ‘most of the time’ = 3). Scores can range 
between 0-21 for anxiety and between 0-21 for depression. The measure is not designed to 
be used as a tool for clinical diagnosis (Whelan-Goodinson, et al., 2009) but despite this it 
offers an interpretation of scores with scores of 0-7 = ‘Normal’,  8-10 = ‘mild’, 11-14 = 
‘moderate’, and  15-21 = ‘Severe’.  These interpretative scores have not been shown to be 
useful in predicting probable presence of clinical depression or anxiety (Whelan-Goodinson, 
et al., 2009). 
 
The HADS has been suggested to have good internal consistency (Bjelland, et al., 2002; 
Mykletun, et al., 2001), and a balance of sensitivity and specificity (Bjelland, et al., 2002). 
Mykletun, et al. (2001) investigated the factor structure, item analyses and internal 
consistency of the HADS measure using a sample of 51,930 people aged 20-89 years. Both 
the anxiety and depression subscales were found to be internally consistent, with values of 
Cronbach's coefficient (alpha) being 0.80 and 0.76, respectively. The study concluded that 
the psychometric properties of the HADS as a self-rating instrument were quite good in 
terms of factor structure, intercorrelation, homogeneity and internal consistency.  In a 
review of 747 papers that utilised the HADS, Bjelland, et al. (2002) reported a Cronbach's 
coefficient (alpha) for the anxiety subscale ranging from .68 to .93 (mean .83) and for the 
depression subscale ranging from .67 to .90 (mean .82). An optimal balance between 
sensitivity and specificity was achieved when presence of anxiety or low mood was defined 
by a score of 8 or above on both the anxiety and depression subscales. Correlations 
between HADS and other commonly used questionnaires were in the range 0.49 to 0.83. 
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2.9 EXPERIMENTAL TASKS  
 
Four different tasks were employed in the study, three ‘priming tasks’ (‘Prime A’ task, ‘Prime 
B’ task, and a ‘Neutral task’) and a ‘behavioural task’.  The 30 participants in Experimental 
Group 1 were asked to complete the ‘Prime A’ task (see Appendix 14). The Prime A task 
required the participants to provide cognitive support for the value of ‘Achievement’ for 
which they were being primed.  The 30 participants in Experimental Group 2 were asked to 
complete the ‘Prime B’ task (see Appendix 15). The Prime B task required the participants to 
provide cognitive support for the value of ‘benevolence’ for which they were being primed.  
The 30 participants in the Control Group were asked to complete the ‘Neutral’ task (see 
Appendix 16), providing cognitive support for neutral statements about beverages. All 
participants then completed the ‘Behaviour’ task (see Appendix 18). 
 
2.9.1. Priming Tasks 
 
The priming task was the manipulation variable in the current study and it aimed to 
investigate the effects of priming social values on participants behaviour. Participants in 
Experimental Group 1 were asked to complete the ‘Prime A’ task and Experimental Group 2 
were asked to complete the ‘Prime B’ task, whilst participants in the Control Group were 
asked to complete a ‘Neutral’ task. The neutral task was similar to previous studies that 
have included neutral task designs (Maio, et al., 2009; Maio, 2010; Woodfield, 2014) and 
required participants to give reasons for choosing to drink different beverages. The aim of 
the neutral task was to provide participants with a similar task experience that did not aim 
to prime specific social values. 
 
The priming tasks required participants to give reasons for a particular value being 
important. Participants in Experimental Group 1 were required to give reasons for 
Achievement values being important and participants in Experimental Group 2 were 
required to give reasons for benevolence values being important. The aim of the two 
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priming tasks was to prime Experimental Group 1 to the social value of Achievement and to 
prime Experimental Group 2 to the social value of Benevolence. These two social values 
were considered to be positioned on opposing quadrants of the Schwartz (1992) model, i.e. 
Achievement is positioned in the Self-Enhancement quadrant positioned opposite to 
benevolence in the Self-Transcendence quadrant.  
 
Values located within the Self-Enhancement quadrant could be considered to be associated 
with motivating perfectionist behaviour as striving for success, competence and 
competitiveness all fall within this quadrant, specifically within Achievement values. 
Perfectionism has been associated with several mental health difficulties including 
depression (Bimanand, et al., 2013; Egan, et al., 2011; McGrath, et al., 2012), social anxiety 
(Al-Naggar, et al., 2013; Frost, et al., 2010; Levinson, et al., 2015; Mackinnon, et al., 2014), 
generalised anxiety (Egan, et al., 2011; Flett, et al., 2004; Handley, et al., 2014; Klibert, et al., 
2005); social physique anxiety (Haase,  et al., 2002), obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
(Frost & Steketee, 1997), body dissatisfaction (Graziano & Sikorski, 2014);  the development 
of eating disorders (Egan, et al., 2011; Fairburn, et al., 1999; Ferreira, et al., 2014; Lilenfeld, 
et al., 2006), anorexia nervosa (Lloyd, et al., 2014), and bulimia nervosa (Silgado, et al., 
2010). 
 
Achievement values are hypothesised to be associated with both self-protection via anxiety 
avoidance and self-growth via anxiety free motivations, with motivations being personally 
focused (Schwartz, et al., 2012). The motivations of the Self-Enhancement and Achievement 
values could be considered to be opposing to those of the Self-Transcendence and 
Benevolence values which are focused on only self-growth via anxiety free motivations, with 
motivations being socially focused.  
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2.9.2 Behaviour Task 
 
The behaviour task was adapted from letter search tasks previously used in research to 
capture perfectionism (Stoeber, et al., 2010). The task required participants to search for 
and identify a specific letter in search areas of mixed letters and numbers. Specifically, 
participants were required to search for and mark every letter ‘F’ and to notify the 
researcher when they had finished (see Appendix 17). Task behaviour was measured 
through recording participant’s completion time, accuracy, whether participants choose to 
take up an offer of checking their task once completed and checking time.  Participants were 
not given any instruction regarding how the task should be completed with regard to time 
and they were not aware that this was a timed task. 
 
2.10 BEHAVIOURAL MEASURES 
 
The current study aimed to capture and measure behaviour that may be relevant to 
perfectionism. The study aimed to measure behaviour that could be associated with 
cognitions suggested by the MCUP subscales i.e. how the task was perceived (via how long 
participants took to complete and task accuracy), whether participants were satisfied with 
their task completion (via whether they took up the option of checking, how long 
participants took to check and checking accuracy) (see Appendix 18) 
 
The behavioural measures were the dependant variables in the current study. All 
participants were scored on several behavioural measures when completing the behavioural 
task, including: task completion time, taking up the option of checking, time checking, task 
accuracy, and accuracy checking.  
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2.10.1. Task Completion Time 
 
Participants were handed the experimental task and told to inform the researcher when 
they had finished the task. The researcher began timing the participants task completion 
time when they were handed the task. When the participants said they had finished, the 
researcher stopped the clock and recorded the time. Times were recorded using a hand held 
stop clock. The researcher sat behind the participant so that they did not see the stop clock 
or become aware that they were being timed. 
 
2.10.2. Taking up the Offer of Checking 
 
When the participant declared that they had finished, the researcher noted the time and 
asked the participant if they would like to check their work. If the participant did not take up 
the offer of checking their work, they were informed that the study had ended. 
 
2.10.3. Checking Time  
 
If the participant took up the offer of checking their work, they were handed a different 
coloured pen to make any amendments and asked to inform the researcher when they had 
finished checking.   When the participant had been handed the different coloured pen, the 
researcher then began to time the participants checking time. When the participant said 
they had finished; the researcher stopped the clock and recorded the time. Participants 
were then told that the study had ended.  
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2.10.4. Task Accuracy 
 
Task accuracy was a measure of the initial accuracy of a participant’s task completion. The 
number of correct answers identified by the participant was summed as a correct score. 
Next, any incorrectly identified or missed answers were summed and recorded as an error 
score. A participant’s error score was then deducted from their correct score to produce an 
accuracy score.  
 
2.10.5. Checking Accuracy  
 
Checking accuracy was a measure of the accuracy of the participants checked task 
completion. Any additional answers identified whilst checking could be identified due to 
being marked in a different coloured pen to any initial answers. The number of correct 
answers identified by the participant was summed as a correct score. Next, any incorrectly 
identified or missed answers were summed and recorded as an error score. A participant’s 
error score was then deducted from their correct score to produce a checking accuracy 
score.  
 
2.11. PROCEDURE 
 
In total, 90 people (80 students and 10 community participants) chose to participate in 
study either via an online programme or e-mail contact with the lead researcher. Interested 
individuals were then invited to meet with the researcher individually at an appropriate 
room within the University.  
 
On meeting the lead researcher, all individuals received an information form (see Appendix 
7) to read and were offered the opportunity to ask any questions. After reading the study 
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information and having any questions answered, individuals were then asked whether or 
not they wanted to participate in the study. If they choose to participate they were given an 
informed consent form to complete (see Appendix 8). 
 
Following completing the consent form and having any questions answered, all participants 
were asked to complete three questionnaires: the Adapted Perceived Values Questionnaire 
(A-PVQ) (Rees & Maio, 2009; Parsons, 2013), the Measure of Constructs 
Underlying Perfectionism (M-CUP) (Stairs, et al., 2012) and the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). The aim of these questionnaires was to 
provide a self-reported measure of each participant’s social values, social value 
discrepancies, perfectionism, experience of anxiety and depression. The questionnaires 
were sorted into 90 packs, with each pack containing one copy of each questionnaire 
measure – totalling three questionnaires per pack. The questionnaires within the packs 
(PVQ=1, M-CUP=2, HADS=3) were then sorted so that there were fifteen sets of 
questionnaires in each of the following orderings: (1, 2, 3) (2, 3, 1) (3, 2, 1) (3, 1, 2) (1, 3, 2) 
(2, 1, 3). An external individual not involved in the study was then asked to mix the packs. 
Participants were given a pack from the top of the pile. The aim of this process was to 
reduce any ordering effects.   
 
Once the questionnaires were completed, participants were randomly allocated to one of 
the three condition groups: Experimental Group 1, Experimental Group 2 or Control Group. 
Prior to the study beginning, an external individual not attached to the study was asked to 
mix the pile of priming and neutral task sheets. On completion of the questionnaires, 
participants were given the next sheet from the top of the pile. This process aimed to 
reduce group allocation bias as the researcher did not know what group the participant 
would be allocated to until the point of handing the participant the priming or neutral task 
sheet. Participants in Experimental Group 1 were given a priming task to complete (see 
Appendix 15). This task aimed to prime the value of ‘Achievement’ from the Self-
Enhancement quadrant of Schwartz (1992) circular model. Participants in Experimental 
Group 2 were also given a priming task to complete (see Appendix 16). This task aimed to 
 
 
Page 113 of 335 
 
prime the value of ‘Benevolence’ from the Self-Transcendence quadrant of Schwartz (1992) 
circular model. Participants in the Control Group received a neutral task (see Appendix 17).  
 
Next, all participants were asked to complete an experimental behaviour task (see Appendix 
18). Task behaviour was measured and recorded by completion time, accuracy, taking up 
the option to check, checking time and checking accuracy (see Appendix 14). 
 
After completing the experimental task, participants were asked about their reflections, i.e. 
if they had had any thoughts about the studies aims or hypotheses. All participants were 
then given a debrief sheet (see Appendix 9) and the opportunity to ask any questions they 
had, before being thanked for their time. Lastly, all participants received payment for their 
time either in cash, course credit or in entry into a prize draw.  
 
Figure 2.2 below outlines the study procedure sequence. This sequence was piloted with 
two individuals unrelated to the study before the study commenced to approximate the 
time required to complete the sequence. Following this pilot, each participant was allowed 
one hour to complete the study and all participants completed within this time.  
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Figure 2.2: The study procedure sequence.  
 
2.12. DESIGN 
 
To strive to meet its aims, the study made use of both questionnaire and behavioural 
measures. These measures produced nominal (behavioural measure: taking up the option of 
checking), ordinal (questionnaire measures: Adapted PVQ, MCUP, HADS) and ratio data (or 
interval data with a natural zero point) (Behavioural measures: completion time, accuracy, 
checking time, checking accuracy).  
 
Experimental Group 1  
 ‘Prime A’ Task  
 (30 participants)  
Completing 3 Questionnaire Measures  
Behaviour Task  
(90 participants)  
 
Reading Information Sheet 
Completing Informed Consent Form  
Reflection & Debrief  
 
Control Group  
‘Neutral’ Task  
(30 participants)  
 
Experimental Group 2  
‘Prime B’ Task 
(30 participants)  
 
Payment 
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These data types required the study to employ a quantitative methodology, making use of 
between subjects multivariate factorial design. 
 
All data was entered in to the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences Version 20 (SPSS-20) computer software programme (IBM 
Corp, 2011). This programme was utilised for all data storage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 116 of 335 
 
CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter all data handling, management and analysis will be outlined. The chapter will 
begin by stating the data software programme utilised, before discussing how any data 
corrections, exclusions, or outliers were accounted for before the data was analysed. 
Descriptive analysis will be discussed before the assumptions for parametric statistical 
analysis are investigated. The choice and process of statistical analysis is outlined, before 
the final statistical analysis outcomes are reported in order to test the current study aims 
and hypotheses.  
 
3.2 DATA HANDLING 
 
All data was entered in to the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences Version 20 (SPSS-20) computer software programme (IBM 
Corp, 2011). This programme was utilised for all data management, descriptive and 
statistical analysis.  
 
3.3. DATA MANAGEMENT 
 
3.3.1. Excluded Data 
 
All data collected during the study was entered in to SPSS and no data was excluded. 
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3.3.2 Missing Data  
 
There were no missing data points for the data collected during the study. 
 
3.3.3 Outliers 
 
All data gathered from the three questionnaire measures (HADS, MCUP, and Adapted-PVQ) 
was explored to identify potential outliers. Box-plots were obtained and reviewed (see 
Appendix 19) for each of the measures to. Outliers were found for the HADS, MCUP and 
Adapted PVQ. Outlier scores were all Windsorised (Fields, 2013) to match the highest or 
lowest score that was not an outlier. Minor outliers were addressed as the correlations 
conducted in the inferential data analysis were sensitive to outliers. 
 
3.3.3.1 Questionnaire Measures 
 
In the HADS, outliers were found for Anxiety (n = 1, score 18 changed to 17), Depression (n = 
2, scores 13 & 15 changed to 11), and total score (n = 2, scores 30 & 31 changed to 24).  In 
the MCUP, outliers were found for the subscales Order (n=2, scores 1 & 1.22 changed to 
1.78), High Standards (n=4, scores 2.17, 2.33 & 2.5(x2) changed to 2.67), Black and White 
Thinking (n=3, scores 4.75 & 5(x2) changed to 4), total score (n=1, score 41.78 changed to 
38.80), and factor 2 (n=3, scores 4.54, 4.6 & 4.9 changed to 4.39).  
 
In the Adapted PVQ outliers were found for Power Ideal (n=3, scores 4.67(x2) & 4.33 
changed to 4), Achievement Ideal (n=1, score 1.50 changed to 1.75), Achievement 
Actual/Ideal (n=5, scores 1.75(x2), 2, 2.25 & 2.5 changed to 1.5), Achievement Actual/Ought 
(n=2, scores 2.5 & 3 changed to 2), Hedonism Actual (n=1, score 1.33 changed to 2), 
Hedonism Ideal (n=4, scores 2.33(x2) & 2.67(x2) changed to 3), Hedonism Actual/Ideal (n=1, 
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score 2.33 changed to 2), Hedonism Actual/Ought (n=2, score 2.67(x2) changed to 2), 
Stimulation Actual (n=2, score 1(x2) changed to 1.5), Stimulation Ideal (n=1, score 1 changed 
to 2.5), Stimulation Actual/ought (n=4, scores 2(x2) & 2.5(x2) changed to 1.5), Self-Direction 
Ideal (n=4, scores 3 & 3.6(x3) changed to 3.8), Self-direction Ought (n=1, score 2.8 changed 
to 3), Universalism Ideal (n=1, score 2.67 changed to 3), Universalism Ought (n=5, scores 
2.83 & 3.17(x4) changed to 3.5), Benevolence Ideal (n=2, scores 1.75 & 3 changed to 3.25), 
Benevolence Ought (n=2, score 3.25(x2) changed to 3.5), Benevolence Actual/Ideal (n=1, 
score 2.5 changed to 2), Tradition Actual (n=2, score 4.5 changed to 3.75 and score 1 
changed to 1.25), Conformity Actual/Ideal (n=4, scores 1.75 & 2(x3) changed to 1.5), 
Security Ideal (n=3, score 5(x2) changed to 4.8 and score 2.4 changed to 2.6), Security 
Actual/Ideal (n=2, scores 2.4 & 2.8 changed to 1.6) and Security Actual/Ought (n=2, scores 
2.6 & 3 changed to 2.2). 
 
3.3.3.2 Behavioural Measures 
 
All data gathered from the behavioural measures (Task Completion Time, Task Accuracy, 
Checking Time, and Checking Accuracy) was explored using Box-Plots to identify potential 
outliers (see Appendix 20). Outliers were found for all the behavioural variables: Task 
Completion Time, Task Accuracy, Checking Time, and Checking Accuracy. Outlier scores 
were all Windsorised (Fields, 2013) to match the highest or lowest score that was not an 
outlier. 
 
In the Task Completion Time scores four outliers were found (344.41, 356.79, 388.011 & 
608.05 changed to 336.77).  In the Task Accuracy scores four outliers were found (81, 84, 88 
& 89 changed to 90).  The ‘taking up the option to check’ measure was not checked for 
outliers because it was defined as categorical in nature rather than a scaled measure i.e. Yes 
or No. For the 52 participants who did take up the option to check, in the Checking Time 
scores two outliers were found (201.11 & 216.35 changed to 180.09) and for Checking 
Accuracy scores four outliers were found (93(x3) & 94 changed to 95). 
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3.4 DATA ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The current study had a between subjects multivariate factorial design. Prior to statistical 
analysis the data was reviewed for meeting the fixed assumptions required for parametric 
statistical data analyses in order determine the most appropriate method of statistical 
analysis to utilise to test the study hypothesis.  
 
Due the study design having multiple dependant and independent variables, multivariate 
analysis of variances would be required to analyse the data using parametric statistical 
analyses. The assumptions required for these parametric statistical analyses reviewed 
included: a) dependant variables being measured at interval or ratio level; b) independent 
variables being categorical independent groups; c) independence of observations; d) an 
adequate sample size; e) data not having multivariate outliers; f) multivariate normality and 
linearity; g) data having homoscedasticity; h) multicollinearity; and i) bivariate relationships. 
 
3.4.1 Dependant Variables are Measured at Interval or Ratio Level 
 
The assumption of dependant variables being measured at an interval or ratio level assumes 
that the difference between data points has a clear definition. Data at an interval level 
would have a defined equal difference between points, for example, the difference in 
temperature between 20 degrees and 30 degrees is the same difference as between 10 
degrees and 20 degrees. Data at a ratio level would have the properties of data at an 
interval level i.e. defined equal difference between points, and also have a clear definition 
of a zero point. For example, height, weight, and time all have definite zero points.  
 
The current study had dependant variables that met this assumption. The dependant 
behavioural measures used included completion time, accuracy score, checking time, and 
checking accuracy score.  
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3.4.2 Independent Variables Consist of Two or More Categorical, Independent Groups 
 
The independent variable was three independent groups: Experimental Group 1, 
Experimental Group 2 and a Control Group. 
 
3.4.3 Independence of Observations  
 
There was no relationship between the observations in or between the three groups as 
there were different participants in each group and no participant was in more than one 
group. 
 
3.4.4 Adequate Sample Size 
 
Adequate sample size refers to the assumption that the sample size of the current study has 
a sample size to achieve power.  
 
To ensure the current study met the assumption of an adequate sample size, a power 
analysis was conducted. This analysis confirmed that the study has adequate sample size of 
90 participants in total, with 30 participants in each group and to allow for any missing 
participant data being excluded for errors. Further details of the analysis are discussed in 
Chapter 2 (see section 2.3 Power Analysis).  
 
3.4.5 Data Multivariate Outliers 
 
Outliers are data points that are positioned outside of the mean for a particular variable. 
Outliers have been suggested to increase errors and can pull the mean for a particular 
variable away from the median and decrease normality (Fields, 2013). The current data set 
 
 
Page 121 of 335 
 
was reviewed and corrected for outliers; further details on this process are discussed above 
in section 3.3.3 Outliers. 
 
3.4.6 Data Multivariate Normality and Linearity 
 
The assumption of normality refers to data meeting an assumed pattern of a normal 
distribution curve. Box plot histograms, skewness and kurtosis values were examined for 
normal distribution.  Next, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were conducted on each variable. 
These test indicated that there were variables (HADS, MCUP and PVQ scores) that did not 
meet the assumptions of normality (Fields, 2013) (see Appendix 21).  
 
Whilst, multivariate normality cannot be calculated in SPSS, it can be assumed from 
univariate normality checks as univariate normality is considered a necessary condition for 
mutivariate normality but does not guarantee multivariate normality (Fields, 2013). 
Therefore, the current data was not considered to have met the assumption of multivariate 
normality.  
 
Multivariate normality can also be checked for using a Box’s Test when conducting the final 
MANOVA, however  it has been indicated that when studies have equal sample sizes across 
group conditions (Taberchnick & Fidell, 2012) and larger sample sizes (Field, 2013) the study 
does not benefit from a Box’s test. Due to the current study having equal sample sizes 
across groups and a large total sample size a Box Test was not used. 
 
3.4.7 Data Homoscedasticity of Covariate Matrices 
 
Data homoscedasticity refers to the assumption that the dependant variables have similar 
amounts of variance across the independent variables (Field, 2013).  The Levene’s test for 
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homogeneity was conducted on to check this assumption. The Levene’s test indicated that 
variables did not meet the assumptions for homoscedasticity (Task Accuracy 
(F(2,87)=6.980,p<.01) and Checking Accuracy (F(2,49)=6.068,p<.01) (see Appendix 22).  
 
3.4.8 Data Multicollinearity 
 
The assumption of multicollinearity refers to there being no perfect linear relationships 
between two or more of the independent variables. Bivariate Pearson’s R correlations were 
calculated to examine if independent variables were highly correlated. Fields (2013) 
suggests correlation values of .8 or above suggest variables are highly correlated and violate 
this assumption. The bivariate Pearson’s r correlations reported that the data was not highly 
correlated and met the assumption of multicollinearity. 
 
3.4.9 Bivariate Relationships 
 
It is possible that the demographic characteristics of the sample population may act as 
confounding factors. Bivariate Pearson’s r correlations were calculated to examine the 
relationships between demographic factors (age, gender and ethnicity) and each of the 
variables.  The correlations reported that age was correlated with a number of the study 
variables. Therefore, age was considered and controlled for in the inferential analyses (see 
section 3.6.2 Hypothesis 2) 
 
3.4.10 Summary of Data Assumptions 
 
In summary, the current data met six of the assumptions required for parametric testing, 
including: dependant variables at internal or ratio level; independent variables of two or 
more categorical independent groups; independence of observations; adequate sample size; 
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outliers were amended; and no multicollinearity.  However, the data failed to meet 
assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity. Fields (2009) discusses that when data sets 
to not meet assumptions required for parametric tests and parametric tests are used, there 
may be an increased change of Type 1 errors (false positives) being reported. Therefore, 
when assumptions are not met, non-parametric tests or data transformations to correct 
assumptions may be used.  
 
Transformation of the data was considered but was not undertaken for several reasons.  
Firstly, F tests have been suggested to perform as they were expected to, despite being used 
on skewed data (Games & Lucus, 1966; in Fields, 2013). Also in Fields (2013), Glass, 
Peckham and Sanders (1972) suggest that transforming data is ‘often not worth the effort’ 
as the process does not largely increase valid probability statements.  Games (1983) 
proposed four issues to consider when deciding whether or not to transform data: 1)The 
central limit theorem (Lumley, et al., 2002) suggests that there are situations where one can 
assume normality regardless of the shape of data such as when a sample size is large – 
especially with light tails; 2) Transforming data changes the study hypotheses and 
interpretations that can be made; 3) In small samples it can be difficult to calculate 
normality; 4) Applying an incorrect transformation may be more costly than not 
transforming the data (in Fields, 2013, pp 202). In agreement with Games (1983), Grayson 
(2004) suggests that transforming data, for example, using log transformation to calculate 
geometric means from arithmetic means, changes the constructs being measured and so 
has implications for hypotheses and interpretations. Tabachnick and Fidell (2006) also argue 
that when measures have been used widely, transformation of the data may hinder any 
interpretation.  Especially when measures are scored using the sums of means, as in this 
situation normality is evaluated according to the distribution of means and not according to 
the distribution of individual data points. In the current study, data normality tests were 
conducted on the sums of means (e.g. PVQ value means).  
 
Non-parametric tests were considered but not undertaken for several reasons. Research has 
proposed that parametric tests F tests in particular (ANOVA, MANOVA) are robust and type 
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1 error rates are not affected when data is not normally distributed (Glass, et al., 1972; 
Finch & French, 2013). Finch (2005) compared nonparametric and parametric tests when 
assumptions for normality had been violated; reporting that the parametric test 
outperformed the nonparametric tests despite not having met assumptions. Other 
researchers have agreed with the robustness of F tests in particular (i.e. MANOVA) even 
when required assumptions have not been met (Field, 2009). Fields (2013) recommends 
that, in light of the issues regarding transforming data, robust procedures may be used 
where possible ‘in preference to transforming the data’ (pp 202). MacDonald (2014) has 
also recently suggested that parametric tests remain robust even when assumptions are 
violated. 
 
In light of the above, the current study analysed the data collated using parametric 
inferential statistics.  
 
3.5 DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Descriptive analyses were utilised to analyse participant data, questionnaire measure data 
(independent variables: HADS, MCUP, PVQ), and the behaviour measure data (dependant 
variables: Task Time, Task Accuracy, Check Option, Check Time, Check Accuracy). 
 
3.5.1. Sample 
 
In total, 90 participants completed the study. There were 30 participants in Experimental 
Group 1, 30 participants in Experimental Group 2 and 30 participants in the Control Group. 
All demographic information collected from the participant sample can be found in Table 
3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Participant descriptive demographic information. 
 
Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 
Age range 
(Mean, SD)  18-51 (21.53,  5.88)  18-62  (21.7, 7.85)  18-50 (23, 7.96) 
Gender  87% Female/13% Male 90% Female/10 % Male 87% Female/13% Male 
  
 
    
Ethnicity 
 
 
 
 
80% White 
10 % Mixed 
7% Other 
3% Not Stated 
 
 93% White 
3% Asian or Asian British 
3% Mixed 
 
 
73% White 
10% Chinese or Chinese 
British 
10% Mixed 
7% Asian or Asian British 
 
 
Participants in Experimental group 1 were 87% female, aged between 18-51 years old with a 
mean age of 21.53 (SD: 5.877). Participants in Experimental Group 2 were 90% female, aged 
between 18-62 years old with a mean age of 21.7 (SD: 7.848). Lastly, participants in the 
control group were 87% female, aged between 18-50 years old with a mean age of 23 (SD: 
7.957). In Experimental Group 1, the majority of the participants were reported to be White 
(80%), as in Experimental group 2 (93%) and the control group (73%).  
 
One way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) calculations were conducted to determine if there 
were differences between the three groups with regard to age or gender. A one way ANOVA 
showed no significant differences between the three groups with regard to age (F, (2, 87) 
=.364, p=.696 (see Appendix 23). There were also no significant differences between the 
three groups with regard to gender (F, (2, 87) =.100, p=.905 (see Appendix 23). A Chi Square 
calculation was conducted to determine if the there were differences between the three 
groups with regard to ethnicity. However, the expected frequencies for a chi-square of 
ethnicity ratio per group showed that fifteen cells (83.3%) of the expected frequencies were 
less than five, suggesting that the Chi Square test should not be carried out (see Appendix 
24). 
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3.5.2. Questionnaire Measures 
 
Descriptive data for the three questionnaire measures (HADS, MCUP and the Adapted-PVQ) 
are displayed in the tables 3.2 to 3.14. The range, mean score and standard deviations are 
reported for each of the three groups (Experimental Group 1, Experimental Group 2 and 
Control Group 3). 
 
3.5.2.1 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
 
The range, mean score and standard deviation for data collated using the HADS measure is 
presented in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive data for the HADS measure for the total sample and each group 
(range, mean & standard deviation (sd). 
 
Total Sample 
   
Experimental Group 1 
 
Experimental Group 2 
 
Control Group 
 
HADS  
 Range Mean sd Range  Mean  sd Range  Mean  sd Range  Mean  sd 
Anxiety 
 0-17 7.54 3.89 4-17 8.47 3.38 0-15 6.83 3.824 0-15 7.33 4.34 
Depression 
 0-11 3.54 2.82 0-11 3.67 3.19 0-9 3.53 2.501 0-11 3.4 2.82 
Total 
 1-30 11.09 2.82 4-24 12 5.32 1-23 10.37 5.846 2-30 10.9 6.49 
 
 
Anxiety scores for the total sample ranged from 0-17; the three groups appear to have a 
similar range in scores compared to the total sample. The mean anxiety score for the total 
sample was 7.54 (SD: 3.89), each of the three groups appear to have similar mean scores 
compared to the total sample. Depression scores for the total sample ranged from 0-11; the 
three groups appear to have a similar range in scores compared to the total sample. The 
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mean depression score for the total sample was 3.54 (SD: 2.82), each of the three groups 
appear to have similar mean scores compared to the total sample. 
 
The measure is not designed to be used as a tool for clinical diagnosis (Whelan-Goodinson, 
et al., 2009) but despite this it offers an interpretation of scores with scores of 0-7 = 
‘Normal’,  8-10 = ‘mild’, 11-14 = ‘moderate’, and  15-21 = ‘Severe’.  Anxiety scores for the 
total sample covered the ‘normal’ to ‘severe’ range of scores and depression scores for the 
total sample covered the ‘normal’ to ‘moderate’ range of scores. A Pearson’s r correlation 
test showed that there was a significant positive relationship between anxiety and 
depression scores (r=.517, p<.01) with higher scores in anxiety being related to higher 
scores in depression. 
 
One way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) calculations were conducted to determine if there 
were differences between the three groups with regard to anxiety or depression scores. A 
one way ANOVA showed no significant differences between the three groups with regard to 
anxiety scores (F, (2, 87) =1.404, p=.251 (see Appendix 25). There were also no significant 
differences between the three groups with regard to depression scores (F, (2, 87) =.066, 
p=.937 (see Appendix 25). 
 
3.5.2.2 Measure of Constructs Underlying Perfectionism (M-CUP) 
 
The range, mean score and standard deviation for data collated using the MCUP measure is 
presented in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive data for the MCUP measure for each group (range, mean & standard 
deviation (sd). 
 
 
Total Sample 
   
Experimental Group 1 
 
Experimental Group 2 
 
Control Group 3 
   
MCUP Range  Mean  sd Range  Mean  sd Range  Mean  sd Range  Mean  sd 
Order* 1-5. 3.42 0.88 1.78-5 3.53 0.8 
1.22-
4.89 3.17 0.89 1-5. 3.54 0.92 
Satisfaction* 3-5. 4.47 0.44 3.56-5 4.54 0.44 3-5. 4.38 0.48 3.67-5 4.49 0.4 
Details & 
Checking* 1-5. 3.30 0.92 1.2-5 3.28 0.98 1.80-5 3.41 0.87 1-5. 3.19 0.93 
Perfectionism 
Towards 
Others* 
1.67-
4.67 2.98 0.71 2-4.5 3.04 0.67 
1.83-
4.17 2.89 0.70 
1.67-
4.67 3.01 0.78 
High Standards* 2.67-5 4.18 0.64 3.17-5 4.22 0.49 2.67-5 4.20 0.67 2.67-5 4.11 0.76 
Black & White 
Thinking** 1-4. 1.98 0.87 1-4. 1.94 0.80 1-4. 2.16 0.89 1-4. 1.84 0.91 
Perceived 
Pressure** 1-5. 2.94 0.95 1-4.83 2.82 0.97 
1.17-
4.83 3.12 1.00 1.67-5 2.87 0.87 
Dissatisfaction** 1.11-5 3.04 0.95 1.33-5 2.97 0.87 1.11-5 3.12 1.07 
1.67-
4.89 3.02 0.91 
Reactivity To 
Mistakes** 1.29-5 2.73 0.95 
1.29-
4.86 2.58 0.94 1.29-5 2.88 1.03 
1.29-
4.86 2.73 0.90 
Factor 1 
Subscale 
2.57-
4.59 3.67 0.44 
2.8-
4.59 3.72 0.4 
2.93-
4.52 3.62 0.45 
2.57-
4.47 3.66 0.49 
Factor 2 
Subscale 
1.33-
4.39 2.68 0.77 
1.33-
4.28 2.61 0.71 
1.61-
4.39 2.82 0.85 
1.54-
4.39 2.61 0.76 
Total Score 
19.10-
38.80 29 4.33 
21.78-
36.15 28.93 3.66 
22.30-
38.80 29.33 4.71 
19.10-
38.80 28.75 4.67 
* Factor 1 subscales, ** Factor 2 subscales 
 
One way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) calculations were conducted to determine if there 
were differences between the three groups with regard to Factor 1 scores, Factor 2 scores 
and MCUP total scores.  MCUP subscales were not calculated to reduce repeat calculations 
as they were already included in the Factor scores.  A one way ANOVA showed no significant 
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differences between the three groups with regard to MCUP Factor 1 scores (F, (2, 87) =.400, 
p=.672), there were also no significant differences between the three groups with regard to 
MCUP Factor 2 scores (F, (2, 87) =.694, p=.502) or with regard to MCUP Total scores (F, (2, 
87) =.135, p=.874) (see Appendix 26). 
 
3.5.2.3 Adapted Portrait Value Questionnaire (A-PVQ)  
 
The data for the Adapted-PVQ measure will be split in to four sections.  Firstly, the data for 
the actual, ideal and ought value means will be presented for each group.  Secondly, the 
data for the actual, ideal and ought value priorities will be presented for each group. 
Thirdly, the data for the Actual/Ideal (AI) and Actual/Ought (AO) value discrepancies will be 
presented for each group.  Lastly, data for the actual, ideal and ought quadrant priorities 
will be presented, before the Actual/Ideal (AI) and Actual/Ought (AO) quadrant 
discrepancies are presented for each group.  
 
3.5.2.3.1 Value Means 
 
This section will present the data for the actual, ideal and ought value means for each of the 
three group conditions.  
 
The range, mean score and standard deviation for actual value data collated using the PVQ 
measure is presented in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4: Descriptive data for the adapted PVQ measure actual scores for each group 
(range, mean & standard deviation (sd). 
 
 
Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 3   
Adapted PVQ - 
Actual Range  Mean  sd Range  Mean  sd Range  Mean  sd 
Power 1-4.67 3.00 0.94 1-4. 2.55 0.79 1.33-4 2.68 0.81 
Achievement 1.50-5 3.77 0.90 2-5. 3.43 0.90 2-5. 3.53 0.89 
Hedonism 2-5. 3.87 0.78 2-5. 3.59 0.81 2-5. 3.81 0.77 
Stimulation 1.50-5 3.4 1.02 1.50-5 3.33 0.85 1.50-5 3.38 1.02 
Self-Direction 2.40-5 3.63 0.63 
2.40-
4.80 3.75 0.60 2.60-5 3.68 0.62 
Universalism 
2.17-
4.33 3.49 0.64 
2.17-
4.83 3.51 0.57 
2.33-
4.67 3.59 0.54 
Benevolence 
2.50-
4.75 3.68 0.63 2-5. 3.71 0.71 
2.50-
4.75 3.83 0.68 
Tradition 
1.25-
3.75 2.37 0.66 
1.25-
3.75 2.63 0.59 
1.50-
3.25 2.48 0.49 
Conformity 
1.75-
4.25 3.23 0.76 
1.75-
4.74 3.36 0.72 
2.25-
4.25 3.09 0.52 
Security 
1.80-
4.80 3.15 0.68 2-4.80 3.16 0.68 
1.80-
4.20 3.06 0.67 
 
 
One way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) calculations were conducted to determine if there 
were differences between the three groups with regard to any of the 10 actual value mean 
scores, no significant differences were found (see Appendix 27). 
 
The range, mean score and standard deviation for ideal value data collated using the PVQ 
measure is presented in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: Descriptive data for the adapted PVQ measure ideal scores for each group (range, 
mean & standard deviation (sd). 
 
 
Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 3   
Adapted PVQ - 
Ideal Range  Mean  sd Range  Mean  sd Range  Mean  sd 
Power 1.67-4 2.71 0.74 
1.33-
3.67 2.54 0.60 1.33-4 2.56 0.62 
Achievement 2-5. 3.77 0.72 1.75-5 3.68 0.75 1.75-5 3.5 0.84 
Hedonism 3-5. 4.06 0.56 3-5. 3.89 0.63 2.33-5 3.83 0.62 
Stimulation 3-5. 4.15 0.56 2.5-5 3.85 0.76 2.5-5 3.77 0.8 
Self-Direction 3.8-5 4.49 0.31 3.8-5 4.48 0.31 3.60-5 4.34 0.38 
Universalism 3.17-5 4.28 0.44 2.67-5 4.33 0.49 3-4.83 4.27 0.48 
Benevolence 3.25-5 4.53 0.42 3.25-5 4.38 0.51 3.25-5 4.49 0.48 
Tradition 
1.50-
4.75 2.89 0.76 2-4.25 2.0 0.61 
1.50-
4.50 3.04 0.69 
Conformity 
1.50-
4.50 3.33 0.73 
2.25-
4.50 3.48 0.58 2.50-5 3.43 0.65 
Security 
2.60-
4.80 3.77 0.51 
2.80-
4.80 3.67 0.51 
2.60-
4.80 3.64 0.58 
 
 
One way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) calculations were conducted to determine if there 
were differences between the three groups with regard to any of the 10 ideal value mean 
scores, no significant differences were found (see Appendix 27). 
 
The range, mean score and standard deviation for ought value data collated using the PVQ 
measure is presented in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6: Descriptive data for the adapted PVQ measure ought scores for each group 
(range, mean & standard deviation (sd). 
 
Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 3   
Adapted PVQ - 
Ought Range  Mean  sd Range  Mean  sd Range  Mean  sd 
Power 1.67-4 2.57 0.64 
1.67-
3.67 2.39 0.57 
1.33-
3.67 2.50 0.59 
Achievement 1.50-5 3.57 0.78 2-4.75 3.48 0.71 2-5. 3.41 0.78 
Hedonism 2-5. 3.56 0.62 
1.67-
4.67 3.53 0.69 
2-
4.67 3.51 0.68 
Stimulation 2-5. 3.6 0.69 
1.50-
4.50 3.27 0.67 2-5. 3.32 0.65 
Self-Direction 3.20-5 4.23 0.46 
3.20-
4.80 4.17 0.46 3-5. 4.07 0.44 
Universalism 3.50-5 4.57 0.37 3.50-5 4.39 0.50 
3.50-
5 4.40 0.46 
Benevolence 3.50-5 4.48 0.41 3.25-5 4.43 0.46 
3.50-
5 4.53 0.46 
Tradition 1.75-5 3.03 0.75 2-5. 3.07 0.76 
1.75-
4.75 3.18 0.66 
Conformity 
2.50-
4.75 3.76 0.60 2.50-5 3.85 0.60 
2.50-
5 3.58 0.74 
Security 
2.60-
4.80 4.06 0.45 2.80-5 3.89 0.63 
2.80-
4.80 3.8 0.56 
  
 
One way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) calculations were conducted to determine if there 
were differences between the three groups with regard to any of the 10 ought value mean 
scores, no significant differences were found (see Appendix 27). 
 
3.5.2.3.2 Value Priorities 
 
This section will present the actual, ideal and ought value priorities for the total sample and 
each of the three group conditions. Value priorities were identified by ranking the value 
means for each of the three groups. Value means were ranked from the largest mean 
(ranked highest priority 1) to the smallest mean (ranked lowest priority 10) (see Chapter 2 
for further detail). 
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For the total sample and each group, actual value priorities are presented in Table 3.7, ideal 
value priorities are presented in Table 3.8, and ought value priorities are presented in Table 
3.9. 
 
Table 3.7: Descriptive data for the adapted PVQ measure actual value priorities for the total 
sample and each group (Mean). 
Actual 
Rank Total Sample Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 3 
1 Hedonism (3.76) Hedonism (3.87) Self-Direction (3.75) Benevolence (3.83) 
2 Benevolence (3.74) Achievement (3.77) Benevolence (3.71) Hedonism (3.81) 
3 Self-Direction (3.69) Benevolence (3.68) Hedonism (3.59) Self-Direction (3.68) 
4 Achievement (3.57) Self-Direction (3.63) Universalism (3.51) Universalism (3.59) 
5 Universalism (3.53) Universalism (3.49) Achievement (3.43) Achievement (3.53) 
6 Stimulation (3.37) Stimulation (3.4) Conformity (3.36) Stimulation (3.38) 
7 Conformity (3.23) Conformity (3.23) Stimulation (3.33) Conformity (3.09) 
8 Security (3.12) Security (3.15) Security (3.16) Security (3.06) 
9 Power (2.74) Power (3.00) Tradition (2.63) Power (2.68) 
10 Tradition (2.49) Tradition (2.37) Power (2.55) Tradition (2.48) 
 
 
The top three actual value priorities appear to be similar across the sample (although in 
slightly different order) with the total sample, Group 2 and Group 3 each holding Hedonism, 
Benevolence and Self-Direction in high priority.  Group 2 also held Hedonism and 
Benevolence, but Achievement was ranked above Self-Direction. 
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Table 3.8: Descriptive data for the adapted PVQ measure ideal value priorities for the total 
sample and each group (Mean) 
Ideal 
Rank Total Sample Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 3 
1 Benevolence (4.47) Benevolence (4.53) Self-Direction (4.48) Benevolence (4.49) 
2 Self-Direction (4.44) Self-Direction (4.49) Benevolence  (4.38) Self-Direction (4.34) 
3 Universalism (4.29) Universalism (4.28) Universalism (4.33) Universalism (4.27) 
4 Hedonism (3.93) Stimulation (4.15) Hedonism (3.89) Hedonism (3.83) 
5 Stimulation (3.92) Hedonism (4.06) Stimulation (3.85) Stimulation (3.77) 
6 Security (3.70) Security (3.77) Achievement (3.68) Security (3.64) 
7 Achievement (3.65) Achievement (3.77) Security (3.67) Achievement (3.5) 
8 Conformity (3.41) Conformity (3.33) Conformity (3.48) Conformity (3.43) 
9 Tradition (2.97) Tradition (2.89) Tradition (2.98) Tradition (3.04) 
10 Power (2.60) Power (2.71) Power (2.54) Power (2.56) 
 
 
Table 3.9: Descriptive data for the adapted PVQ measure ought value priorities for the total 
sample and each group (Mean). 
Ought 
Rank Total Sample Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 3 
1 Benevolence (4.48) Universalism (4.57) Benevolence (4.43) Benevolence (4.53) 
2 Universalism (4.45 Benevolence (4.48) Universalism (4.39) Universalism (4.4) 
3 Self-Direction (4.16) Self-Direction (4.23) Self-Direction (4.17) Self-Direction (4.07) 
4 Security (3.92) Security (4.06) Security (3.89) Security (3.8) 
5 Conformity (3.73) Conformity (3.76) Conformity (3.85) Conformity (3.58) 
6 Hedonism (3.53) Stimulation (3.6) Hedonism (3.53) Hedonism (3.51) 
7 Achievement (3.48) Achievement (3.57) Achievement (3.48) Achievement (3.41) 
8 Stimulation (3.39) Hedonism (3.56) Stimulation (3.27) Stimulation (3.32) 
9 Tradition (3.09) Tradition (3.03) Tradition (3.07) Tradition (3.18) 
10 Power (2.49) Power (2.57) Power (2.39) Power (2.50) 
 
 
The top three ideal and ought value priorities (see Table 3.8 & 3.9) appear to be similar 
across the sample (although slightly different in order) with the total sample, Group 1, 
Group 2 and Group 3 each holding Benevolence, Universalism, and Self-Direction in high 
priority. 
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Value priorities were also looked at in terms of quadrant priorities (Schwartz, 1992; 
Schwartz, et al., 2012). Quadrant priorities were identified by calculating the quadrant 
means (summing the relevant value means and dividing by the number of values as there 
were differing numbers of values relating to the quadrants) and ranking these means for the 
total sample and each of the three groups. Quadrant means were ranked from the largest 
mean (ranked highest priority 1) to the smallest mean (ranked lowest priority 10)  For the 
total sample and each group, actual quadrant priorities are presented in Table 3.10, ideal 
quadrant priorities are presented in Table 3.11, and ought value priorities are presented in 
Table 3.12. 
 
Table 3.10: Descriptive data for the adapted PVQ measure actual quadrant priorities for the 
total sample and each group (Mean). 
Actual 
Rank Total Sample Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 3 
1 
Self-Transcendence 
(3.64) 
Openness 
 (3.62) 
Self-Transcendence 
(3.63) 
Self-Transcendence   
( 3.71) 
2 
Openness 
 (3.60) 
Self-Transcendence 
(3.58) 
Openness  
(3.55) 
Openness  
(3.62) 
3 
Self Enhancement 
(3.35) 
Self Enhancement 
(3.53) 
Self Enhancement 
(3.19) 
Self Enhancement 
(3.34) 
4 
Conservation  
(2.95) 
Conservation  
(2.94) 
Conservation  
(3.04) 
Conservation  
(2.88) 
      
Table 3.11: Descriptive data for the adapted PVQ measure ideal quadrant priorities for the 
total sample and each group (Mean). 
Ideal Rank Total Sample Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 3 
1 
Self-Transcendence 
(4.37) 
Self-Transcendence 
(4.40) 
Self-Transcendence 
(4.33) 
Self-Transcendence 
(4.38) 
2 
Openness  
(4.08) 
Openness 
 (4.23) 
Openness 
 (4.06) 
Openness  
(3.94) 
3 
Self Enhancement 
(3.39) 
Self Enhancement 
(3.53) 
Conservation 
 (3.38) 
Conservation 
(3.34) 
4 
Conservation 
(3.35) 
Conservation  
(3.33) 
Self Enhancement 
(3.36) 
Self Enhancement 
(3.29) 
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Table 3.12: Descriptive data for the adapted PVQ measure ought quadrant priorities for the 
total sample and each group (Mean). 
Ought 
Rank Total Sample Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 3 
1 
Self-Transcendence 
(4.46) 
Self-Transcendence 
(4.51) 
Self-Transcendence 
(4.42) 
Self-Transcendence 
(4.46) 
2 
Openness  
(3.69) 
Openness 
 (3.79) 
Openness 
 (3.66) 
Openness 
 (3.63) 
3 
Conservation  
(3.58) 
Conservation  
(3.62) 
Conservation  
(3.60) 
Conservation 
 (3.52) 
4 
Self Enhancement 
(3.17) 
Self Enhancement 
(3.23) 
Self Enhancement 
(3.13) 
Self Enhancement 
(3.14) 
 
 
The top two actual, ideal and ought value priorities appear to be similar across the sample 
(although slightly different in order) with the total sample, Group 1, Group 2 and Group 3 
each holding value priorities within the Self-Transcendence and Openness to Change 
quadrants in high priority.  
 
3.5.2.3.3 Value Discrepancy 
 
This section will present the actual/ideal (AI) and actual/ought (AO) value discrepancy for 
the total sample and each of the three group conditions. AI value discrepancy was 
calculated by subtracting actual value scores from ideal value scores, and AO value 
discrepancy was calculated by subtracting actual value scores from ought value scores. In 
some instances the calculated value discrepancy scores were negative. The negative scores 
were amended to absolute scores as to the current study hypothesis is not investigating the 
direction of discrepancy scores and only absolute scores were used for further analysis.   
 
Table 3.13 presents the AI and AO discrepancy value scores for the total sample and each 
group condition. All discrepancy scores have been ranked from the largest discrepancy (1) to 
the smallest discrepancy (10) score. 
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Table 3.13: Descriptive data for the adapted PVQ measure AI and AO discrepancy value 
scores (Mean), ranked largest to smallest for the total sample and each group. 
 
 
In Table 3.13, the largest three AI discrepancies appear similar across the total sample and 
three group conditions (although in slightly different order) with the total sample and Group 
1 both having the largest discrepancies in Stimulation, Self-Direction, and Benevolence 
values. Similarly, Group 2 also had large discrepancies in Self-Direction and Benevolence, 
but differed having large discrepancy in Universalism values. Group three also had large 
discrepancy in Stimulation and Self-Direction but differed having large discrepancy in 
Hedonism values. 
 
Table 3.13 also presents AO discrepancies, the largest three AO discrepancies appear similar 
across the total sample and three group conditions (although in slightly different order) with 
 
Total 
Sample   
Experimental 
Group 1   
Experimental 
Group 2   
Control 
Group 3   
Rank Actual/Ideal Actual/Ought Actual/Ideal Actual/Ought Actual/Ideal Actual/Ought Actual/Ideal Actual/Ought 
1 
Stimulation 
(0.82) 
Universalism 
(0.91) 
Stimulation 
(1.05) 
Universalism 
(1.06) 
Universalism 
(0.82) 
Benevolence 
(0.88) 
Hedonism 
(0.76) 
Universalism 
(0.8) 
2 
Self-
Direction 
(0.78) 
Benevolence 
(0.84) 
Benevolence 
(0.89) 
Security  
(0.94) 
Self-Direction 
(0.76) 
Universalism 
(0.88) 
Stimulation 
(0.72) 
Conformity 
(0.8) 
3 
Benevolence 
(0.77) 
Security  
(0.84) 
Self-Direction 
(0.87) 
Benevolence 
(0.88) 
Benevolence 
(0.75) 
Security 
(0.77) 
Self-
Direction 
(0.71) 
Security  
(0.79) 
4 
Universalism 
(0.77) 
Conformity 
(0.78) 
Universalism 
(0.80) 
Conformity 
(0.8) 
Stimulation 
(0.7) 
Conformity 
(0.74) 
Universalism 
(0.68) 
Benevolence 
(0.77) 
5 
Hedonism 
(0.67) 
Tradition  
(0.69) 
Hedonism 
(0.69) 
Tradition 
(0.74) 
Achievement 
(0.59) 
Self-Direction 
(0.61) 
Benevolence 
(0.66) 
Tradition 
(0.73) 
6 
Security  
(0.62) 
Hedonism 
(0.66) 
Tradition 
(0.66) 
Achievement 
(0.72) 
Security 
(0.59) 
Tradition 
(0.61) 
Tradition 
(0.63) 
Hedonism 
(0.68) 
7 
Tradition 
(0.61) 
Achievement 
(0.64) 
Security 
(0.65) 
Hedonism 
(0.71) 
Hedonism 
(0.567) 
Achievement 
(0.6) 
Security 
(0.62) 
Power  
(0.62) 
8 
Achievement 
(0.57) 
Stimulation 
(0.63) 
Power 
 (0.64) 
Stimulation 
(0.7) 
Tradition 
(0.55) 
Hedonism 
(0.59) 
Conformity 
(0.58) 
Achievement 
(0.62) 
9 
Power  
(0.55) 
Self-Direction 
(0.62) 
Conformity 
(0.58) 
Power  
(0.67) 
Power 
 (0.44) 
Stimulation 
(0.58) 
Power 
 (0.57) 
Stimulation 
(0.62) 
10 
Conformity 
(0.53) 
Power  
(0.60) 
Achievement 
(0.55) 
Self-Direction 
(0.65) 
Conformity 
(0.43) 
Power  
(0.53) 
Achievement 
(0.57) 
Self-Direction 
(0.61) 
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the total sample, Group 1 and Group 2 having the largest discrepancies in Universalism, 
Benevolence and Security values. Similarly to the total sample and other groups, Group 3 
also had large discrepancies in Universalism and Security, but differed having large 
discrepancy in Conformity values.  
 
AI and AO value discrepancy was also looked at in terms of AI and AO quadrant discrepancy. 
Table 3.14 presents the AI and AO quadrant discrepancy scores for the total sample and 
each group condition. All discrepancy scores have been ranked from the largest discrepancy 
(1) to the smallest discrepancy (10) score. 
 
Table 3.14: Descriptive data for the adapted PVQ measure AI and AO discrepancy quadrant 
score (Mean) ranked largest to smallest for the total sample and each group. 
 
 
In Table 3.14, the largest two AI discrepancies appear similar across the total sample and 
two group conditions (in the same order) with the total sample, Group 1 and Group 2 have 
the largest discrepancies in Self-Transcendence and Openness to Change quadrant value 
priorities. Similarly, Group 3 has large discrepancy in the Self-Transcendence quadrant but 
differs with large discrepancy in the Conservation quadrant value priorities.  
 
 
Total Sample   
Experimental 
Group 1   
Experimental 
Group 2   
Control Group 
3   
Rank Actual/Ideal Actual/Ought Actual/Ideal Actual/Ought Actual/Ideal Actual/Ought Actual/Ideal Actual/Ought 
1 
 
Self-
Transcendence 
(.75) 
Self-
Transcendence 
(.86) 
Self-
Transcendence 
(.83) 
Self-
Transcendence 
(.94) 
Self-
Transcendence 
(.73) 
Self-
Transcendence 
(.86) 
Self-
Transcendence 
(.68) 
Self-
Transcendence 
(.77) 
2 
 
Openness 
(.61) 
Conservation 
 (.69) 
Openness 
(.74) 
Conservation 
(.71) 
Openness 
(.53) 
Conservation  
(.65) 
Conservation 
 (.58) 
Conservation 
 (.71) 
3 
 
Conservation 
 (.50) 
Self 
Enhancement 
(.51) 
Conservation 
(.51) 
Self 
Enhancement 
(.57) 
Self 
Enhancement 
(.41) 
Openness  
(.45) 
Openness  
(.56) 
Self 
Enhancement 
(.56) 
4 
 
 
Self 
Enhancement 
(.46) 
 
Openness 
 (.49) 
 
 
Self 
Enhancement 
(.44) 
 
Openness  
(.50) 
 
 
Conservation 
 (.40) 
 
 
Self 
Enhancement 
(.40) 
 
Self 
Enhancement 
(.54) 
 
Openness  
(.52) 
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Table 3.14 also present the AO discrepancies, the largest two AO discrepancies appear 
similar across the total sample and three group conditions (in the same order) with the total 
sample, Group 1, Group 2 and Group 3 having the largest discrepancies in Self-
Transcendence and Conservation quadrant value priorities. 
 
3.5.3. Behaviour Measures 
 
Descriptive data for the five behavioural measures (Task Completion Time, Task Accuracy, 
Checking option, Checking Time and Checking Accuracy) are displayed in Table 3.15 to 3.17. 
The range, mean score and standard deviations are reported for each of the three groups 
(Experimental Group 1, Experimental Group 2 and Control Group 3). 
 
3.5.3.1 Task Completion Time and Accuracy 
 
The range, mean score and standard deviation for data collated for Task Time and Task 
Accuracy measures are presented in Table 3.15. 
 
Table 3.15: Descriptive data for the Task Completion and Task Accuracy measure for each 
group (range, mean & standard deviation (sd). 
 
Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 3 
 
Mean sd Range Mean sd Range Mean sd Range 
Task Completion 
Time (Seconds) 200.61 49.40 
120.81-
299.20 184.86 65.49 
99.14-
336.77 208.27 62.07 
104.04-
336.77 
Task Accuracy (%) 97.57 2.5 91-100 96.43 3.94 90-100 97.8 2.68 90-100 
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3.5.3.2 Checking Option 
 
The percent (%) for data collated for the checking option (decided to take option – Yes, 
declined option – No) measure is presented in Table 3.16. 
 
Table 3.16: Descriptive data for the Checking Option measure for each group (%). 
 
Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 3 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Checking Option (%)  22 (73%)  8(27%) 17 (57%) 13 (43%) 14 (47%) 16 (53%) 
 
 
3.5.3.3 Checking Time and Accuracy  
 
The range, mean score and standard deviation for data collated for Checking Time and 
Checking Accuracy measures are presented in Table 3.17. 
 
Table 3.17: Descriptive data for the Checking Time Accuracy measure for each group (range, 
mean & standard deviation (sd). 
 
Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Control Group 3 
 
Mean sd Range Mean sd Range Mean sd Range 
Checking Time 
(Seconds) 110.42 43.3 
32.02-
180.09 82.07 33.71 
32.10-
180.09 81.9 48.39 
12.91-
180.09 
Checking Accuracy 
(%) 98.82 1.53 95-100 98.12 2.12 95-100 99.31 1.03 97-100 
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3.6 INFERENTIAL DATA ANALYSIS 
 
All inferential data analysis was conducted using the International Business Machines 
Corporation (IBM) Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Version 20 (SPSS-20) computer 
software programme (IBM Corp, 2011). Inferential statistical analyses were utilised to 
analyse the questionnaire measure data (independent variables: HADS, MCUP, PVQ), and 
the behaviour measure data (dependant variables: Task Time, Task Accuracy, Check Option, 
Check Time, Check Accuracy). This section will present the analyses and results in relation to 
each of the study hypotheses.  
 
3.6.1 Hypothesis 1  
 
1a) It was predicted that participants who score higher on the perfectionism measure will 
give higher ranking to the values within the Self-Enhancement quadrant of Schwartz (1992; 
Schwartz, et al., 2012) circular model. Additionally, the value of Achievement will have a 
higher relative rank with this quadrant.  
 
Pearson’s R Bivariate Correlations were used to test the first part of this hypothesis, as the 
hypothesis aimed to investigate relationships between perfectionism scores and quadrant 
value priorities. Perfectionism scores were correlated with the quadrant priorities to test if 
higher scores on the perfectionism measure related to Self-Enhancement quadrant value 
priorities (see Table 3.18).  Results showed that the MCUP total scores and value priorities 
within the Self-Enhancement quadrant were significantly positively correlated (r=.402, p< 
0.01).  There was also a small significant positive correlation between MCUP total scores 
and value priorities within the Conservation quadrant (r= .214, p<0.05). Correlations 
between the MCUP total scores and Self-Transcendence (r=.086, p=.422) and Openness to 
Change (r=.141, p=.184) quadrants were not significant. Suggesting value priorities 
positioned in the Self-Enhancement and Conservation quadrants (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, 
et al., 2012) were related to higher perfectionism scores. 
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Table 3.18: MCUP perfectionism scores correlated with quadrant mean scores (Schwartz, 
1992; Schwartz, et al., 2012). 
 
MCUP Perfectionism Scores   
Quadrants MCUP Total (r,(p)) MCUP Factor 1 (r,(p)) MUP Factor 2 (r,(p)) 
Self Enhancement  .402 (.000) .393 (.000)  .259 (.014) 
Self-Transcendence .086 (.422) -.030 (.777) .147 (.167) 
Openness .141 (.184) .067 (.529) .126 (.235) 
Conservation .214 (.043) .307 (.003) .078 (.466) 
 
 
Further correlations were run between the MCUP Factor 1 and 2 scores and quadrants. 
Results showed that the MCUP Factor 1 scores and value priorities within the Self-
Enhancement quadrant were significantly positively correlated (r=.393, p< 0.001), as were 
MCUP Factor 1 scores and value priorities within the Conservation quadrant (r=.307, 
p<0.01). Correlations between the MCUP FACTOR 1 and Self-Transcendence (r= -.030, 
p=.777) and Openness to Change (r=.067, p=.529) quadrants were not significant. Results 
showed that the MCUP Factor 2 scores and value priorities within the Self-Enhancement 
quadrant were significantly positively correlated (r=.259, p< 0.05). Correlations between the 
MCUP Factor 2 and Self-Transcendence (r= .147, p=.167), Openness (r=.126, p=.235) and 
Conservation (r=.078, p=.466) quadrants were not significant. Suggesting value priorities 
positioned within the Self-Enhancement and Conservation quadrants (Schwartz, 1992; 
Schwartz, et al., 2012) were related to Factor 1 ‘Ego-Syntonic’ aspects of perfectionism, 
including  the subscales Order, Satisfaction, Details and Checking, Perfectionism toward 
Others, and High Standards. These ‘Ego-Syntonic’ subscales have been suggested to 
represent a ‘healthy or positive’ aspect of perfectionist thinking (Stairs, et al., 2012). Value 
priorities positioned within the Self-Enhancement quadrant also related to Factor 2 ‘Ego-
Dystonic’ aspects of perfectionism, including: Black and White Thinking about Tasks and 
Activities, Perceived Pressure from Others, Dissatisfaction, and Reactivity to Mistakes. These 
subscales have been suggested to represent more negative aspects of perfectionist thinking 
that may be related to experiences of emotional distress (Stairs, et al., 2012) 
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Pearson’s R Bivariate Correlations were then used to test the second part of this hypothesis, 
as the hypothesis aimed to investigate relationships between perfectionism scores and 
Achievement value priorities. Perfectionism scores were correlated with the value priorities 
to test if higher scores on the perfectionism measure related to Achievement value 
priorities (see Table 3.19). Results showed that MCUP total scores were significantly 
positively correlated with the Achievement (r=.507, p<.001), Power (r=.285, p<.01), 
Conformity (r=.264. p<.05) and Security (r=.264 p<.05) values. Correlations between the 
MCUP total scores and Hedonism (r=.154, p=.147), Stimulation (r=.138, p=.194), Self-
Direction (r=.063, p=.557), Universalism (r=.141, p=.186) and Benevolence (r=.010, p=.929) 
and Tradition (r=-.037, p=.727) were not significant. These results indicate that the value 
priorities of Achievement, Power, Conformity and Security values were related to higher 
perfectionism scores, with higher Achievement values having the largest significant 
relationship with higher perfectionism scores. 
 
Table 3.19: MCUP perfectionism scores correlated with value priority mean scores 
(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, et al., 2012). 
 
MCUP Perfectionism Scores   
Value Priority MCUP Total (r,(p)) MCUP Factor 1 (r,(p)) MUP Factor 2 (r,(p)) 
Power .285 (.006) .338 (.001) .155 (.144) 
Achievement .507 (.000) .466 (.000) .345 (.001) 
Hedonism .154 (.147) .109 (.307) .108 (.309) 
Stimulation .138 (.194) .005 (.961) .170 (.109) 
Self-Direction .063 (.557) .073 (.491) .028 (.792) 
Universalism .141 (.186) -.071 (.509) .260 (.013) 
Benevolence .010 (.929) .003 (.977) .009 (.931) 
Tradition -.037 (.727) -009 (.936) -.054 (.613) 
Conformity .242 (.022) .295 (.005) .127 (.233) 
Security .264 (.012) .391 (.000) .094 (.377) 
 
 
Further correlations were run between the MCUP Factor 1 and 2 scores and value priorities. 
Results showed that the MCUP Factor 1 scores were significantly positively correlated to 
Achievement (r=.466, p<.01), Power (r=.338, p<.01), Conformity (r=.295, p<.01) and Security 
(r= .391, p<.01) values. Correlations between MCUP Factor 1 scores and Hedonism (r=.109, 
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p=.307), Stimulation (r=.005, p=.961), Self-Direction (r=.073, p=.491), Universalism (r=-.071, 
p=.509), Benevolence (r=.003, p=.977), and Tradition (r=-.009, p=.936) were not significant. 
Results showed that the MCUP Factor 2 scores were significantly positively correlated to 
Achievement values(r=.354, p<.01) and a smaller significant positive correlation was found 
between MCUP Factor 2 scores and Universalism values (r=.260, p<.05). Correlations 
between MCUP Factor 2 scores and Power (r=.155, p=.144), Hedonism (r=.108, p=.309), 
Stimulation (r=.170, p=.109), Self-Direction (r=.028, p=.792), Benevolence (r=.009, p=.931), 
Tradition (r=-.054, p=.613), Conformity (r=.127, p=.233), and Security (r=.094, p=.377). These 
results indicate that Achievement, Power, Conformity and Security values related to Factor 
1 ‘Ego-Syntonic’ aspects of perfectionism, suggested to represent a ‘healthy or positive’ 
aspect of perfectionist thinking (Stairs, et al., 2012).  Whilst, Achievement and Universalism 
values related to Factor 2 ‘Ego-Dystonic’ aspects of perfectionism, suggested to represent 
more negative aspects of perfectionist thinking that may be related to experiences of 
emotional distress (Stairs, et al., 2012) 
 
1b) Participants scoring higher on the perfectionism measure will be more likely to display 
the behaviours related to perfectionism than those who score lower on the measure. 
 
Pearson’s R Bivariate Correlations were used to test this hypothesis, as the hypothesis was 
aiming to investigate relationships between perfectionism scores and behaviour. 
Perfectionism scores were correlated with behavioural measures to test if higher scores on 
the perfectionism measure related to increased Task Time, Task Accuracy, Checking Option, 
Checking Time and Checking Accuracy (see Table 3.20). Results showed that MCUP total 
scores were significantly positively correlated with Checking Accuracy (r=.277, p<.05). 
Correlations between MCUP total scores and Task Time (r=-.089, p=.402), Task Accuracy 
(r=.014, p=.895), Checking Option (r=-.118, p=.269), and Checking Time (r=.200, p=.150) 
were not significant.   
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Table 3.20: MCUP perfectionism scores correlated with behavioural measures: Task Time, 
Task Accuracy, Checking Option, Checking Time, and Checking Accuracy. 
 
MCUP Perfectionism Scores   
Behaviour Measure MCUP Total (r,(p)) MCUP Factor 1 (r,(p)) MUP Factor 2 (r,(p)) 
Task Time -.089 (.402) -.112 (.294) -.051 (.630) 
Task Accuracy .014 (.895) .098 (.375) -.051 (.632) 
Checking Option -.118 (.269) -.124 (.243) -.073 (.492) 
Checking Time .200 (.150) .093 (.507) .250 (.071) 
Checking Accuracy .277 (.047) .374 (.006) .102 (.470) 
 
 
Further correlations were run between the MCUP Factor 1 and 2 scores and behavioural 
measures. MCUP factor 1 scores and checking accuracy were significantly positively 
correlated (r= .374, p<.01). Correlations between MCUP Factor 1 scores and Task Time (r=-
.112, p=.294), Task Accuracy (r=.098, p=.357), Checking Option (r=-.124, p=.243), and 
Checking Time (r=.093, p=.507) were not significant. Correlations between MCUP Factor 2 
scores and Checking Time (r=.250, p=.071 – approaching significance), Task Time (r=-.051, 
p=.630), Task Accuracy (r=.051, p=.632), Checking Option (r=-.073, p=.492), and Checking 
Accuracy (r=.102, p=.470) were not significant.  
 
These results indicate that higher total perfectionism scores and Factor 1 scores were 
related to higher Checking Accuracy. Factor 1 ‘Ego-Syntonic’ aspects of perfectionism, 
suggested to represent a ‘healthy or positive’ aspect of perfectionist thinking (Stairs, et al., 
2012).  Factor 2 scores were approaching significance in relation to Checking Time, 
suggesting that higher Factor 1 scores were approaching being related to increased 
Checking Time. Factor 2 ‘Ego-Dystonic’ aspects of perfectionism, suggested to represent 
more negative aspects of perfectionist thinking that may be related to experiences of 
emotional distress (Stairs, et al., 2012) 
 
1c) Participants scoring higher on the perfectionism measure will be more likely to self-report 
experiences of anxiety and depression on the HADS. 
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Pearson’s R Bivariate Correlations were used to test this hypothesis, as the hypothesis 
aimed to investigate relationships between perfectionism scores and self-reported anxiety 
and depression. Perfectionism scores were correlated with anxiety scores and then 
depression scores to test if higher scores on the perfectionism measure related to higher 
scores on the anxiety and depression aspects of the HADS (see Table 3.21). Results showed 
that MCUP total scores were significantly positively correlated with anxiety scores (r=.586, 
p<.01). MCUP total scores were also significantly positively correlated with depression 
(r=.404, p<.01). 
 
Table 3.21: MCUP perfectionism scores correlated with HADS anxiety and depression scores. 
 
MCUP Perfectionism Scores   
HADS Scores MCUP Total (r,(p)) MCUP Factor 1 (r,(p)) MUP Factor 2 (r,(p)) 
Anxiety .586 (.000) .397 (.000) .541 (.000) 
Depression .404 (.000) .065 (.543) .538 (.000) 
 
 
Further correlations were run between the MCUP Factor 1 and 2 scores and anxiety and 
then depression scores. MCUP Factor 1 scores were significantly positively correlated with 
anxiety (r=.397, p<.01) as were MCUP Factor 2 scores and anxiety (r=.541, p<.01). MCUP 
Factor 1 scores were not significantly correlated to depression scores (r=.065), however, 
MCUP Factor 2 scores were significantly positively correlated with depression scores 
(r=.538, p<.01). 
 
Results indicate that higher perfectionism total scores, Factor 1 and Factor 2 scores were 
related to higher self-reported levels of anxiety. Higher perfectionism total scores and 
Factor 2 scores were also related to higher levels of self-reported depression. 
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3.6.2 Hypothesis 2 
 
2a) Participants who were primed with the Achievement value within the Self-Enhancement 
quadrant of Schwartz (1992) circular model will demonstrate increased behaviour associated 
with perfectionism compared to those who primed on opposing value of Benevolence within 
the opposite Self-Transcendence quadrant on the circular model.   
 
A Pearson’s R Bivariate Correlation was used to test this hypothesis, as the hypothesis was 
aiming to investigate relationships between the three group conditions and behavioural 
measures. The three groups were correlated with checking option (as this measure was 
dichotomous and so could not be included in the MANOVA) to test if the group condition 
was related to performance on this measure. Results showed that group condition was 
significantly positively correlated to checking option (r=.221, p<.05). Independent t-tests 
were used to explore the group conditions separately to test which groups differed on 
checking option. Results showed that Experiment group 1 (Primed for Achievement) 
significantly differed to Control Group 3 (t(58)=2.154, p=<.05) with Experiment Group 1 
taking up the offer to check more often than the Control Group. Differences in taking up the 
offer to check for Experiment Group 1 and Experiment Group 2 (Primed for Benevolence) 
(t(58)=1.351, p=.182) and for Experiment Group 2 and Control Group 3 (t(58)=.766, p=.447) 
were not significant (see Appendix 28).  
 
Two Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) were used to further test differences 
between the three group conditions. Firstly, a MANOVA was used to test differences 
between the groups in task time and task accuracy, then a second MANOVA was used to 
test differences between the groups in checking time and checking accuracy. Two 
MANOVA’s were conducted due to there being fewer participants in the second MANOVA 
as not all participants chose to take up the checking option. The checking option variable 
will not be included in either MANOVA as it is nominal data level. A MANOVA was selected 
as there were three independent variables (Experiment Group 1, Experiment Group 2 and 
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Control Group 3) and two dependant variables (Either Task Time and Task Accuracy or 
Checking Time and Checking Accuracy).  
 
Results showed that differences between the groups with regard to Task Time (F (2, 87) 
=1.212, p=.303) and Task Accuracy (F (2, 87) =1.662, p=.196) were not significant. Results 
also showed that differences between the groups with regard to Checking Time (F (2, 49) 
=2.662 p=.080) a Checking Accuracy (F (2, 49) =1.990, p=.148) were not significant. When 
age was considered as a covariate differences between group condition and Task Time 
(F(2,86)=1.064,p=3.50), Task Accuracy (F(2,86)=1.575,p=2.13), Checking Time 
(F(2,48)=2.909,p=.064) and Checking Accuracy (F(2,48)=.162,p=.162) remained not 
significant. 
 
2b) It is predicted that those participants who score higher on the perfectionism measure 
and who value Achievement within the Self-Enhancement quadrant, will show the largest 
increase in behaviour when Self-Enhancement values are primed.   
 
MANOVAs were run to test this hypothesis, as the hypothesis was aiming to investigate the 
effects of priming groups on behavioural measures, taking in to consideration MCUP 
perfectionism scores and PVQ scores.  Two MANOVA’s were run (as above) with added 
effects of covariates for total MCUP scores (high/low), MCUP Factor 1 scores (high/low), 
MCUP Factor 2 scores (high/low) and PVQ scores (high/low) Achievement (high/low). High 
and low groups were determined by calculating the median score for these variables and 
then categorising scores higher or lower than the median. 
 
Results showed that there was no significant effect for MCUP total scores (Task Time 
(F(1,74)=.786,p=.378) and Task Accuracy (F(1,74)=3.336,p=.0.72)), Factor 1 scores (Task 
Time (F(1,74)=.023,p=.880) and Task Accuracy (F(1,74)=.130,p=.720)) and Factor 2 scores 
(Task Time (F(1,74)=.090,p= .765) and Task Accuracy (F(1,74)=.3.465,p=.0.67)). There were 
also no significant effects of Achievement value priorities (Task Time (F (1,74)=.034,p=.854) 
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and Task Accuracy (F(1,74)=.277,p=.600)). All other PVQ value priorities were also not 
significant (see Appendix 29). 
 
Results also showed that there was no significant effect for MCUP total scores (Checking 
Time F(1,36)=1.981,p=.168) and Checking Accuracy (F(1,36)=1.315,p=..259)), Factor 1 scores 
(Checking Time (F(1,36)=.154,p=.697) and Checking Accuracy (F(1,36)=.252,p=.619)) and 
Factor 2 scores (Checking Time (F(1,36)=.007,p= .935) and Checking Accuracy 
(F(1,36)=.1.670, p=.205)). There were also no significant effects of Achievement value 
priorities (Checking Time (F (1,36)=.349,p=.558) and Checking Accuracy 
F(1,36)=.359,p=.553)). All other PVQ value priorities were also not significant (see Appendix 
29). 
 
Results suggest that higher perfectionism scores and Achievement value priorities did not 
have a significant effect on behaviour when Self-Enhancement values were primed. 
 
3.6.3 Hypothesis 3  
 
3a) It was predicted participants who give higher ranking to values within the Self-
Enhancement quadrant of Schwartz (1992) circular model will have larger actual/ideal 
discrepancy between values rather than actual-ought discrepancy between values.  
 
Pearson’s R Bivariate Correlations were used to test this hypothesis, as the hypothesis was 
aiming to investigate relationships between Self-Enhancement quadrant scores and AI and 
AO value discrepancies.   
 
Results showed there were significant positive relationships between Self-Enhancement 
quadrant scores and AI discrepancies in Tradition (r=.315, p<.01) and Power value priorities 
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(r=.218, p<.05). There were also significant negative relationships between Self-
Enhancement quadrant scores and AI discrepancies in Hedonism values (r=-.217, p<.05) and 
AI discrepancies in Self-Direction values (r=-.220, p<.05). Correlations between Self-
Enhancement quadrant scores and AI discrepancies in Achievement (r=-.070, p=.510), 
Stimulation (r=-.170, p=.108), Universalism (r=.142, p=.183), Benevolence(r= -.160, p=.131), 
Conformity (r=.099, p=.353) and Security (r=-.003, .975) values were not significant. These 
results indicate that higher scores in the Self-Enhancement quadrant were related to higher 
AI discrepancy in Tradition and Power value priorities and lower AI discrepancy in Hedonism 
and Self-Direction value priorities. 
 
Results showed there were significant positive relationships between Self-Enhancement 
quadrant scores and AO discrepancies in Power (r=.366, p<.01) and Tradition(r=.292, p<.01) 
value priorities. There was only a significant negative relationship between Self-
Enhancement and AO discrepancy in Self-Direction value priorities (-.236, p<.05). 
Correlations between Self-Enhancement quadrant scores and AO discrepancies in 
Achievement (r=.066, p=.534), Hedonism (r=.053, p=.619), Stimulation (r=.063, p=.554), 
Universalism (r=.086, p=.421), Benevolence (r= -.190, p=.073), Conformity (r=.076, p=.479) 
and Security (r=.139, p=.193) value priorities were not significant. These findings indicate 
that higher scores in the Self-Enhancement quadrant are related to higher AO discrepancy in 
Power and Tradition value priorities and lower AO discrepancy in Self-Direction value 
priorities. 
 
These results suggest that higher Self-Enhancement quadrant scores were related to both AI 
and AO discrepancies.  
 
3b) Furthermore, those participants who give higher ranking to values within the Self-
Transcendence quadrant will have larger discrepancy between actual/ought values rather 
than between actual-ideal values. 
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Pearson’s R Bivariate Correlations were used to test this hypothesis, as the hypothesis was 
aiming to investigate relationships between Self-Transcendence quadrant scores and AI and 
AO value discrepancies.   
 
Results showed there were significant positive relationships between Self-Transcendence 
quadrant scores and AI discrepancies in Universalism (r=.453, p<.01) and Benevolence 
(r=.510, p<.01) value priorities. There were significant negative relationships between Self-
Transcendence quadrant scores and AI discrepancies in Power (r=-.081, p=.447), Self-
Direction (-.256, p<.05) and Security (r=-.291, p<.01) value priorities.  Achievement values 
were approaching significance (r=-.203, p=.054). Correlations between Self-Transcendence 
quadrant scores and AI discrepancies in Hedonism (r=.065, p=.543), Stimulation (r=.042, 
p=.694), Tradition (r=-.091, p=.395) and Conformity (r=-.116, p=.276) value priorities were 
not significant. These findings indicate that higher scores in the Self-Transcendence 
quadrant were related to higher AI discrepancy in Universalism and Benevolence value 
priorities and lower AI discrepancy in Power, Self-Direction and Security value priorities. 
 
Results showed there were significant negative relationships between Self-Transcendence 
quadrant scores and AO discrepancies in Self-Direction (r=-.277, p<.01), Universalism (r=-
.578, p<.01), Benevolence (r=-.554, p<.01) and Security (r=-.316, p<.01) value priorities. 
Correlations between Self-Transcendence quadrant scores and AO discrepancies in Power 
(r=-.148, p=.163), Achievement (r=-.042, p=.693), Hedonism (r=.048, p=.651), Stimulation 
(r=-.157, .141), Tradition (r=-.052, p=.626), and Conformity (r=-.116, p=.275) value priorities 
were not significant. Results indicate that higher scores in the Self-Transcendence quadrant 
were related to lower AO discrepancy in Self-Direction, Universalism, Benevolence, and 
Security values.  
 
These results suggest that higher Self-Transcendence quadrant scores were related to both 
AI and AO discrepancies.  
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3.6.4 Hypothesis 4   
 
4a) As per Higgins’ (1987) theory, it is predicted larger discrepancy in values will relate to 
higher scores for anxiety and depression.  
 
Pearson’s r Bivariate Correlation tests were used to test this hypothesis, as the hypothesis 
aimed to investigate relationships between discrepancies and anxiety and depression 
scores. Results showed there were four significant relationships between discrepancy scores 
and anxiety scores (Hedonism AI x anxiety (r=.212, p<.05), Achievement AO x anxiety 
(r=.247, p<.05), Security AO x anxiety(r=.219, p<.05) and Stimulation AO x anxiety (r=.227, 
p<.05). There were six significant relationships between discrepancy scores and depression 
scores (Hedonism AI x depression (r=.214, p<.05), Security AI x depression (r=.231, p<0.05), 
Achievement AO x depression (r=.226, p<.05), Hedonism AO x depression (r=.228, p<.05) 
Benevolence AO x depression (r=.210, p<.05) and Security AO x depression (r=.239, p<.05) 
 
These results suggest that larger discrepancy scores in four value priorities (Hedonism, 
Achievement, Security and Stimulation) were related to higher anxiety scores. Whilst larger 
discrepancy scores in four value priorities (Hedonism, Security, Achievement, and 
Benevolence) were related to higher depression scores. 
 
4b) Furthermore, the type of value discrepancy will relate to the type of emotional distress 
reported. Based on Higgins (1987) theory, it is predicted that those participants who have 
larger actual/ideal discrepancy between values will report lower mood and those 
participants who have larger actual/ought discrepancy between values will report higher 
anxiety.  
 
Using the results from the Pearson’s r correlations discussed in 4a) above, results show that 
larger AI discrepancy scores in one value priority (Hedonism) and larger AO discrepancies in 
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three value priorities (Achievement, Security and Stimulation) were related to higher 
anxiety scores. Whilst larger AI discrepancy scores in two value priorities (Hedonism, 
Security) and larger AO discrepancies in four value priorities (Achievement, Hedonism, 
Benevolence and Security) were related to higher depression scores. These results suggest 
that larger AI discrepancy between values were related to low mood slightly more than to 
anxiety and larger AO discrepancy between values also related to low mood slightly more 
than to anxiety. 
 
4c) Those who score more highly in helpful perfectionism will differ to those who score more 
lowly in helpful perfectionism – with higher scores in helpful perfectionism relating to smaller 
discrepancy. Whilst those scoring more highly in unhelpful perfectionism will differ to those 
who score more lowly in unhelpful perfectionism – with higher scores in unhelpful 
perfectionism relating to larger discrepancy. 
 
Pearson’s r Bivariate Correlation tests were used to test this hypothesis, as the hypothesis 
was aiming to investigate relationships between perfectionism scores and discrepancies. 
Results showed there were three significant relationships between MCUP total scores and 
discrepancy scores (MCUP total scores x AO Achievement AO (R=.213, p<.05), MCUP total 
scores x AO Stimulation (r=.213, p<.05) and MCUP total x AO Tradition (r=.224,p<.05). These 
results suggest that higher MCUP total scores were related to larger discrepancy scores in 
three value priorities (Achievement, Stimulation and Tradition). 
 
Correlations were also calculated for the MCUP Factor 1 and Factor 2 scores. There were no 
significant correlations found between MCUP Factor 1 scores and discrepancies in values. 
For MCUP Factor 2 scores there was a significant positive relationship with AO Achievement 
value priority discrepancy (r=.301, p<.01). This finding indicates that higher MCUP Factor 2 
scores were related with higher AO discrepancy. Factor 2 ‘Ego-Dystonic’ aspects of 
perfectionism, suggested to represent more negative aspects of perfectionist thinking that 
may be related to experiences of emotional distress (Stairs, et al., 2012) 
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4d) Those who score more highly in unhelpful perfectionism will differ to those who score 
more lowly in unhelpful perfectionism – with higher scores in  unhelpful perfectionism 
relating to larger actual/ought discrepancies and anxiety. 
 
Using the results from the Pearson’s r correlations discussed in 4c) above, results show that 
higher MCUP total scores were significantly related to larger AO discrepancy scores in three 
value priorities (Achievement, Stimulation and Tradition), whilst no significant relationships 
were found with AI discrepancy scores. These results suggest that higher scores in 
perfectionism were related to larger AO discrepancy between specific values. AO 
discrepancies have been associated with increased anxiety (Higgins, 1987).  
 
Results also showed that higher Factor 2 scores were significantly related to larger AO 
discrepancy scores in the Achievement value priority. These results suggest that higher 
scores in Factor 2 ‘Ego Dystonic’ aspects of perfectionism were related to larger AO 
discrepancy in Achievement value priorities positioned in the Self-Enhancement quadrant 
(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, et al., 2012). 
 
3.7 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 3 
 
Descriptive analyses explored the participant (demographics), questionnaire (MCUP, HADS, 
and PVQ) and behavioural (Task Time, Task Accuracy, Checking Option, Checking Time and 
Checking Accuracy) data collated.  The analyses indicated that group conditions did not 
differ in regard to the participant demographics (age and gender) at baseline. Ethnicity data 
could not be computed, but the groups appeared similar in ethnic diversity.  When 
participant demographic data was explored in relation to the questionnaire and behavioural 
measures, age was identified as a variable that may need to be controlled for in any 
inferential analysis.  
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The data was then reviewed to assess whether it met the assumptions required for 
parametric statistical tests. The data met six of the assumptions required for parametric 
testing, including: dependant variables at internal or ratio level; independent variables of 
two or more categorical independent groups; independence of observations; adequate 
sample size; outliers were amended; and no multicollinearity.  However, the data failed to 
meet assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity. Fields (2009) discusses that when 
data sets to not meet assumptions required for parametric tests and parametric tests are 
used, there may be an increased change of Type 1 errors (false positives) being reported. In 
light of research recommending the use of parametric analyses over the use of non-
parametric (Glass, et al., 1972; Finch & French, 2013; Finch, 2005; Field, 2009, 2013; 
MacDonald, 2014) and data transformations (Games, 1983; Games & Lucus, 1966; Glass, et 
al., 1972; Grayson, 2004; Lumley, et al., 2002; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006) when assumptions 
are violated, the data collated was analysed using parametric inferential statistics.  
 
Descriptive data for the HADS indicated that for both anxiety and depression scores, there 
were no significant differences across the three groups at baseline.  Anxiety scores for the 
total sample covered the ‘normal’ to ‘severe’ range of scores and depression scores for the 
total sample covered the ‘normal’ to ‘moderate’ range of scores. There was also a significant 
relationship between anxiety and depression scores, with higher anxiety scores being 
related to higher depression scores.  The descriptive data for the MCUP indicated that there 
were no significant differences across the three groups at baseline. 
 
The PVQ descriptive data was presented for value (actual, ideal and ought) means and then 
for value (actual/ideal and actual/ought) discrepancy. No significant differences were found 
between the three groups at baseline for actual, ideal or ought value means. The top three 
actual, ideal and ought value priorities appeared to be similar across the sample (although 
in slightly different order) reflecting the cross cultural priorities identified by Schwartz 
(1992). 
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Inferential statistical analyses were used to explore the data in relation to the main 
hypothesis. Hypotheses 1 was focused on perfectionism in relation to value priorities (PVQ), 
behaviours (Behavioural measures) and emotional distress (HADS). Results indicated that 
overall higher scores on the perfectionism measure were related to higher value priorities 
positioned in the Self Enhancement and Conservation quadrants (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, 
et al., 2012). Higher scores on Factor 1 ‘Ego-Syntonic’ aspects of perfectionism were related 
to value priorities positioned within the Self-Enhancement and Conservation quadrants 
(Schwartz, 1992, 2012). Whilst higher scores on Factor 2 ‘Ego-Dystonic’ aspects of 
perfectionism were only related to value priorities positioned within the Self-Enhancement 
quadrant.  Additionally, results indicated that higher overall perfectionism scores were 
related to higher value priorities of Achievement, Power, Conformity and Security values - 
with higher perfectionism scores and Achievement values having the largest significant 
relationship. Higher scores on Factor 1 ‘Ego-Syntonic’ aspects of perfectionism were related 
to higher value priorities in Achievement, Power, Conformity and Security values.  Whilst, 
higher scores on the Factor 2 ‘Ego-Dystonic’ aspects of perfectionism were only related to 
higher priorities in Achievement and Universalism values.  In regard to behaviour, results 
indicated that higher total perfectionism scores and Factor 1 scores were related to higher 
checking accuracy. Factor 1 ‘Ego-Syntonic’ aspects of perfectionism, suggested to represent 
a ‘healthy or positive’ aspect of perfectionist thinking (Stairs, et al., 2012).  Factor 2 scores 
were approaching significance in relation to Checking Time, suggesting that higher Factor 1 
scores were approaching being related to increased Checking Time. Factor 2 ‘Ego-Dystonic’ 
aspects of perfectionism, suggested to represent more negative aspects of perfectionist 
thinking that may be related to experiences of emotional distress (Stairs, et al., 2012). 
Lastly, in regard to emotional distress, results indicated that higher perfectionism total 
scores, Factor 1 and Factor 2 scores were related to higher self-reported levels of anxiety. 
Higher perfectionism total scores and Factor 2 scores were also related to higher levels of 
self-reported depression. 
 
Hypothesis 2 was focused on the effects of priming social values on behaviour associated 
with perfectionism. Results indicated that Experiment group 1 (Primed for Achievement) 
significantly differed to Control Group 3, with Experiment Group 1 taking up the offer to 
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check more often than the control group. Differences between the priming groups with 
regard to Task Time, Task Accuracy, Checking Time and Checking Accuracy were not 
significant, even when age was considered as a covariate. Results also indicated that higher 
perfectionism scores and Achievement value priorities did not have a significant effect on 
behaviour when Self-Enhancement values were primed. 
 
Hypothesis 3 focused on value discrepancy in relation to value priorities. Results indicated 
that higher Self-Enhancement quadrant scores were related to both AI and AO 
discrepancies, also higher Self-Transcendence quadrant scores were related to both AI and 
AO discrepancies. However, these discrepancies did lay in different values. Higher scores in 
the Self-Enhancement quadrant were related to: higher AI discrepancy in Tradition and 
Power value priorities; lower AI discrepancy in Hedonism and Self-Direction value priorities; 
higher AO discrepancy in Power and Tradition value priorities; and lower AO discrepancy in 
self-direction value priorities. Whilst higher scores in the Self-Transcendence quadrant were 
related to: higher AI discrepancy in Universalism and Benevolence value priorities; lower AI 
discrepancy in Power, Self-Direction and Security value priorities; and lower AO discrepancy 
in Self-Direction, Universalism, Benevolence, and Security values.  
 
Hypothesis 4 focused on value discrepancy in relation to emotional distress and 
perfectionism. Results indicated that larger discrepancy scores in four value priorities 
(Hedonism, Achievement, Security and Stimulation) were related to higher anxiety scores. 
Whilst larger discrepancy scores in four value priorities (Hedonism, Security, Achievement, 
and Benevolence) were related to higher depression scores. Larger AI and AO discrepancy 
between values were related to low mood slightly more than to anxiety.  Higher MCUP total 
scores were related to larger discrepancy scores in three value priorities (Achievement, 
Stimulation and Tradition).Further analysis revealed that MCUP Factor 2 ‘Ego Dystonic’ 
scores were related with higher AO discrepancy in Achievement value priorities positioned 
in the Self-Enhancement quadrant (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, et al., 2012). 
                                                                                                                                                                
The interpretation of the analyses results will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will summarise and interpret the results of the current study, discussing 
findings in relation to the current literature on social values, value discrepancy and 
perfectionism. Clinical implications of the research will be considered in a mental health 
context. The study will be critiqued by outlining its strengths and limitations before 
recommendations for future research are offered. The chapter will then conclude with a 
summary of the current study and a declaration of any conflicts of interest and sponsorship.  
 
4.2 STUDY RESULTS 
 
The current study had four main hypotheses that aimed to explore the effect of priming the 
social value of Achievement on behaviour associated with perfectionism, whilst considering 
value discrepancy and distress.  The focus of the four hypotheses were as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1 focused on perfectionism, social value priorities, behaviour associated with 
perfectionism and distress. The aim of this hypothesis was to review the use of the MCUP in 
measuring perfectionism in relation to the PVQ, behavioural measures and HADS. 
 
Hypothesis 1a - It is predicted that participants who score higher on the 
perfectionism measure will give higher ranking to the values within the Self-
Enhancement quadrant of Schwartz (1992; Schwartz, et al., 2012) circular model. 
Additionally, the value of Achievement will have a higher relative rank with this 
quadrant.  
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Hypothesis 1b –Participants scoring higher on the perfectionism measure will be 
more likely to display the behaviours related to perfectionism than those who score 
lower on the measure. 
 
Hypothesis 1c– Participants scoring higher on the perfectionism measure will be 
more likely to self-report experiences of anxiety and depression on the HADS. 
 
Hypothesis 2 focused on the effects of priming social values on behaviour. The aim of this 
hypothesis was to explore the effect of priming Achievement value priorities on behaviour 
associated with perfectionism.  
 
Hypothesis 2a–Participants who are primed with the Achievement value within the 
Self-Enhancement quadrant of Schwartz (1992) circular model will demonstrate 
increased behaviour associated with perfectionism compared to those who primed 
on opposing value of Benevolence within the opposite Self-Transcendence quadrant 
on the circular model.   
 
Hypothesis 2b - It is predicted that those participants who score higher on the 
perfectionism measure and who value Achievement within the Self-Enhancement 
quadrant, will show the largest increase in behaviour when Self-Enhancement values 
are primed.   
 
Hypothesis 3 focused on value discrepancy and social value priorities. The aim of this 
hypothesis was to explore the amount and type of value discrepancies in Achievement and 
Benevolent value priorities. 
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Hypothesis 3a – It is predicted that those participants who give higher ranking to 
values within the Self-Enhancement quadrant of Schwartz (1992) circular model will 
have larger actual/ideal discrepancy between values rather than actual-ought 
discrepancy between values.  
 
Hypothesis 3b – Furthermore, those participants who give higher ranking to values 
within the Self-Transcendence quadrant will have larger actual/ought discrepancy 
between values rather than actual-ideal discrepancy between values. 
 
Hypothesis 4 focused on value discrepancy and emotional distress, specifically, anxiety and 
depression. The aim of the last hypothesis was to explore amount and type of value 
discrepancies impacting on self-reported anxiety, depression and perfectionism. 
 
Hypothesis 4a –As per Higgins’ (1987) theory, it is predicted larger discrepancy in 
values will relate to higher scores for anxiety and depression.  
 
Hypothesis 4b –Furthermore, the type of value discrepancy will relate to the type of 
emotional distress reported. Based on Higgins (1987) theory, it is predicted that those 
participants who have larger actual/ideal discrepancy between values will report 
lower mood and those participants who have larger actual/ought discrepancy 
between values will report higher anxiety.  
 
Hypothesis 4c – Those who score more highly in helpful perfectionism will differ to 
those who score more lowly in helpful perfectionism – with higher scores in helpful 
perfectionism relating to smaller discrepancy. Whilst those scoring more highly in 
unhelpful perfectionism will differ to those who score more lowly in unhelpful 
perfectionism – with higher scores in unhelpful perfectionism relating to larger 
discrepancy. 
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Hypothesis 4d – Those who score more highly in unhelpful perfectionism will differ to 
those who score more lowly in unhelpful perfectionism – with higher scores in  
unhelpful perfectionism relating to larger actual/ought discrepancies and anxiety. 
 
To investigate these hypotheses, inferential statistical analyses were used to explore the 
data.  
 
4.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
 
Hypotheses 1 was focused on perfectionism in relation to value priorities (PVQ), behaviours 
(Behavioural measures) and emotional distress (HADS). Results indicated that overall higher 
scores on the perfectionism measure were related to higher value priorities positioned in 
the Self-Enhancement (Achievement, Power) and Conservation (Conformity and Security) 
quadrants (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, et al., 2012). In relation to Schwartz (1992) model of 
basic social values, these findings suggest that perfectionism is related to value priorities 
that promote the self (Self-Enhancement) and the existing status quo (Conservation).  
Schwartz, et al. (2012) revised model also proposed that the pursuit of values within the 
Self-Enhancement and Conservation quadrants are self-protective and serve to cope with 
anxiety. This suggests, individuals who prioritise values associated with conservation and 
self-enhancement may be motivated to pursue behaviours associated with self-protection 
and trying to cope with life. In relation to the revised model, findings from the current study 
suggest that perfectionism may be associated with self-protection and coping with anxiety. 
 
Results further indicated that higher scores on Factor 1 ‘Ego-Syntonic’ aspects of 
perfectionism were related to value priorities positioned within the Self-Enhancement and 
Conservation quadrants (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, et al., 2012). Whilst higher scores on 
Factor 2 ‘Ego-Dystonic’ aspects of perfectionism were only related to value priorities 
positioned within the Self-Enhancement quadrant. In relation to Schwartz, et al. (2012) 
these findings suggest that ‘Ego-Syntonic’ aspects of perfectionism were associated with 
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Conservation and Self-Enhancement value priorities– suggesting perfectionism may have 
functioned as a ‘healthy/positive self-protection strategy (Stairs, et al., 2012). Findings also 
suggested that ‘Ego-Dystonic’ aspects of perfectionism were only associated with Self-
Enhancement value priorities  - suggesting perfectionism may have functioned as a more 
‘unhealthy/negative’ strategy (Stairs, et al., 2012).   
 
When looking at individual value priorities, overall perfectionism scores were most 
significantly related to the Achievement value priorities. This suggests that perfectionism 
was related to Achievement values such as being successful, capable, ambitious and 
influential, prioritising personal success though demonstrating competence according to 
social standards (Schwartz, 1992). Findings also suggested that both ‘Ego-Syntonic’ and ‘Ego-
Dystonic’ aspects of perfectionism were associated with Achievement value priorities - 
suggesting perfectionism may have both ‘healthy /positive’ and ‘unhealthy/negative’ 
functions (Stairs, et al., 2012). This appears to support the placement of the Achievement 
values having an overlapping position on the self-protection/self-growth dimension of 
Schwartz, et al. (2012) model, suggesting that perfectionism and Achievement values 
motivations to meet standards may serve to self-protect and cope with anxiety or to 
promote self-growth by expressing ones competence and  anxiety free motivations. 
 
In regard to behaviour, results indicated that higher perfectionism scores were associated 
with increased checking accuracy. ’Ego-Syntonic’ aspects of perfectionism were associated 
with this behaviour, suggesting it represent a ‘healthy or positive’ strategy (Stairs, et al., 
2012).  Lastly, in regard to emotional distress, results indicated that higher perfectionism 
total scores, Factor 1 and Factor 2 scores were related to higher self-reported levels of 
anxiety. Higher perfectionism total scores and factor 2 scores were also related to higher 
levels of self-reported depression. In relation to Stairs, et al. (2012) these findings appear to 
suggest that perfectionism was associated with both healthy/positive anxiety and also 
unhealthy/negative anxiety. Again, this supports perfectionism being associated with 
Achievement values that is proposed to have motivations to meet standards may serve to 
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self-protect and cope with anxiety or to promote self-growth by expressing ones 
competence and  anxiety free motivations  (Schwartz, et al., 2012). 
 
4.2.2 Hypothesis 2  
 
This hypothesis was focused on the effects of priming social values on behaviour associated 
with perfectionism. Results indicated that Experiment group 1 (Primed for Achievement) 
significantly differed to Control Group 3, with Experiment Group 1 taking up the offer to 
check more often than the Control Group. These results suggest that individuals primed 
with Achievement values displayed value congruent behaviour, as taking up the offer to 
check their work may have functioned to increase their personal success though 
demonstrating competence according to the expectations of the researcher (Schwartz, 
1992). In relation to the literature on priming values, these results suggest that priming 
social values increases value congruent behaviour (Maio, et al., 2009; Maio, 2010). 
Differences between the priming groups with regard to Task Time, Task Accuracy, Checking 
Time and Checking Accuracy were not significant, even when age was considered as a 
covariate. Results also indicated that higher perfectionism scores and Achievement value 
priorities did not have a significant effect on behaviour when Self-Enhancement values were 
primed.  
 
4.2.3. Hypothesis 3 
 
Hypothesis 3 focused on value discrepancy in relation to value priorities. Results indicated 
that higher Self-Enhancement quadrant scores were related to both AI and AO 
discrepancies, also higher Self-Transcendence quadrant scores were related to both AI and 
AO discrepancies. Higher scores in the Self-Enhancement quadrant were related to: higher 
AI discrepancy in Tradition and Power value priorities; lower AI discrepancy in Hedonism 
and Self-Direction value priorities; higher AO discrepancy in Power and Tradition value 
priorities; and lower AO discrepancy in Self-Direction value priorities. These results 
 
 
Page 164 of 335 
 
suggested that higher discrepancies were located in more congruent values, whilst lower 
discrepancies were located in opposing values. If individuals are motivated to reduce 
discrepancy (Higgins, 1987) these results suggesting individuals may be more motivated to 
pursue the self-enhancing values that they experience more discrepancy within.  Whilst 
higher scores in the Self-Transcendence quadrant were related to: higher AI discrepancy in 
Universalism and Benevolence value priorities; lower AI discrepancy in Power, Self-Direction 
and Security value priorities; and lower AO discrepancy in Self-Direction, Universalism, 
Benevolence, and Security values. Again, if individuals are motivated to reduce discrepancy 
(Higgins, 1987) these results suggest higher AI discrepancies were located in more 
congruent values, suggesting individuals with higher Self-Transcendence scores may be 
more motivated to pursue the values that promote others that they experience more 
discrepancy within. These findings appear to provide support for Schwartz (1992) and 
Schwartz, et al., 2012) models of basic social values. 
 
4.2.4 Hypothesis 4 
 
Hypothesis 4 focused on value discrepancy in relation to emotional distress and 
perfectionism. Results indicated that larger discrepancy scores in four value priorities 
(Hedonism, Achievement, Security and Stimulation) were related to higher anxiety scores. 
Whilst larger discrepancy scores in four value priorities (Hedonism, Security, Achievement, 
and Benevolence) were related to higher depression scores. Larger AI and AO discrepancy 
between values were related to low mood slightly more than to anxiety.  These results 
appear to support Higgins (1987) theory that discrepancy increases anxiety and low mood, 
however, not that AI and AO discrepancy will predict the type of distress reported.  
 
Higher perfectionism total scores were related to larger discrepancy scores in three value 
priorities (Achievement, Stimulation and Tradition).Further analysis revealed that ‘ego 
dystonic’ aspects of perfectionism were related with higher AO discrepancy in Achievement 
value priorities positioned in the Self-Enhancement quadrant (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, et 
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al., 2012). This finding suggests that perfectionism is associated with the actual pursuit of 
Achievement value priorities (i.e. success, ambition, capability, and influence) not meeting 
the perceived expectations of others. This AO discrepancy may account for the increased 
anxiety and depression reported by individuals higher in perfectionism (Higgins, 1987).  
 
4.3 CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS IN A MENTAL HEALTH CONTEXT 
 
Research in a mental health context has proposed that individuals who experience ‘clinical 
perfectionism’ are motivated to focus on Achievement in life (Fairburn et al., 2003; Shafran 
et al., 2002; Wonderlich, 2002). Research has suggested that perfectionism and a focus on 
Achievement is related to psychological distress; both increasing vulnerability to and 
maintaining psychological difficulties (Egan, et al., 2014). Despite perfectionism and 
Achievement based values sharing conceptual similarities, research in to clinical 
perfectionism appears to not have incorporated social values in to a clinical understanding 
of perfectionism.  
 
The current study aimed to begin to explore Achievement values, perfectionism and 
psychological distress in a non-clinical population. Results suggest that prioritising 
Achievement values was associated with higher levels of perfectionism and increased self-
reports of anxiety and depression. Further, Actual/Ought discrepancies in Achievement 
values were found to be associated with more negative aspects of perfectionism that have 
been associated with increased distress (Stairs, et al., 2012). The current study supports the 
inclusion of Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz, et al. (2012) model of social values and Higgins 
(1987) value discrepancy theory as frameworks for further understanding Achievement 
values, perfectionism and distress in a non-clinical population.   
 
Further research is needed to explore the efficacy of Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz, et al. 
(2012) model of social values and Higgins (1987) value discrepancy theory as frameworks for 
understanding social values, perfectionism and distress with clinical populations in a mental 
health context. Further research on Actual/Ought discrepancies in Achievement values, 
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perfectionism and clinical distress could potentially inform clinical interventions that focus 
on values. 
 
4.4 STUDY CRITIQUE 
 
4.4.1 Strengths  
 
Several strengths of the study will be discussed, including: the unique literature review, 
empirical research, and the study design. 
 
4.4.1.1 Literature Review 
 
The current study conducted a unique systematic literature review of the evidence 
regarding perfectionism and anxiety. The review aimed to collate and critique an empirical 
research literature base exploring the role of perfectionism in experiences of anxiety in an 
adult population.  
 
4.4.1.2 Empirical Research 
 
The current study used an empirical design that provides support for considering social 
values when working with individuals who experience perfectionism and the role that values 
have in relation to value discrepancy and psychological distress. The study findings suggest 
that the inclusion of Schwartz (1992) model of basic social values in psychological 
interventions may support understanding value priorities and the adapted PVQ (Parsons, 
2013; Rees & Maio, 2009) may inform individuals about value discrepancy to further 
understand discrepancy and psychological distress.  
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4.4.1.3 Design 
 
4.4.1.3.1 Sample Size 
 
The participant sample size (90) used in the current study was larger than the sample size 
calculated by power analysis (39).  
 
4.4.1.3.2 Comparison Group 
 
The study made use of both a control group and comparison group to explore the effects of 
social values on behaviour associated with perfectionism. This design allowed for a more 
valid interpretation of effects caused by manipulation variables. 
 
4.4.1.3.3 Randomisation 
 
Participants in the study were randomly allocated to group conditions. Measures were also 
randomly ordered. These processes aimed to reduce researcher bias and any ordering 
effects. 
 
4.4.1.3.4 Measures 
 
The questionnaire measures (MCUP, PVQ, & HADS) used in the study were regarded to have 
high validity. The priming task has also been used by researchers to prime social values 
(Maio, et al., 2009; Maio, 2010; Woodfield, 2014).  
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4.4.2 Limitations 
 
Several limitations of the study will be discussed, including: the literature review, study 
design, and analysis of results. 
 
4.4.2.1 Literature Review 
 
The literature review initially set out to explore the role of perfectionism in anxiety and 
depression. However, due to limitations in the scope of the current study, and a rationale 
based on anxiety being part of Schwartz, et al. (2012) model of values, the literature review 
question was revised to include only anxiety and depression was not part of the review. The 
current study findings suggest that social values and perfectionism are associated with both 
anxiety and depression. Future review of perfectionism and depression may enhance 
understanding in this area. 
 
The review used a Quality framework (SURE) to assess the quality of the 17 studies 
identified. Whilst this framework has been widely used, it is important to note that the 
structure of the framework has a built in inherit bias. The framework places larger weighting 
on items that ask about whether studies have comparison groups, the framework also has 
multiple questions on the processes of randomisation. Therefore, studies which did have 
comparison groups and utilised randomisation scored higher compared to those who did 
not.  
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4.4.2.2 Design 
 
4.4.2.2.1 Sample 
 
The study utilised a non-clinical population that included a majority of undergraduate 
students, individuals who were female, and predominantly of White ethnicity.  These 
limitations in the sample diversity reduce the generalisability of the study results to a wider 
more diverse population and to a clinical population. Previous research by Parsons (2013) 
reported that clinical samples had larger value-discrepancy than non-clinical samples and so 
it would be interesting to repeat his study with clinical samples.  
 
The sample demographics may also have had an impact on the study results, it is possible 
that the population used produced a skewed range of outcomes on the measures used i.e. a 
student population may have all scored within the top percentiles compared to the general 
population on the measures used e.g. students may have scored more highly on 
Achievement value priorities and perfectionism compared to a wider population. It is also 
important to note that students may have been revising for or undergoing exams and so 
Achievement value priorities may have been primed prior to participating in the study, as 
well as participants perhaps having higher than baseline levels of anxiety and depression.  
 
The findings of the study should be considered with caution when applied outside of the 
current population and context. Future research would need to conduct the study with a 
more diverse population before findings can be generalised to any other population. 
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4.4.2.2.2 Procedure  
 
In the experimental task, to avoid participants becoming aware that their behaviour was 
being timed, the researcher was positioned behind the participant. Then as part of the 
debrief procedure, all participants were debriefed using a funnelling technique. None of the 
participants verbalised that they had guessed that they had been primed and what the 
prime was for, they also did not report being aware of being timed. If participants had 
become aware and chose not to verbalise this, they still would not have known whether the 
researcher expected a faster or slower time performance. There are limitations in this 
methodology. Firstly, it relied on participants being forthcoming with their thoughts. 
Secondly, it relied on researcher timing which may have included human error. Future 
studies using computerised tasks and timing may produce a more precise timing count. 
 
It is also possible that individual differences impacted on the experimental task i.e. 
processing speed. To estimate a completion time for the task, it was piloted on two 
individuals who were not attached to the current study.  The task was also produced in size 
12 font to reduce effects of limited eyesight and participants were asked to bring any 
glasses or eyesight correction with them. 
 
4.4.2.2.3 Measures 
 
The questionnaire measures used were all reliant on participants subjectively self-reporting 
their experiences. A limitation with such measures is that participants may provide biased 
responses as well perceived socially desirable responses (Van de Motel, 2008), this may 
have been particularly important for participants who scored more highly on perfectionism 
measures. To account for this bias, a scale to measure perceived social desirability could 
have been used. 
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The questionnaire measures used were also chosen due to the scope of the current study, 
including financial limitations.  The HADS measure was chosen due to being a well validated 
and widely used measure. It is also a short measure that does not take long to complete. 
The studies in the review utilised several anxiety measures and it may useful to use such 
measures in future research and to correlate findings with the HADS.  The current study only 
measured anxiety and depression, as these emotions has been identified as being relevant 
to social values (Schwartz, et al., 2012) and value discrepancy (Higgins, 1987).  Future 
studies could use the HADS alongside other measures of anxiety, depression and wider 
emotional experience. 
 
The MCUP measure was chosen due to its validation and ease of completion. The studies in 
the review had utilised several perfectionism measures, however these have received 
criticism regarding their construct validity. The MCUP proposed to overcome these 
limitations; however it has not been widely used in empirical research and does not have a 
clinical threshold after which perfectionism may be considered to be a ‘clinical’ 
need/difficulty. Future studies could use the MCUP alongside other measures of 
perfectionism. 
 
As previous research has noted perfectionism has been considered to be adaptive or 
maladaptive, it may be that both extremely low and extremely high levels of perfectionism 
are maladaptive (creating an inverted ‘u curve’ when perfectionism is plotted on an x axis 
and functioning or wellbeing is plotted on a y axis on a graph). It may be that whilst the non-
clinical sample used in the current study score highly on the perfectionism measure used, 
they may not fall within ‘extreme score’ ranges and so perfectionism and 
functioning/wellbeing are positively correlated. It is possible that non-clinical and clinical 
populations are situated at different points on such a graph, with clinical populations being 
placed at either end within ‘extreme score’ ranges. Further research is needed to explore 
the range of perfectionism scores utilising the MCUP measure with wider and clinical 
populations.  
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The current study used the original PVQ 40-item measure adapted to incorporate Higgins 
(1987) model of self-discrepancies. Whilst Schwartz, et al. (2012) has revised the PVQ, this 
version is longer and has not yet been widely researched in terms of its validity. Therefore 
using the original model may be considered a limitation, however, it terms of making the 
study time appealing to participants and using a more widely validated the measure, the 
original PVQ appeared to be a more efficient choice of measure. 
 
The adapted PVQ has not yet been widely researched in terms of its validity and so further 
research would enhance the understanding of the properties of the measure. In the current 
study, the PVQ findings did appear to reflect the cross cultural patterns reported by 
Schwartz (1992). On reflection, the Adapted PVQ used the term ‘should’ rather than ‘ought’. 
This may have impacted on the way that participants understood the questions. To review if 
the should items relate to ought concepts, future studies could adapt the measure to 
include ought statements. Participants could also be asked about their understanding of the 
actual, ideal and should/ought concepts as in previous research (Rees & Maio, 2009). 
 
4.4.2.3 Results 
 
The study hypotheses were focused on exploring Achievement values and perfectionism. 
However, it is important to note that other social values have also been associated with 
perfectionism.  Individuals who experiences have been considered to meet diagnostic 
criteria for obsessive compulsive difficulties often score highly on perfectionism measures 
and have been suggested to have an increased sense of personal responsibility that may be 
associated with “a high degree of conscientiousness, marked by dedication to work and an 
acute sense of social obligation” (Salkovskis, et al., 1999, pp. 1060). In this clinical 
population, perfectionism associated with self-criticism about being caring enough appears 
to be focused more on social conscientiousness and benevolent values. It is important to 
acknowledge that whilst social values may appear to be distinct within the theory; in 
practise such concepts may be more complex. Further research is needed to explore values 
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associated with perfectionism and how these relate,  in both wider non-clinical and clinical 
populations e.g. when does wanting to be caring towards others become less about a desire 
for benevolence and more about a desire for personal achievement through meeting one’s 
own high standards of caring for others.  
 
In light of the research on transforming data and using non parametric tests when 
assumptions for parametric tests have not been met, the current study chose to go ahead 
with parametric analysis. The analysis conducted did not provide the casual direction of 
relationships between values, perfectionism, discrepancy or distress. Several correlations 
were calculated to test specific hypothesis. Whilst each correlation had a rationale it is 
important to note that multiple correlations may increase type 1 errors, i.e. incorrectly 
reporting the presence of a significant correlation, and so should be considered with 
caution. To account for the increased likelihood that type 1 errors may have occurred, the 
significance level may be adjusted so that it is more conservative, moving from a 
significance threshold of .05 to 0.1.  
 
Despite there being statistically significant findings from the study, it is important to note 
that such findings are not presumed to be clinically significant. The calculation of statistical 
significance does offer a method for working out the probability that the study findings may 
have occurred by chance and would not be found if the study was repeated. However, these 
probability values (e.g. that findings had a .01 (1%) or 0.5 (5%) probability of occurring by 
chance) are arbitrary and do not reflect an actual measurement of the degree or 
meaningfulness of the effect seen in the study. Instead, clinical significance may be used as 
a concept to consider whether the findings in the study were enough to have impact on 
altering clinical practice. Whilst clinical judgement would be used in deciding whether a 
study and its findings were sufficient to have clinical importance, statistical calculations may 
also be used to inform clinical judgement through the use of confidence intervals. 
Confidence intervals offer likely range of results within which the true finding is likely to sit, 
this information may be more useful for a clinician.  
 
 
 
Page 174 of 335 
 
4. 5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The current study has provided support for the social value of Achievement and value 
discrepancy being associated with perfectionism and psychological distress in a non-clinical 
population. However, further research is needed to explore these findings and increase 
understanding of values and discrepancy and the efficacy of these concepts applied to a 
mental health context.  
 
Future research could explore social values and perfectionism with larger, diverse and 
clinical populations.  Research could also explore other social value priorities in relation to 
other behaviours associated with mental health or psychological distress. It would also be 
interesting to explore the hypothesis that living (i.e. behaving) consistently with values 
promotes psychological wellbeing and that living (i.e. behaving) inconsistently with values is 
a risk factor for experiencing psychological distress. Research by Parsons (2013) reported 
clinical samples to have larger value discrepancies than non-clinical samples; it would be 
interesting to explore value discrepancy further in clinical populations in relation to 
psychological distress. 
 
The current study did not explore value discrepancy direction but a study from the review 
suggested that lower levels of social anxiety were associated with negative discrepancy 
scores i.e. others standards were rated lower than an individual’s own efficacy, regardless of 
SPP and so individuals thought they could match or exceed others expectations. In contrast, 
higher levels of social anxiety were associated with positive discrepancy scores i.e. others 
standards were rated higher than an individual’s own self efficacy, increasing with SPP and 
so individuals thought they could not meet the expectations of others. Laurenti, et al. 
(2008). Future research could explore the direction of value discrepancy and the impact this 
has on behaviour and emotional distress. 
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The current study found that both anxiety and depression were associated with social 
values. Social value motivations in relation to depression are not currently included in 
Schwartz, et al. (2012) model of basic values. Future research in this area would add to the 
current understanding of social value priorities and experiences of depression. Future 
research could also add to this area by exploring other emotional experiences. 
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4.9 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 4 
 
The current study applied Schwartz (1992) model of basic social values and Maio (2010) 
theory of priming values to explore the effect of priming social values on behaviour 
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associated with perfectionism. The study also considered Higgins (1987) theory of self-
discrepancy to explore the concept of value discrepancy and self-reported anxiety and 
depression. 
 
The study found that higher perfectionism was related to Self-Enhancement and 
Conservation value priorities, with strongest relations to Achievement values. These findings 
suggest that perfectionism was related to value priorities that promote the self and the 
existing status quo, whilst being self-protective and serve to cope with anxiety. 
Perfectionism was found to have both a ‘healthy/positive’ and ‘unhealthy/negative’ aspect 
(Stairs, et al.,2012). This appears to support Achievement being related to perfectionism, as 
Achievement values have an overlapping position on the self-protection/self-growth 
dimension of Schwartz, et al. (2012) model. Priming Achievement increased perfectionist 
behaviour associated with more ‘healthy or positive’ behaviour. Results indicated that 
higher perfectionism was related to higher self-reported levels of anxiety and depression. 
‘Unhealthy/negative’ perfectionism were related with higher AO discrepancy in 
Achievement value, suggesting that perfectionism was associated with the actual pursuit of 
Achievement value priorities (i.e. success, ambition, capability, and influence) not meeting 
the perceived expectations of others.  
 
The current study provides empirical support for the inclusion of a theory and model of 
values and value discrepancy to further understanding perfectionism and distress in a 
mental health context. Further research is needed to explore the use of Schwartz (1992) 
theory and model of social values and the PVQ (Schwartz, 1992) or adapted PVQ measure 
(Rees & Maio, 2009; Parsons, 2013) in clinical assessments, formulations and interventions 
to further understand social values in relation to behaviour and psychological distress. The 
current study lends some support to priming social values leading to value congruent 
behaviour, however further research is needed to explore priming behaviours related to 
clinical presentations.  
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Appendix 1 Systematic Review Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Studies identified using the search 
terms and databases 
392 
Studies checked to ensure they were 
written in English, published in a peer 
reviewed journal, had human adult 
samples aged over 18 years old and 
were empirical. 
270 
122 studies excluded 
Study titles and abstracts checked for 
relevance to the review question. 
239 
31 studies excluded 
70 studies excluded 
Studies limited to those published in the 
last 10 years 
169 
93 studies excluded 
Full papers were retrieved and examine 
in more detail. Studies included 
measured perfectionism and anxiety 
59 
9 studies excluded 
Posters, conference papers and 
presidential addresses were excluded 
67 
8 studies excluded 
Studies limited to those on 
perfectionism and anxiety  
76 
Studies checked for experimental design 
15 
44 studies excluded  
References of studies reviewed for any 
further studies that met inclusion 
criteria  
17 
These 17 studies were eligible to be 
included in the systematic review  
8 studies identified, 6 studies excluded 
 
2 studies included 
 
Appendix 2 Systematic Review Results 
 
Study 
Author 
(Date) 
Number of 
Participants 
(Population Type, 
Age range, Mean, 
Gender, Ethnicity 
Study 
Design Measures for Perfectionism 
Measures for 
Anxiety Other Measures Key Focus Results (Effect Sizes) Key Findings 
Aldea, et al 
(2010) 59 Participants  
Mixed 
experim
ental 
design 
Almost Perfect Scale-Revised (APS-
R) (Slaney, et al, 1996, 2001) 
 Psychological 
Distress subscale for 
Phobic Anxiety  
Differentiation of Self 
Inventory (DSI) (Skowron 
& Friedlader, 1998) 
Determining the 
efficacy of receiving 
feedback  Correlation Time 1 
Discrepancy scores were 
significantly related to distress 
scores across time. 
  
Undergraduate 
students   
 
- Brief Symptom 
Inventory (BSI) 
(Derogatis, 1993)   
Rosenberg Self Esteem 
Inventory (Rosenberg, 
1965, 1979) 
in a sample of 
maladaptive 
perfectionists 
High Standards x Global 
Severity = -.06 (not sig) 
Maladaptive perfectionist 
participants who reported higher 
than average  
  
Range not 
reported, Mean 
age: 19.68, 
SD:1.74,    
 
  
 
  
Discrepancy x Global Severity = 
.30 (sig p<.05) 
discrepancy scores also reported 
higher distress scores across time. 
  
78% 
female/22%male   
 
  
 
  Correlation Time 2 
High Standards scores were not 
significantly associated with 
distress scores across time. 
  
53% White or 
European 
American, 15% 
Hispanic/ Latino,   
 
  
 
  
High Standards x Global 
Severity = .00 (not sig) 
It was not how high individuals 
standards were but how much they 
believed they were 
  
14% Asian or 
Asian American, 
8% Black or 
African American,    
 
  
 
  
Discrepancy x Global Severity = 
.42 (sig p<.05) 
failing to meet standards that 
contributed to experience of 
distress across time. 
  
7% Multicultural 
Mixed Race, and 
1% Pacific 
Islander   
 
  
 
  Correlation Time 3 
The intervention condition was a 
significant, negative predictor of 
Time 3 distress scores with 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
High Standards x Global 
Severity = .12(not sig) 
individuals receiving the 
intervention reported significantly 
lower levels of distress at  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Discrepancy x Global Severity = 
.44 (sig p<.05) 
Time 3 than those who did not 
receive the intervention.  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Hierarchal Linear Regression 
Maladaptive perfectionists who 
received feedback were less 
distressed two weeks 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Unconditional Model  
later than those who did not 
receive feedback.  
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Mean Outcome t=13.67 (sig 
p<.001) 
19% of the variance in distress 
between people was accounted for 
by discrepancy levels and  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Level 1 model with time group condition 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Mean time 3 outcome t = 
11.01 (sig p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Mean change in outcome t = 
3.01 (sig p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Level 1 model with 
perfectionism    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Mean time  3 outcome t=12.00 
(sig p<.001)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Mean change in outcome 
t=2.78 (sig p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Discrepancy on outcome  
t=4.01 (sig p<.001)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
High standards on outcome t=-
0.45 (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Level 2 with intervention 
condition   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Mean time  3 outcome  t=9.34 
(sig p<.001)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Mean change in outcome 
t=2.78 (sig p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Discrepancy on outcome  t= 
4.53 (sig p<.001)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
High standards on outcome t=-
0.54 (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Intervention condition on time 
3 outcome t=-2.45 (sig p<.05)   
Arpin-
Cribbie,  
Irvine & 
Ritvo 
(2012)  77 Participants 
RCT 
Interven
tion  
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (MPS) (Frost, et al., 1990) 
Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (Beck, et 
al., 1988) 
Centre for Epidemiologic 
Studies- Depressed Mood 
Scale (Radloff 1987) 
Assessed the 
effectiveness of a 
web-based CBT 
intervention in Paired T-Tests 
For individuals in the CBT 
intervention there were significant 
changes on perfectionism and 
anxiety 
  
Undergraduate 
students   
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (MPS) (Hewitt & Flett, 1991) 
Anxiety Sensitivity 
Index (ASI) (Reiss, et 
al., 1986) 
Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire (ATQ)  
(Hollon & Kendall 1987) 
 reducing 
perfectionism and 
psychological distress  
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy 
Pre/Post 
scales except the BAI. For 
individuals in the General Stress 
Management  intervention there 
were  
  
Age range 18-48, 
Mean age 20.14,  
SD: 4.14   
Perfectionism Cognitions 
Inventory (PCI) (Flett, et al., 1998)   
Creditability Expectancy 
Questionnaire (CEQ) ( 
Devilly & Borkovec, 2000)   
Self-Orientated Perfectionism 
(sig p<.01) 
significant changes on four of scales 
(ASI, CM, PCI, SOP). Lastly, for 
individuals in the no intervention 
  
70% female, 30% 
male   
Almost Perfect Scale-Revised (APS-
R) (Slaney, et al., 2001)   
 
  
Other Orientated 
Perfectionism  (sig p<.05) 
group there were no significant 
changes on any scales. In the CBT 
intervention, Other  Orientated  
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Ethnicity not 
reported   
 
  
 
  
Socially Prescribed 
Perfectionism  (sig p<.01) 
Perfectionism scores were not 
significantly correlated with the 
anxiety scales. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Concern over Mistakes  (sig 
p<.01) 
In the CBT intervention, the 
perfectionism scores for: SOP, SPP, 
PCI, CM and DIS, decreased  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Discrepancy  (sig p<.01) 
Significantly more than scores in 
the no intervention group. In the 
CBT intervention group 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Perfectionism Cognitions  (sig 
p<.01) 
perfectionism scores for SOP, SPP, 
PCI and CM, scores decreased 
significantly more than in the 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Beck Anxiety Inventory  (not 
sig) 
General Stress Management 
intervention.  In the General Stress 
Management intervention, the 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Anxiety Sensitivity  (sig p<.05) 
 perfectionism scores for: SOP, PCI,  
CM and DIS  decreased significantly 
more than in the no  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
General Stress Management 
Pre/Post intervention group. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Self-Orientated Perfectionism  
(sig p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Other Orientated 
Perfectionism (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Socially Prescribed 
Perfectionism (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Concern over Mistakes  (sig 
p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Discrepancy (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Perfectionism Cognitions  (sig 
p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Beck Anxiety Inventory  (not 
sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Anxiety Sensitivity  (sig p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  No Treatment Pre/Post   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Self-Orientated Perfectionism  
(not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Other Orientated 
Perfectionism (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Socially Prescribed 
Perfectionism (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Concern over Mistakes (not 
sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Discrepancy (not sig)   
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Perfectionism Cognitions (not 
sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Beck Anxiety Inventory (not 
sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Anxiety Sensitivity (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Correlations CBT group   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Self-Orientated Perfectionism 
(x Beck Anxiety Inventory = .44, 
sig p<.05) (x Anxiety Sensitivity 
= .41, sig p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Other Orientated 
Perfectionism   (x Beck Anxiety 
Inventory = .22, not sig) (x 
Anxiety Sensitivity = .34, not 
sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Socially Prescribed 
Perfectionism  (x Beck Anxiety 
Inventory = .44, sig p<.05) (x 
Anxiety Sensitivity = .45, sig 
p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Concern over Mistakes  (x Beck 
Anxiety Inventory = .36, not 
sig) (x Anxiety Sensitivity = .44, 
sig p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Discrepancy  (x Beck Anxiety 
Inventory = .29, not sig) (x 
Anxiety Sensitivity = .45, sig 
p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Perfectionism Cognitions  (x 
Beck Anxiety Inventory = .64, 
sig p<.01) (x Anxiety Sensitivity 
= .49, sig p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  ANCOVA   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy - 
General Stress Management   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Self-Orientated Perfectionism  
(sig, p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Other Orientated 
Perfectionism  (sig, p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Socially Prescribed 
Perfectionism   (sig, p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Perfectionism Cognitions (sig, 
p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Concern Over Mistakes  (sig,   
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p<.05) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Discrepancy   (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Beck Anxiety Inventory   (not 
sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Anxiety Sensitivity (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy - 
No Treatment   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Self-Orientated Perfectionism  
(sig, p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Other Orientated 
Perfectionism  (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Socially Prescribed 
Perfectionism   (sig, p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Perfectionism Cognitions  (sig, 
p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Concern Over Mistakes (sig, 
p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Discrepancy  (sig, p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Beck Anxiety Inventory  (sig, 
p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Anxiety Sensitivity (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
General Stress Management - 
No Treatment   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Self-Orientated Perfectionism  
(sig, p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Other Orientated 
Perfectionism  (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Socially Prescribed 
Perfectionism  (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Perfectionism Cognitions (sig, 
p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Concern Over Mistakes (sig, 
p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Discrepancy (sig, p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Beck Anxiety Inventory  (sig, 
p<.05)   
      
 
  
 
  Anxiety Sensitivity (not sig)   
Arpin-
Cribbie, et 
al. (2008) 83 Participants 
RCT 
Interven
tion  
Concern over Mistakes Subscale 
(CM) - Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (Frost et al. 
1990) 
Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAI) 
(Beck, et al. 1988) 
Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire (ATQ) 
(Hollon & Kendall 1987) 
Assessed the 
effectiveness of a 
web-based 
psychoeducational Paired T-Tests 
For individuals in the CBT 
intervention there were significant 
changes on all of the scales except  
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Undergraduate 
students   
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (Hewitt & Flett 1991)   
Centre for Epidemiologic 
Studies-Depressed Mood 
Scale (CESD) (Radloff 
1987)  
intervention protocol 
for decreasing levels 
of perfectionism and  
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy 
Pre/Post 
the BAI.  For GSM participants, 
significant changes were on the 
SOP, the CM, and the PCI. 
  
Age range 18-48, 
Mean age 20.14, 
SD: 4.14   
Perfection Cognitions Inventory 
(PCI) (Flett, et al., 1998)   
 
psychological distress. 
Self-Orientated Perfectionism 
(sig p<.01) 
No significant changes were noted 
for NT participants. Post-test 
perfectionism was significantly 
  
 70% female, 30% 
male   
 
  
 
  
Socially Prescribed 
Perfectionism  (sig p<.01) 
 predicted from pretest 
perfectionism, z = 4.27, p<.001. 
Posttest psychological distress 
factor  
  
Ethnicity not 
reported   
 
  
 
  
Concern over Mistakes  (sig 
p<.01) 
was significantly predicted from 
pretest psychological  distress 
factor, z = 6.27, p<.001. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Perfectionism Cognitions  (sig 
p<.01) 
level of therapeutic intervention 
significantly predicted the amount 
of change in perfectionism, 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Beck Anxiety Inventory  (not 
sig) 
  z = 5.560, p<.001. Those receiving 
more therapeutic intervention 
showed greater improvement than 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
General Stress Management 
Pre/Post 
those receiving less therapeutic 
intervention. Level of therapeutic 
intervention also predicted 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Self-Orientated Perfectionism  
(sig p<.01) 
 amount of change in psychological 
distress, z = 2.774, p = .002, where 
again those receiving more  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Socially Prescribed 
Perfectionism (not sig) 
therapeutic intervention showed 
greater improvement than those 
receiving less therapeutic  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Concern over Mistakes  (sig 
p<.01) 
intervention. changes in 
perfectionism were significantly 
associated with changes in 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Perfectionism Cognitions  (sig 
p<.01)  psychological distress.  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Beck Anxiety Inventory  (not 
sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  No Treatment Pre/Post   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Self-Orientated Perfectionism  
(not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Socially Prescribed 
Perfectionism (not sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Concern over Mistakes (not 
sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Perfectionism Cognitions (not 
sig)   
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Beck Anxiety Inventory (not 
sig)   
Ashbaugh, 
et al. 
(2007)  107 Participants 
Within 
Interven
tion 
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (MPS) (Frost et al, 1990) 
Social Phobia Scale 
(Mattick & Clarke, 
1998)    
To investigate the 
extent to which 
various dimensions of  Paired T-Tests 
Individuals showed a significant 
decrease on both measures of 
social anxiety, self-reported  
  
Outpatients - all 
participants had a 
principal 
diagnosis of social 
phobia based on 
DSM-IV   
 
Social Interaction 
Anxiety Scale (SAIS) 
(Mattick & Clarke, 
1998)  
 
perfectionism change 
as a result of 
participating in a  Anxiety Pre/Post 
anxiety. Overall perfectionism 
scores, CM and DA subscales 
decreased post intervention. 
However,  
  
Age range not 
reported, Mean 
age: 36.31, SD: 
10.94   
 
Depression Anxiety 
Stress Scales (DASS) 
(Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995) 
 
12 session CBT group 
for social phobia. 
SPS  t=131.45  (Sig, p<.0001) 
(Cohen’s d=1.08) 
after controlling for the number of 
analyses conducted, decreases in 
the DA subscale were no  
  
53% female, 47% 
male   
 
  
 
  
SAIS  t=123.28 (Sig, p<.0001) 
(Cohen’s d=1.08) longer significant.  
  
Caucasian 95%, 
African American 
1%, Hispanic 2%, 
Unknown 2%    
 
  
 
  
DASS- 21 -A  t=22.06 (Sig, 
p<.0001) (Cohen’s d=.42) 
Pre intervention levels of 
perfectionism were not significant 
predictors of treatment outcome 
after 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Perfectionism Pre/Post 
controlling for pre intervention 
levels of social anxiety and anxiety .  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Total MPS t=8.04 (sig, p<.01) 
(Cohen’s d=.26) 
However, changes on the DA 
predicted post intervention levels 
of social anxiety, even after  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
CM t=17.04 (sig, p<.0001) 
(Cohen’s d=.41) 
controlling for changes in general 
psychopathology and levels of 
social anxiety.  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
DA t=7.39 (sig, p<.05) (Cohen’s 
d=.25)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
PS t=.64 (not sig) (Cohen’s 
d=.07)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
PE t=.001 (not sig) (Cohen’s 
d=.00)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
PC t=1.17 (not sig) (Cohen’s 
d=.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
OR t=6.80 (sig, p<.01) (Cohen’s 
d=.26)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Hierarchal Linear Regression - 
SPS   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 1 was significant for the 
SPS accounting for 49% of the 
variance   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 2 was significant for the 
SPS  [R2 change= .05, F(3,   
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101)=3.55, P<.05]  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 3 was not significant    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Hierarchal Linear Regression - 
SIAS   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 1 was significant for the 
SIAS, accounting for 31% of the 
variance   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 2 was significant for the 
SIAS [R2 change=.07, F(3, 
100)=3.86, P<.05].   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 3 was not significant    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Multiple Regression - SPS   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Level 1 with social anxiety 
scores and DASS-21 residual 
change scores (RCS)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
R=.847, R2=.72, F(4, 
101)=64.28, P<.001   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Level 2 with perfectionism 
scores CM, DA, and OR  
residual change scores (RCS)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Total MPS  R=.85, R2=.72,  F(1, 
100)=2.04, P<.16   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
CM   R=.85, R2=.73, F(1, 
100)=2.85, P<.09   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
DA  R=.86, R2=.74, F(1, 
100)=8.38, P<.01   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
OR R=.85, R2=.72,  F(1, 
100)=.35, P<.55   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Multiple Regression - SAIS   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Level 1 with social anxiety 
scores and DASS-21 residual 
change scores (RCS)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
R=.74, R2=.54, F(4, 100 =29.42, 
p<.001   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Level 2 with perfectionism 
scores: Total MPS, CM, DA, 
and OR  residual change 
scores (RCS)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Total MPS R=.74, R2=.55, F(1, 
99) = .88, P<.35   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
CM  R=.74, R2=.55, F(1, 
99)=2.53, P<.12   
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DA R=.76, R2=.58, F(1, 
99)=9.68, P<.01   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
OR R=.74, R2=.55, F(1, 
99)=1.41, P<.24   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
The Sobel test -  indirect effect 
for  mediation of SPS by DA 
RCS   
              
Sobel=.04, z=1.50, P<.13 (not 
sig)   
Brown, & 
Kocovski  
(2014)  104 Participants 
Within 
Experim
ental  Trait perfectionism  
Social Interaction 
Anxiety Scale (SAIS)  
(Mattick & Clarke, 
1998) 
Rumination subscale - 
Rumination and 
Reflection Questionnaire 
(Trapnell & Campbell, 
1999) 
To examine 
perfectionism in both 
state and trait forms,  Correlations 
Trait and state perfectionism scores 
were a significant predictor of post 
event rumination two days  
  Students    
Concern about Mistakes (CM) 
Subscale  - Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (Frost, et al, 
1990) State Anxiety 
Beck Depression 
Inventory  (BDI) (Beck et 
al, 1996) 
as a predictor or post-
event rumination 
LSAS x Trait CM/DA .38 (sig, 
p<.01) after a speech.  
  
Age Range not 
reported, Mean 
age: 18.58, SD: 
109.    
Doubts about Actions (DA) 
Subscale  - Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (Frost, et al, 
1990) 
Subjective Units of 
Distress Scale (SUDS) 
(Wople, 1969) 
Modified Version of the 
Post Event Processing 
Questionnaire (Fehm, 
2008)   LSAS x Trait SPP .43 (sig, p<.01) 
Baseline social anxiety and state 
anxiety were significantly 
correlated with PEP.  
  
69% female, 31% 
male   State perfectionism   
 
  LSAS x SUDS .43 (sig, p<.01) 
State anxiety was a significant 
predictor in the model predicting 
PEP, but not TQ-Negative,  
  
73.1% White, 23% 
Asian    
Adapted version of the Concern 
about Mistakes (CM) Subscale  - 
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (Frost, et al, 1990)   
 
  
LSAS x State CM/DA .49 (sig, 
p<.01) 
whereas baseline social anxiety was 
significant in both models. 
However, when perfectionism  
  
 
  
Adapted version of the Doubts 
about Actions (DA) Subscale  - 
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (Frost, et al, 1990)   
 
  
LSAS x State SPP .38 (sig, 
p<.01) 
was added into the models, state 
anxiety and baseline social anxiety 
were no longer significant 
  
 
  
Socially Prescribed Perfection 
(SPP) Subscale - Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (Hewitt & Flett 
1991)   
 
  
SUDS x State CM/DA .47 (sig, 
p<.01) 
predictors. In three of the four 
models, state perfectionism was 
the only significant predictor in 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
SUDS x State SPP .38 (sig, 
p<.01) 
 the final model. In the remaining 
model, trait perfectionism was the 
only significant predictor  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
SUDS x  Trait CM/DA .30 (sig, 
p<.01) 
Finding if a socially anxious 
individual is not concerned about 
having made mistakes during a  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  SUDS x Trait SPP .30 (sig, social event, then that individual 
 
 
Page 214 of 335 
 
p<.01) will be less likely to dwell on that 
event at a later time. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Trait CM/DA x  State CM/DA 
.56 (sig, p<.01) 
 Similarly, if the individual feels that 
others are not expecting perfection, 
then dwelling on the event   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Trait CM/DA x  State SPP .47 
(sig, p<.01) 
would be less likely. Concluding 
perfectionism may maintain social 
anxiety, at least in part, by 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Trait SPP x  State CM/DA .55 
(sig, p<.01) 
leading to greater post-event 
rumination. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Trait SPP x State SPP .51 (sig, 
p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Trait CM/DA x  PEPQ .32 (sig, 
p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Trait CM/DA x  TQ Negative .42 
(sig, p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Trait SPP x  PEPQ .40 (sig, 
p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Trait SPP x TQ Negative .32 
(sig, p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
State  CM/DA x  PEPQ .60 (sig, 
p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
State CM/DA x  TQ Negative 
.46 (sig, p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
State SPP x  PEPQ .57 (sig, 
p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
State SPP x TQ Negative .41 
(sig, p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  LSAS x PEPQ .44 (sig, p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
LSAS x TQ Negative .42 (sig, 
p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  SUDS  x PEPQ .43 (sig, p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
SUDS x TQ Negative .33 (sig, 
p<.01)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Hierarchal Linear Regression - 
TQ Negative   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 1  F Change (3, 87) = 7.90, 
p\.001    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 2 F Change (1, 86) = 6.50, 
p\.05,   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 3   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Hierarchal Linear Regression - 
PEPQ   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 1 F Change (3 87) = 10.83,   
 
 
Page 215 of 335 
 
p\.01  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 2   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 3  F Change (1, 85) = 
15.52, p\.01.    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Hierarchal Linear Regression - 
TQ Negative & SPP   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 1   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 2   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 3  F Change (1,85) = 4.35, 
p\.05.   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Hierarchal Linear Regression - 
PEPQ & SPP   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 1   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 2  F Change (1,86) = 4.02, 
p\.05.   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 3 F Change (1, 85) = 
14.87, p\.01    
Burns, Lee  
& Brown 
(2011)  43 Participants 
Within 
Interven
tion 
Perfectionistic Cognitions 
Inventory (Flett, et al.,1998) Trait Anxiety  
Perceive Stress Scale- 
(Cohen, Kamarck & 
Mermelstein, 1983) 
The effects of 
meditation 
specifically on 
experiences of stress,  
Group 1 - Paired T Tests  
Pre/Post Intervention 
Results suggest TM interventions 
may significantly reduce trait 
anxiety but not perfectionism. 
  College Students   
 
Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAI) 
(Kohn, et al., 2001) 
Centre for Epidemiologic 
Studies- Depressed Mood 
Scale (Radloff 1987) 
anxiety, depression 
and perfectionistic 
thoughts 
Trait anxiety t(16) = 2.47, 
p<.025 (sig)   
  
Age range not 
reported, Mean 
age 19.55   
 
  
 
  
Perfectionistic Thinking t(16) = 
2.88, p<.11 (reported as sig, 
*error as  figures reported 
suggest not sig)   
  
58% female, 42% 
male   
 
  
 
  
Group 2- Paired T Tests  
Pre/Post Intervention   
  
European 59.3%, 
biracial/multiracia
l – 14.8%, African 
origin 7.4%, Asian 
7.4%,    
 
  
 
  
Trait anxiety t(12) = 3.36, 
p<.007 (sig)   
  
Hispanic 7.4%, 
indigenous 3.7%   
 
  
 
  
Perfectionistic Thinking t(12) = 
2.05, p<.063 (not sig)   
Chabaud, 
Ferrand & 
Maury 
(2010)  65 Participants 
Mixed 
experim
ental 
design 
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (MPS) Hewitt & Flett, 1991) 
State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory form Y2 
(STAI; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene,   
To examine how 
undergraduate 
student athletes 
organised 
Vignette (8 levels) x Group (2 
levels: high and low trait 
anxiety and perfectionism) = 
F(7, 504) = 3.44, p < .001. 
The 2 groups both placed the 
nonprocrastinator vignette 
  
Undergraduate 
students   
 
Vagg & Jacobs, 1983) 
 
different explanations 
relating to 
 
in the first position, but rated 
differently the behavioural self-
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behavioural 
procrastination into a 
hierarchy. 
handicap of reveller drinker and 
  mean age 19.14   
 
  
 
  
 
perfectionism with high standards 
vignettes. 
  
No gender 
reported   
 
  
 
  
 
In the group scoring high in TA and 
perfectionism (see Figure 1A), 
vignettes 
  
No ethnicity 
reported   
 
  
 
  
 
were classified in ascending order 
between two control vignettes. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
both groups a nonprocrastinator 
tends to have higher levels of 
purposive use of 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
time, control of time, and self-
efficacy than does a procrastinator 
(Chu & Choi, 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
2005; Vodanovich & Seib, 1997). 
However, participants scoring high 
on TA and 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
perfectionism significantly 
differentiated between the two 
control situations in 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
procrastinating situations. In other 
words, they distinctly identified 
three groups 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
of vignettes: a nonprocrastinator 
vignette, procrastination vignettes, 
and a self-handicapping 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
vignette.  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 In contrast, participants scoring 
low in TA and perfectionism 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
did not significantly differentiate 
between this behavioural self-
handicap and 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
other procrastinating behaviours. 
Instead, identified two groups of 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
vignettes: a nonprocrastinator 
vignette and a group containing 
procrastination 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
and self-handicapping vignettes. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
although the positions of vignette 2 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
(Socially prescribed perfectionism 
and anxiety) and vignette 5 
(Perfectionism 
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with high standards) in the 
classification order of the two 
groups includes some 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
differences, the results lend 
support to the maladaptive aspects 
of perfectionism 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
associated with procrastination. 
Cox & Chen 
(2014)  48 Participants  
Within 
Experim
ental  
Doubts about Actions (DA) 
Subscale  - Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (Frost, et al, 
1990) 
Stait Anxiety Rating 
(SAR) (Rapee & 
Abbott, 2007) 
Speech Performance 
Questionnaire (SPQ) 
(Rapee & Lim, 1992) 
To examine how 
perfectionism is 
contributing to social 
anxiety and  Correlations 
All indirect relations regarding SPP 
were statistically significant 
  
Undergraduate 
students   
Socially Prescribed Perfection 
(SPP) Subscale - Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (Hewitt & Flett 
1991) 
Brief Fear of 
Negative Evaluation 
Scale–
Straightforward 
Items (BFNE-S) 
 
its cognitive 
processes of post-
event rumination and 
self-perception 
DAA x Social anxiety = .71 (sig, 
p<.001) 
the current results showed that  
SPP and DAA directly influenced 
trait social anxiety, but 
  
Age range 18-55, 
Mean age 23.94, 
SD: 9.05   
 
(Weeks, et al., 2005) 
 
 of performance 
following a speech 
task 
DAA  x State anxiety = .23 (not 
sig) 
 did not directly influence 
rumination or self-perception of 
performance and only DAA 
influenced 
  
71% female 29% 
male    
 
  
 
  
SPP x Social anxiety = .54 (sig, 
p<.001) 
state anxiety directly. SPP and DAA 
indirectly influenced rumination 
through trait social anxiety 
  
Ethnicity not 
reported   
 
  
 
  
SPP x State anxiety = .41 (sig, 
p<.01) 
or in sequence through trait social 
anxiety, state anxiety, and self-
perception of performance. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Mediation Models 
SPP and DAA influenced self-
perception of performance through 
trait social anxiety or serially 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Model a 
 through trait social anxiety and 
state anxiety.  showed that trait 
social anxiety did not directly 
influence 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (a) DAA → SA → StA 1.68 . 
rumination but did have an indirect 
influence through its relationship 
with state anxiety  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (b) DAA → SA → StA → PP 1.21  and self-perception of performance 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(c) DAA → SA → StA → PP → R 
1.04   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (d) DAA → SA → R 1.43    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (e) DAA → PP → R .45    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (f) DAA → SA → PP 1.34    
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  (g) DAA → StA → PP .46    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (h) DAA → StA → PP → R .39    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (i) SA → StA → PP .57    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (j) SA → StA → PP → R .48   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (k) StA → PP → R .65   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (l) SA → PP → R .54   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Model b   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (a) SPP → SA → StA .26   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (b) SPP → SA → StA → PP .19   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
(c) SPP → SA → StA → PP → R 
.16    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (d) SPP → SA → R .29    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (e) SPP → PP → R .29   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (f) SPP → SA → PP .19    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (g) SPP → StA → PP .26    
              (h) SPP → StA → PP → R .22    
Egan, et al 
(2014)  52 Participants  
RCT 
Interven
tion  
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (FMPS) (Frost et al., 1990) 
Depression Anxiety 
and Stress Scale 
(DASS-21) (Lovibond 
& Lovibond, 1995) 
Dichotomous Thinking in 
Eating Disorders Scale 
(DTEDS)  (Byrne, Cooper, 
& Fairburn, 2004) 
Investigated the 
efficacy of two 
formats of CBT for 
perfectionism (CBT-
P), 
Generalised linear mixed 
model 
face to face therapy showed a 
significant decrease in 
perfectionism (CM, PS, DAS-SC)and 
anxiety,  
  
Outpatients - all 
participants 
scored over 25 on 
the Concern over 
Mistakes subscale 
-    
Clinical Perfectionism 
Questionnaire (CPQ) (Fairburn, 
Cooper, & Shafran, 2003)   
Rosenberg Self-esteem 
Scale (RSES) (Rosenberg, 
1965) 
face-to-face and pure 
online self-help, in 
reducing 
perfectionism Group x time interactions 
decrease in perfectionism , 
depression, anxiety changes were 
maintained at 6 month follow-up. 
  
MPS (Frost, et al., 
1990).   
Self-Criticism (SC) subscale - 
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS)  
(Weissman & Beck, 1978)   
Eating Disorders 
Examination 
Questionnaire (EDEeQ) 
Fairburn & Beglin, 1994).  
and associated 
psychological 
symptoms. 
clinical perfectionism (CPQ: 
F[2, 88] = 2.14, p=.124) (not 
sig) 
 No significant changes were 
reported for the  waitlist Face to 
face therapy had statistically  
  
20-65 years, mean 
age 39.88, SD: 
11.88   
 
  
Quality of Life Enjoyment 
and Satisfaction 
Questionnaire18 (Q-LES-
Q-18)   
 concern over mistakes (CM: 
F[2, 88] = 14.73, p < .001) (sig) 
increased improvements  
compared to self-help treatment at 
follow up for CM and PS.  
  
58% female,  42 % 
male   
 
  
(Ritsner, Kurs, Gibel, 
Ratner, & Endicott, 2005)   
personal standards (PS: F[2, 
88] = 3.65, p = .030) (sig) 
Whilst self-help was effective in 
decreasing perfectionism , did not 
have significant effect on anxiety. 
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Ethnicity not 
reported   
 
  
Mini International 
Neuropsychiatric 
Interview Version 5 (MINI-
5) (Sheehan et al., 1998)   
self-criticism (DAS-SC: F[2,88] = 
9.29, p < .001) (sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
depression, anxiety, and stress 
(DASS-21: F[2,88] =7.04, p = 
.001) (sig)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Paired t test Pre/Post   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  WL group   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
no significant pre-post change 
on any of the outcome 
measures   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  F2F  group   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
CM (t[88] = 5.77, p < .001 
(Effect size, Cohen's d = 1.23)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
PS (t [88] = 3.62, p < .001 
(Effect size, Cohen's d = 0.77)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
DAS-SC (t[88] = 4.80, p < .001 
(Effect size, Cohen's d = 1.02)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
DASS-21 (t[88] = 4.17, p < .001 
(Effect size, Cohen's d = 0.89)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  POSH group   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
CM (t[88] = 3.94, p < .001 
(Effect size, Cohen's d = 0.84)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
PS (t[88] =3.00, p = .004 (Effect 
size, Cohen's d = 0.64)    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
DAS-SC (t[88] = 2.70, p = .008 
(Effect size, Cohen's d = 0.58),     
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
DASS-21 (t[88] =1.79, p = .077 
(Effects size, Cohen's d = 0.38)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Paired t tests Pre/Follow up   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  FSF   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 CM (t[41] = 6.76, p < .001 
(Effect size, Cohen's d =2.11)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 PS (t[41] = 5.72, p < .001 
(Effect size, Cohen's d = 1.77)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
DAS-SC (t[41] = 7.03,p < .001 
(Effect size, Cohen's d = 2.20)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
DASS-21 (t[41] = 3.73, p 
¼=.001 (Effect size, Cohen's d = 
1.16)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  POSH    
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 CM (t[36] = 2.19, p = .035 
(Effect size, Cohen's d = 0.73)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 PS (t[36] = 2.21, p = .033 
(Effect size, Cohen's d = 0.74)   
              
DAS-SC (t[36] = 2.21, p = .033 
(Effect size,  Cohen's d = 0.74)   
Laurenti, 
Bruch & 
Haase  
(2008)  77 Participants  
Within 
Experim
ental  
Socially Prescribed Perfection 
(SPP) Subscale - Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (Hewitt & Flett 
1991) 
Social Interaction 
Anxiety Scale (SIAS) 
(Mattick &Clarke, 
1998) 
Visual Rating Scale (VRS) 
(Wallace &Alden, 1991) 
The joint role of social 
anxiety and socially 
prescribed 
perfectionism was  Correlations 
both social anxiety and SPP were 
related with discrepancy scores and 
SPP moderated the  
  College Students   
 
  
 Social Interaction Self-
Statement Test (SISST) 
(Glass, Merluzzi, Biever & 
Larsen, 1982) 
assessed relative to 
participants’ appraisal 
of an interpersonal 
situation. 
Social Anxiety x SPP = .57 (sig, 
p<.01) 
relationship between social anxiety 
and discrepancy.  
  
Age range 17-36 
years, Mean age 
21.40   
 
  
 
  Hierarchical Regression 
At a lower level of social anxiety, 
participants’ discrepancy scores 
were negative  
  
61% female, 39% 
male    
 
  
 
  
Other standards – self-efficacy 
discrepancy 
 (i.e., others’ standards rated lower 
than one’s own self-efficacy) 
regardless  of level of SPP.  
  
53.1% white, 7.6% 
as African–
American, 16.5% 
as Hispanic, 3.8% 
as Asian,    
 
  
 
  
Step 1: Social Interaction Self-
Statements R2= .53 p=.0001 
Therefore, individuals who were 
low in social anxiety across all levels 
of SPP believed that they  
  
2.5% as Native 
American, and 
16.5% as other   
 
  
 
  Step 2 
could either match or slightly 
exceed the expectations that they 
perceived others had for them.  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Social anxiety (SA) p= .002 
Participants who were higher in 
social anxiety only reported 
positive discrepancy scores 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  SPP p= .001 
 (i.e., others’ standards rated higher 
than one’s own self-efficacy), 
increasing with level of SPP . 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 3: SA x SPP R2 =.70 p= 
.002 
Therefore, individuals who were 
higher in social anxiety and had 
higher levels of SPP believed they  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Negative self-statements 
were not capable of meeting the  
high standards expected of them by 
others. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 1: O – S discrepancy .53 
p= .0001   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 2   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Social anxiety (SA) p= .0001   
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  SPP p= .073   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 3: SA x SPP R2= .72 p= 
.003   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Positive self-statements   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Step 1: Social anxiety (SA) p= 
.006   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  SPP p= n.s.   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 2: SA x SPP R2.16 p =n.s.   
Radhu, et al  
(2012)  47 Participants  
Mixed 
Interven
tion 
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (FMPS) (Frost et al., 1990) 
Becks anxiety 
inventory (BAI) (Beck 
et al 1988) 
Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire (ATQ) 
(Hollon & Kendall 1987) 
assessed a Web-
based cognitive 
behavioral therapy 
(CBT) for maladaptive Paired t-tests Pre-Post  
maladaptive perfectionists 
randomized to the CBT intervention 
demonstrated significant decrease  
  
Undergraduate 
students   
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (Hewitt & Flett 1991) 
Anxiety sensitivity 
index (ASI) (Reiss et 
al, 1986) 
Centre for Epidemiologic 
Studies- Depressed Mood 
Scale (Radloff 1987) 
 perfectionism, 
investigating 
perfectionism, 
anxiety, depression, 
negative  CBT group   
on the ASI compared to the waiting 
list group.  
  
Age range not 
reported, Mean  
age 22.63 years   
Perfection Cognitions Inventory 
(PCI) (Flett, et al., 1998)   
Perceived Stress Scale 
(PSS) (Cohen, Kamarck & 
Mermelstein, 1986) 
automatic thoughts, 
and perceived stress 
CM subscale of MPS (Frost)  
(t(21) = 2.997, p =.007  
The CBT group also demonstrated 
significantly lower scores at 
posttest compared 
  
72% female, 28% 
male   
Almost Perfect Scale-Revised (APS-
R) (Slaney, et al, 1996, 2001)   
 
  
PC  subscale of the MPS-F 
(t(21) = 2.127, p = .045 
to pretest on 4 perfectionism 
measures: Concern Over Mistakes 
(MPS-F), Parental Criticism (CM) 
  
West Asian 17%, 
black African 2%, 
black Caribbean 
4%, Caucasian 
34%,   
 
  
 
   PCI  (t(21) = 4.088, p =.001) 
(MPS-F), PCI, and the Standards 
subscale of the APS-R. Lastly, 
participants within the CBT group  
  
 Latin American 
2%, Chinese 9%, 
Pilipino 4%, south 
Asian 9%, 
southeast Asian 
9%,    
 
  
 
  
Standards subscale of the APS-
R  (t(21) = 2.037, p = .054)  
demonstrated significant positive 
correlations between self-reported 
changes in perfectionism  
  other 11%    
 
  
 
  Waiting list 
scores and self-reported changes in 
anxiety, The waitlist control group 
significantly increased their  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
PE subscale of the MPS-F t(24) 
= 2.054, p = .051 
ASI scores from pre-test to post test 
(i.e., they became more anxiety 
sensitive between assessments.  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
P C subscale of the MPS-F 
(t(24) = 2.502, p= .020) 
 Furthermore, the wait-list controls 
also manifested significant pre- to 
posttest improvements on  
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PCI scores (t(24) = 2.397, p = 
.025)  
perfectionism measures:  Parental 
Expectations (MPS-F), Parental 
Criticism (MPS-F), and PCI. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 ASI scores (t(24) =−2.344, p = 
.028)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  CBT V Waiting List   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
ASI  , F(1, 46) = 9.132, p =.004, 
η2 = 0.172, (power of .84)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Correlations   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  CBT group     
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Perfectionism x anxiety   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Organization (MPS-F) x BAI 
(r=.467, p=<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Order (APS-R)  x BAI (r=.480, 
p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
CM (MPS, Frost) x ASI 
(r=.428,p<.05)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
P E (MPS-Frost) x ASI (r=.469, 
p<.05)   
              
Organization (MPS-F) x ASI 
(r=.464, p<.05)   
Richardson,  
Rice  & 
Devine 
(2014)  61 Participants  
Mixed 
experim
ental 
design 
Short Version - Almost Perfect 
Scale–Revised (S-APS) (Rice et al., 
in press; Slaney et al., 2001) 
Anxiety and Self-
Control Subscales - 
Sixteen Personality 
Factors’  
The Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (ERQ; 
Gross & John, 2003) 
Examined 
perfectionists’ typical 
emotion regulation 
patterns and Latent profile analysis (LPA) 
Maladaptive perfectionists had a  
more blunted than reactive pattern 
of cortisol reactivity compared  
  
Undergraduate 
students   
 
Questionnaire (16PF) 
(Cattell, Cattell, & 
Cattell,1993) 
Saliva samples were 
obtained with Salivette 
sampling devices 
(Sarstedt, Newton, NC). 
physiological 
reactivity (salivary 
cortisol 
concentration) to a 
social-evaluative 
 
with the other groups. The  profile 
for adaptive perfectionists 
suggested better approaches to  
  
Age range note 
reported, Mean 
age 18.88, SD   
1.91   
 
  
 
 stress experience. 
 
emotion regulation and a level of 
stress reactivity that was  higher in 
change of  cortisol  
  
52% female, 48% 
male   
 
  
 
  
 
compared with maladaptive 
perfectionists but lower in 
concentration than non-
perfectionists. 
  
White or 
European 
American (51.7%), 
Black or African 
American (17.6%),    
 
  
 
  
 
Results suggest that maladaptive 
perfectionism is associated with a 
lower cortisol response to a 
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Hispanic/Latino/a 
(12.8%), Asian or 
Asian American 
(10.7%), or 
Multicultural 
Mixed Race    
 
  
 
  
 
stressful task,  suggesting daily 
challenges e.g. Academic tasks and 
self-criticism take their toll on   
  
(4.5%); other or 
did not report 
(2.6%)    
 
  
 
  
 
physiological reactivity to multiple 
stress events. 
Schrijvers, 
et al. 
(2010)  39 Participants 
Mixed 
experim
ental 
design 
Dutch version of the 
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (MPS) (Soenens et al. 2005) 
Trait form - State-
Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI-T) 
(Spielberger et al. 
1970; 
Electroencephalogram 
(EEG) 
Explore the impact of 
perfectionism and 
anxiety traits on 
action  Correlations  
patients who displayed more 
perfectionistic doubts about their 
responses had significantly larger 
  
Inpatients - all 
participants had a 
diagnosis of a 
major depressive 
(single or 
recurrent) episode   
 
 Van der Ploeg et al. 
1980) 
 
monitoring in MDD. 
Overall MPS x STAI-T r=.28, 
p<.1 
 Ne/ERN amplitudes than those 
who were less doubtful.  With 
regard to the STAI scores, the  
  
 according to 
DSM-IV-TR    
 
  
 
  
Regression for Ne/ERN 
amplitudes 
regression analyses did not show a 
substantial effect of the measured 
anxiety traits on any of the  
  
Age range not 
reported, Mean 
age: 39 years, SD 
= 11   
 
  
 
  Overall perfectionism (p=.023)  
ERP amplitudes.  A possible 
explanation was given in that the 
assessed trait anxiety features are  
  
67% female, 33% 
male   
 
  
 
  STAI-T  (p = 0.613)  
more closely linked to state-
dependent depression as the STAI-T 
and HDRS were highly correlated.  
Steele, et al 
(2013)  21  Participants  
Within 
Interven
tion 
Concern about Mistakes (CM) 
subscale  - Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (Frost, et al, 
1990) 
Depression Anxiety 
Stress Scale -21 Item  
(DASS-21)  
Psychiatric Diagnostic 
Screening Questionnaire 
(PDSQ) (Zimmerman 
&Mattia, 2001) 
Utilised a case series 
design to compare 
psycho-education 
materials 
Linear Regression Tests for 
CBT group 
information-alone intervention did 
not have a significant impact on any 
outcome measures. The 8  
  
Outpatients - all 
participants had 
high levels of 
perfectionism on 
the Concern over    
Clinical Perfectionism 
Questionnaire (CPQ) (Riley et al., 
2007) 
(Lovibond 
&Lovibond, 1995) 
Self-Criticism subscale - 
Dysfunctional Attitude 
Scale (DAS) (Weissman & 
Beck, 1978) 
and subsequent 
eight-week group 
cognitive behaviour 
therapy (CBT) to a  Baseline to post treatment 
week CBT group intervention was 
associated with improvements on 
all measures and changes 
  
Mistakes subscale 
of the MPS (Frost, 
et al., 1990)   
Personal Standards (PS) subscale -  
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (Frost, et al, 1990)   
Mini-International 
Neuropsychiatric 
Interview - Version 5 
(MINI-5) (Sheehan et al., 
1998) 
baseline waitlist in an 
outpatient 
community psychiatry 
sample 
clinical perfectionism  F=10.74, 
p<.001 (Cohen’s D, Effect Size 
1.55) 
were maintained at the 3-month 
follow-up assessment.  These 
results  may have been produced as  
  
Age range not 
reported, Mean   
 
  
 
  
CM F=14.41,  p<.001  (Cohen’s 
D, Effect Size 1.72) 
a result of participants being 
primed by psycho-education. The 
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age 35.77 (SD: 
14.40), range 18-
67 
information-alone condition may 
have 
  
71% female, 29% 
male   
 
  
 
  
PS F=17.72, p<.001 (Cohen’s D, 
Effect Size 1.91) 
 increased participants’ readiness 
to take part in the intervention and 
may have been partially 
  
Ethnicity not 
reported   
 
  
 
  
Depression, Anxiety, Stress 
F=12.51, p<.001 (Cohen’s D, 
Effect Size 1.59) 
 responsible for producing effective 
treatment results from group CBT. 
7 individuals who had met  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Baseline to 3 month follow up  
diagnostic criteria for social phobia 
at baseline did not meet criteria at 
follow up. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
clinical perfectionism  F=16.06, 
p<.001 (Cohen’s D, Effect Size 
1.90)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
CM F=12.80  p<.001  (Cohen’s 
D, Effect Size 1.64)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
PS F=17.88 p<.001 (Cohen’s D, 
Effect Size 1.93)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Depression, Anxiety, Stress 
F=11.83 p<.001 (Cohen’s D, 
Effect Size 1.55)   
Stoeber, et 
al  (2014)  100 Participants 
Mixed 
experim
ental 
design 
Self-Orientated (SO) Subscale - 
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale (Hewitt & Flett, 2004) 
State form - State-
Trait Anxiety 
Inventory, Short 
Version (STAI-S) 
Depression subscale -  
Profile of Mood States, 
Short Version  (McNair, 
Lorr, & Droppleman, 
1971; 
This study 
investigated the 
effects of two forms 
of perfectionism – self 
moderated regression 
analyses - initial failure on 
anxiety 
Following an initial failure,  SPP 
showed increased anxiety and SOP 
showed no increased anxiety. 
  
Undergraduate 
students   
Socially Prescribed Perfection 
(SPP) Subscale - Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (Hewitt & 
Flett, 2004) 
(Spielberger et al. 
1983; Marteau and 
Bekker, 1992) Shacham’s, 1983) 
oriented 
perfectionism and 
socially prescribed 
perfectionism – on  Step 1,  
SOP predicted increased anxiety, 
suggesting SOP may show resilience 
with one failure but that this 
  
Age range 18-45, 
Mean age 21.35, 
SD: 3.11   
 
  
Feeling Angry subscale - 
State-Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory 
(STAEI) (Spielberger, 
1999) 
reactions to repeated 
failure (versus 
repeated success) 
examining three  
self-oriented perfectionism, 
socially prescribed 
perfectionism,  and feedback 
R2=.32,p<.001 
is not sustained when multiple 
failure is experienced. SOP 
associated with being highly self-
critical, 
  
50% female 50% 
male   
 
  
 
negative emotions: 
anxiety, depression, 
and anger. Step 2  
and repeat failure may be 
perceived as a threat and increase 
anxiety. 
  
Ethnicity not 
reported   
 
  
 
  
interactions of self-oriented 
perfectionism x feedback, 
socially prescribed   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
perfectionism x  feedback 
R2=.04, p=not sig   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
moderated regression 
analyses - repeated failure on   
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anxiety 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 1.    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  (initial failure) R2=.63,p<.001   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 2    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
self-oriented perfectionism, 
socially prescribed 
perfectionism,  and feedback 
R2=.32,p<.001   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Step 3   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
interactions of self-oriented 
perfectionism x feedback, 
socially prescribed   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
perfectionism x  feedback 
R2=.07,p<.01   
Besser, 
Flett, & 
Hewitt  
(2004) 200 Participants 
Mixed 
experim
ental 
design 
Multidimensional Perfectionism 
Scale  (MPS) (Hewitt & Flett, 1991, 
2004) 
Visual Analogue 
Scale (VAS) 
(Albersnagel, 1988) 
Cognitive and 
Performance Appraisals 
Explored self-oriented 
perfectionism as 
vulnerability factor 
involving negative MANCOVA 
SPP was associated with pre-task 
and post-task anxiety, whilst SOP 
was only associated with post task 
  College Students   
 
  
 
cognitive and 
affective reactions 
following failure 
experiences that 
reflect 
task difficulty x feedback, 
covariate anxiety (F(1,192) 
=20:18, p <.0001) 
anxiety. SOP was associated with 
significant increases in anxiety 
regardless of whether in the 
positive 
  
Mean age 21.75, 
SD: 3.08   
 
  
 
poorly on the self. CORRELATIONS 
 or  negative feedback group, task 
difficulty and actual performance.  
  
50% female, 50% 
male   
 
  
 
Socially evaluative 
cues were minimized 
by having the 
participant receive  
SPP X  pre anxiety  (r =.24, p < 
.001)   
  
Ethnicity not 
reported   
 
  
 
feedback via 
computer while alone 
SPP X  post anxiety (r = .19, p < 
:006)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  SOP X pre anxiety (r =.09)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
SOP x post anxiety  (r =.23, p 
<.001)   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Hierarchical Multiple 
Regressions   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Anxiety affect: After 
controlling for pre-task anxiety 
affect (b = :53,   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
p < :0001, F(1,198)=77:96, p 
<.0001), a significant increase 
in anxious   
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affect was found for 
participants who received 
negative feedback   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
and for those high in self-
oriented perfectionism (b =.22, 
p <.0001   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
and b =.19, p < .001 
respectively; F(5,194)=23:00, p 
< .0001).    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
No significant two-way or 
three-way interactions were 
obtained. The   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
final model explained 
significantly 38% of the 
variance in post-task   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
anxiety (F(10, 189)=11:58, p 
<.0001).   
Besser et al 
(2008) 200 Participants 
Mixed 
experim
ental 
design 
The Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (MPS) (Hewitt 
& Flett 1991, 2004) 
Visual Analogue 
Scale (VAS) 
(Albersnagel, 1988) 
Adapted - Current 
Thoughts Scale 
(Heatherton & Polivy, 
1991) 
Examined possible 
fluctuations among 
perfectionists in state 
self-esteem 
Hierarchical Multiple 
Regressions 
in the two negative feedback 
groups, PCI was  associated 
significantly with increased anxiety 
  College Students   
Adapted Perfectionistic Cognitions 
Inventory (Flett, et al.,1998; 
Besser et al 2008)   
Adapted - Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire 
(Hollon & Kendall, 1980)  
 as a function of 
performance 
feedback. 
After controlling for pre-task 
anxiety (b = .59, p=.0001, 
F[1,198] = 105.03, 
Trait perfectionism interacted with 
experimental conditions to 
influence anxiety. 
  
Age range not 
reported, Mean 
age 23.63, SD: 
2.92   
 
  
Adapted - Positive 
subscale - Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire 
(Ingram &Wisnicki 1988) 
Examined how 
perfectionism 
combines with 
performance 
feedback and  
p=.0001), a significant 
decrease in anxiety was found 
for participants who 
performed 
High SPP was associated with 
increases in anxiety in individuals 
with lower confidence but who 
  
50% female, 50% 
male   
 
  Manipulation checks 
 task difficulty to 
influence 
physiological 
responses 
the easy task (b = –.16, p=..01; 
F[5,194] = 22.92, p=0001). 
There were no 
received positive feedback. Also, 
high SPP was associated with 
increased anxiety in individuals 
with  
  
Ethnicity not 
reported   
 
  reaction times and errors   
significant effects for trait 
perfectionism nor were 
significant two-way 
interactions detected. The final 
regression 
higher confidence but who received 
negative feedback .  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 explained significantly 38% 
(adjusted) of the variance in 
post-task anxiety (F[33,166] = 
4.71, p=.0001). 
high SOP was associated with 
increased post-task anxiety in 
individuals who had lower objective  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 objective performance and lower 
initial confidence. Low SOP was 
also associated with increased post 
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task anxiety in individuals who had 
good objective performance and 
lower initial confidence.  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 Additional findings suggested that 
level of self-confidence is a factor 
that moderates the  
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Appendix 5 Ethical Approval Application 
 
 
 
 
    
SCHOOL OF 
PSYCHOLOGY, CARDIFF 
UNIVERSITY ETHICS 
PROFORMA 
 
` 
 
  
   
 
    
      
    
   
 
    
      
    
   
 
    Form version 2.4     
   
 
Guidelines for completing 
this form 
                
   
 
1) You should save this document with the following type of Filename: 
Username_Title.xls where Username refers to the 1st Researcher's university 
username and Title refers to the project title. 
   
 
2) All sections marked YELLOW should be completed.  
   
 
3) Click on the blue and white question mark symbol for more info on an adjacent 
section 
   
 
4) All supporting attachments should be either Word or PDF format. Please 
combine multiple documents of the same format into one. 
   
 
5) When completed, this document and any supporting material should be emailed 
to  
psychethics@cardiff.ac.uk by the permanent member of staff associated 
with the  
project.  Please ensure that emails are sent via the Cardiff University Network 
using your Cardiff email address.  
   
              
  
 
            
 
        
         
 
  Select one option:       
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
              
        
 
 
 
 
    
 
       
 
        
        
 
  
Select if submission is 
for:  
    
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
              
 
NB. Undergraduate projects MUST be Standard Submission 
Type 
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If project comes under supervisor's generic approval, please provide the EC 
reference number.  For non-human studies please insert the relevant Home 
Office Project Licence reference here (if applicable). 
    
 
  
         
              
 
 
 
 
            
 
     
         
 
        
         
 
        
         
              
           
 
Title of Project   
         
 
Values,  Perfectionism, Anxiety and Depression - title TBC 
    
  
   
         
  
   
         
 
Applicant's Email Address 
     
 
   
 
louise_fermandel@hotmail.co.uk / louise.fermandel@wales.nhs.uk 
   
  
   
         
  
   
         
 
Name of researcher(s) (Please list all researchers on 
separate line with the applicant first) 
Status  (e.g. staff, 
UG/PG, external 
RA) 
 
   1 Andrew Vidgen staff 
   2     
    3     
    4     
    5     
    6     
    7     
    8     
    9     
    1
0 
    
    
  
   
         
  
   
         
 
Name of supervisor (for student research) 
       
 
Andrew Vidgen 
    
  
   
         
  
   
         
 
Name of permanent member of staff associated with 
the project 
Mailname of permanent 
member of staff (e.g. 
JonesA@cardiff.ac.uk) 
   
 
Andrew Vidgen Andrew.vidgen@wales.nhs.uk 
                
              
          
NOT 
   
  
 
    
YES 
 
NO 
APPLICA
BLE 
  
 
1 I will describe the main experimental procedures to 
participants in advance, so that they are informed 
about what to expect. 
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2 I will tell participants that their participation is 
voluntary and that they may withdraw from the 
research at any time and for any reason. 
      
 
3 I will obtain written consent for participation (this 
includes consent to be observed in observational 
studies). 
      
 
4 The data are to be stored anonymously (i.e. the 
identity of the person IS NOT linked directly or 
indirectly with their data). 
      
 
5 I will debrief participants at the end of their 
participation (i.e. give them a brief explanation of 
the study and an explicit opportunity to comment 
and ask questions). 
      
 
6 With questionnaires, I will give participants the 
option of omitting questions they do not want to 
answer. 
      
 
7 The research is observational without consent 
and/or involves any covert recording. 
      
 
8 The research involves deliberately misleading 
participants (excluding mild deception through 
omission). 
      
 
9 The research asks questions or includes tasks that 
are likely to elicit negative affect in participants 
(e.g. anxiety, sadness, disgust, distress).  (If yes, 
please include a description of the steps in place to put 
participants back into their original state.) 
      
 
10 The research includes participants taking part from 
outside of the School of Psychology, who may be 
relatively unfamiliar with psychological research 
and practice (e.g. online studies). 
      
 
11 Participants will be recruited through another 
department or institution (e.g. business, school, 
government, third-sector organisation, research 
survey group)?  (If yes, please include a letter asking 
permission to recruit from the relevant authority and/or 
information about the institution's recruitment practices.) 
      
              
 
12 Do participants fall into any of the following special groups?  If they do, please 
refer to BPS guidelines, and tick box B below. 
   
 
  Note that you may also need to obtain satisfactory Disclosure and Barring 
Service clearance (formerly known as CRB), or equivalent for overseas 
students. 
   
 
   
       
  
   
 
I will be recruiting:  
 
 
 
  
   
 
a Children and/or vulnerable adults. 
  
  
   
 
  If yes is ticked then 12b needs to be completed. 
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b  I confirm that the University's Safeguarding Children 
and Vulnerable Adults Policy 2010 has been read and 
understood; and I have attached the completed 
Guidance for Researcher's Checklist.  
      
   
 
c Patients recruited through the NHS (NHS ethical 
approval will be required). 
  
  
   
 
d People lacking capacity to give consent (NHS 
ethical approval will be required) 
  
  
   
 
e People in custody. (NOMS approval will be 
required.) 
  
  
   
 
f People engaged in illegal activities, for example 
drug taking. 
      
   
  
  
  
 
       
 
13a The research involves the collection or use of human tissue 
(including, but not limited to, blood, saliva and bodily waste 
fluids).     
   
 
  If yes is ticked then a copy of the submitted application form and any 
supporting documentation must be emailed to the Human Tissue Act 
Compliance Team (HTA@cf.ac.uk). A decision will only be made 
once these documents have been received.  13b also needs to be 
completed. 
 
  
   
 
  HTA@cf.ac.uk 
 
  
   
 
         
 
  
   
 
13b I confirm that the relevant Human Tissue Act considerations, 
in accordance with University policy and School requirements, 
have been taken into account for the proposed research. 
I confirm that, where appropriate, the University's 
Safeguarding Children and Vulnerable Adults Policy 2010 has 
been read and understood. 
I confirm that, where appropriate, the University's 
Safeguarding Children and Vulnerable Adults Policy 2010 has 
been read and understood. 
 
    
   
 
       
 
 
 
 
    
 
14 The research involves the use of a drug, controlled 
substance or medical product, including alcohol, 
tobacco or caffeine. 
      
   
 
  If yes and the drug is not alcohol, tobacco or caffeine, then you 
should inform the Research Governance team and include their 
guidance in the proposal. 
 
  
   
 
  
Contact details: 
resgov@cf.ac.uk  029 20 
879131   
 
  
   
 
       
      
 
 Note: Guidance on Box A or Box B submission and supporting 
documentation: 
   
 
 If you have ticked NO to any of Q1-6 or YES to any of Q7-11 then EITHER 
choose Box A below, address the relevant ethical issues in a separate 
word document and include a consent form and debrief sheet, OR choose 
Box B below.  
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 If you ticked YES to Q12-14 or there are any other ethical concerns with the 
proposed research then complete a full Box B proposal. 
Otherwise, simply choose Box A and provide a summary of the proposed 
research.  
   
  
   
         
 
PLEASE SELECT EITHER BOX A OR BOX B BELOW AND PROVIDE THE 
DETAILS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF YOUR APPLICATION THEN SIGN 
THE FORM. 
   
  
  
          
 
A.  I consider that this project has no significant ethical 
implications to be brought before the School Research Ethics 
Committee. 
  
 
  
   
 
Give a brief description of the experiment (approximately 200 words). Include 
study rationale and theoretical constructs as well as brief information about: 
participants (e.g. number, age, sex, recruitment method, group assignment), 
apparatus and materials  (e.g., stimuli, names of questionnaire) and procedure 
(e.g., what will happen to participants).  Any exclusions must be scientifically 
justified. 
Tip: To insert line breaks within a cell use Alt+Enter on a PC and Cmd+Option+Return 
on a Mac. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Previously approved project:  EC.14.08.05.3830R2. Please may I request the approval for 2 minor 
amendments to my ethics proposal. 
 
1. The first amendment is regarding the control group neutral task changing from listing animals to answering 
questions regarding beverages. 
2. The second amendment is regarding timing participants checking behaviour. 
 
These changes can be found on highlighted on pages: 9, 45 and 46 within my application. 
   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
If any of the above information is missing, your application will be returned 
to you. 
   
  
  
          
 
B  I consider that this project may have ethical implications that 
should be brought before the School Research Ethics 
Committee, and/or it will be carried out with children or other 
vulnerable populations. 
  
 
  
   
 
If you have checked BOX B, please provide all the further information listed 
below in a separate attachment.  Please number the pages. 
   
 
i Title of project 
   
 
 
Page 236 of 335 
 
 
ii Purpose of project and its academic rationale. 
   
 
iii Brief description of methods and measurements. 
   
 
iv Participants: recruitment methods, number, age, gender, exclusion/inclusion 
criteria. 
   
 
v Consent and participant information arrangements, debriefing. 
   
 
vi A clear but concise statement of the ethical considerations raised by the project 
and how you intend to deal with them. 
   
 
vii Estimated start date and duration of project. 
   
 
  This form should be submitted to the School Research Ethics Committee for 
consideration. 
   
 
 If any of the above information is missing, your 
application will be returned to you. 
 
 
   
 
15a I confirm that the relevant health and safety measures, in 
accordance with University policy and School requirements, 
have been taken into account for the proposed research.  
    
   
 
  
        
  
   
 
15b If 15a is confirmed, please include the relevant Risk Assessment 
Receipt number. 
1402475585_4
37 
   
         
 
 
 
    
 
16 I confirm that the relevant equality and diversity 
considerations, in accordance with University policy and 
School requirements, have been taken into account for the 
proposed research.      
   
         
 
 
 
    
  
17 I am familiar with the BPS Guidelines for ethical practices in 
psychological research (and have discussed them with the 
other researchers involved in the project).  
      
  
  
         
 
  
 
INFORMATION FOR PERMANENT MEMBER OF STAFF ONLY 
  
 
                    
   
 
I confirm as the permanent member of staff, by forwarding this documentation to 
the Ethics Committee, I have read this application and consider it suitable for 
ethical review. 
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Appendix 6 Ethical Approval Granted  
 
From: psychethics [mailto:psychethics@cardiff.ac.uk]  
Sent: 26 September 2014 15:23 
To: Louise Fermandel (Lo114782) 
Cc: Andrew Vidgen (Cardiff and Vale UHB - Psychology Training) 
Subject: Ethics Feedback - EC.14.08.05.3830R2 
  
Dear Louise, 
The Ethics Committee has considered your revised postgraduate project proposal: Self 
enhancement, Perfectionism and the role of psychological distress (EC.14.08.05.3830R2). 
The project has now been approved.  
Please note that if any changes are made to the above project then you must notify the Ethics 
Committee. 
  
Best wishes, 
 Natalie 
  
 School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
Tower Building 
Park Place 
CARDIFF 
CF10 3AT 
 
Ffôn /Telephone: +44 (0) 29 2087 0360                            
Ffacs/Fax: +44 (0) 29 2087 4858   
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From: psychethics 
Sent: 28 October 2014 11:04 
To: louise.fermandel@wales.nhs.uk 
Cc: Andrew Vidgen 
Subject: Ethics Feedback - EC.14.08.05.3830R2A 
  
Dear Louise, 
  
The Ethics Committee has considered the amendment to your PG project: Self enhancement, 
Perfectionism and the role of psychological distress (EC.14.08.05.3830R2A). 
The project has been approved. 
Please note that if any changes are made to the above project then you must notify the Ethics 
Committee. 
  
Best wishes, 
 Hannah Parker 
  
School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
Tower Building 
Park Place 
CARDIFF 
CF10 3AT 
 
Ffôn /Telephone: +44 (0) 29 2087 0360                            
Ffacs/Fax: +44 (0) 29 2087 4858   
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Appendix 7 Participant Information Sheet (Student) 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
You are invited to participate in a study which will aim to explore the values you hold, 
your performance on a specific task and the role of anxiety and depression. The 
study is being undertaken as part of a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. To help you 
to decide if you would like to participate or not, this sheet will provide you with 
additional information on the study and what it will involve.  
Please could you take some time to read the following information carefully. If this 
information is not clear, if you would like further information or if you have any other 
questions you can ask the researcher who will be happy to help. The researcher 
contact details can be found at the end of the information sheet. 
 
Why is the study being done? 
Research has suggested that a person’s values have an impact on the way that they 
behave and feel. Despite research suggesting that values can have an impact on a 
person’s psychological wellbeing and the inclusion of values in psychological 
therapies such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT); the use of values 
within a mental health context has not been widely empirically researched.  
This study will aim to explore the use of a structural concept of values, how this 
relates to performance on a specific task and the role of anxiety and depression.  
The findings of the study will be used to further our understanding of how values 
might be used in a mental health context to change behaviour and reduce anxiety 
and depression. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You do not have to participate in the study. It is entirely your choice whether you 
decide to participate or not.  
 
What I will I be asked to do if I do take part? 
If you decide that you would like to participate in this study, you will be asked to 
complete a consent form.  You will then be asked to fill in three questionnaires. The 
questionnaires will ask you questions about your values, your behaviour and your 
feelings. All of the questions can be answered using  variety of rating scales, for 
example: when answering on a scale of 1 to 5, you may select ‘1’ if you would like to 
answer ‘not at all’ and you may select ‘5’ if you would like to answer ‘very much’. 
After you have completed the questionnaires, you will be asked complete two short 
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tasks. Once you have completed the tasks, you will be given a debrief sheet and an 
opportunity to ask any questions you may have. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The total time taken to complete the study will be approximately one hour.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
There are minimal anticipated disadvantages of participating in the study. You will be 
asked to give an hour of your time and you will be paid by receiving either a cash 
payment or course credit. Payment type will be agreed when signing up. There is 
also a small possibility that you may become distressed when completing the 
questionnaires or at any time during the study. If this does happen, you are free to 
withdraw from the study and you may also speak to the researcher or research 
supervisor conducting the study.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will receive a small payment for your time. Although you may not benefit 
personally from the study, your participation will contribute to a study that may 
improve the support available for people who experience mental health difficulties. 
 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
All information collected about you during the course of the research is strictly 
confidential and only accessible to the lead researcher.  Your consent form will be 
the only paperwork that identifies you by your name.  This is why your consent will 
be sought prior to and separately to you being asked to complete any 
questionnaires.  The consent forms will be available only to the lead researcher and 
they will be stored separately from your other data in a locked filing cabinet.  
Each participant will be allocated a participant identification number which will be 
used to ensure that all data collected can be kept confidentially but can still be 
Completing 3 questionnaires – 25 minutes 
Short task– 10 minutes 
Short task – 10 minutes 
Reading participant information sheet – 5 minutes 
Completing consent form – 5 minutes 
Debrief – 5 minutes 
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identified as coming from a particular participant to ensure data can be matched and 
analysed accurately. Any information you provide will be made anonymous at the 
point of collection. 
Any information gathered will only be used for the purposes of this study.  
 
What will happen if I don’t want to continue taking part? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason and 
there will be no adverse consequences. In this case, any information collected from 
you will not be used in the research and will be destroyed. 
 
What will happen when the study ends? 
All information gathered will be analysed and the results will be written up into a 
research study report. No identifying data will be used in the written report. This 
means that it will not be possible to trace any of the information you provide back to 
you personally. 
This report will be used as part of a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology thesis. All 
information will be stored securely at Cardiff University for a minimum of 12 months 
before being destroyed. Only the anonymous data may be kept indefinitely. There is 
a possibility that the report may be used in future published articles.  
 
Who is carrying out and funding the study? 
The study is being conducted by Louise Fermandel (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
as part of a Doctorate thesis. The Doctorate course is funded by the National Health 
Service (NHS) and accredited by Cardiff University. The study is being supervised by 
Dr Andrew Vidgen (Consultant Clinical Psychologist). 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed and approved by an ethics committee panel at Cardiff 
University.  
 
What if there is a problem or I have any concerns about the study? 
If you have any problems or concerns about any aspect of the study, you can speak 
directly to the researcher or research supervisor or contact them on the details 
below. 
 
Who can I contact for further information? 
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If you would like any further information or have any queries please contact: 
 
Researcher: Louise Fermandel (Trainee Clinical Psychologist/Post graduate student) 
Email: Louise.fermandel@wales.nhs.uk 
Tel:  029 2087058 
 
   
Research Supervisor: Dr Andrew Vidgen (Consultant Clinical Psychologist) 
Email: andrew.vidgen@wales.nhs.uk 
Tel:     029 20870582 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet.  
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Participant information sheet (Community) 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
You are invited to participate in a study which will aim to explore the values you hold, 
your performance on a specific task and the role of anxiety and depression. The 
study is being undertaken as part of a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. To help you 
to decide if you would like to participate or not, this sheet will provide you with 
additional information on the study and what it will involve.  
Please could you take some time to read the following information carefully. If this 
information is not clear, if you would like further information or if you have any other 
questions you can ask the researcher who will be happy to help. The researcher 
contact details can be found at the end of the information sheet. 
 
Why is the study being done? 
Research has suggested that a person’s values have an impact on the way that they 
behave and feel. Despite research suggesting that values can have an impact on a 
person’s psychological wellbeing and the inclusion of values in psychological 
therapies such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT); the use of values 
within a mental health context has not been widely empirically researched.  
This study will aim to explore the use of a structural concept of values, how this 
relates to performance on a specific task and the role of anxiety and depression.  
The findings of the study will be used to further our understanding of how values 
might be used in a mental health context to change behaviour and reduce anxiety 
and depression. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
You do not have to participate in the study. It is entirely your choice whether you 
decide to participate or not.  
 
What I will I be asked to do if I do take part? 
If you decide that you would like to participate in this study, you will be asked to 
complete a consent form.  You will then be asked to fill in three questionnaires. The 
questionnaires will ask you questions about your values, your behaviour and your 
feelings. All of the questions can be answered using  variety of rating scales, for 
example: when answering on a scale of 1 to 5, you may select ‘1’ if you would like to 
answer ‘not at all’ and you may select ‘5’ if you would like to answer ‘very much’. 
After you have completed the questionnaires, you will be asked complete two short 
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tasks. Once you have completed the tasks, you will be given a debrief sheet and an 
opportunity to ask any questions you may have. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The total time taken to complete the study will be approximately one hour.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
There are minimal anticipated disadvantages of participating in the study. You will be 
asked to give an hour of your time and you will be entered in to a prized draw for 
your time. There is also a small possibility that you may become distressed when 
completing the questionnaires or at any time during the study. If this does happen, 
you are free to withdraw from the study and you may also speak to the researcher or 
research supervisor conducting the study.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You will be entered into a prized draw for your time. Although you may not benefit 
personally from the study, your participation will contribute to a study that may 
improve the support available for people who experience mental health difficulties. 
 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
All information collected about you during the course of the research is strictly 
confidential and only accessible to the lead researcher.  Your consent form will be 
the only paperwork that identifies you by your name.  This is why your consent will 
be sought prior to and separately to you being asked to complete any 
questionnaires.  The consent forms will be available only to the lead researcher and 
they will be stored separately from your other data in a locked filing cabinet.  
Each participant will be allocated a participant identification number which will be 
used to ensure that all data collected can be kept confidentially but can still be 
identified as coming from a particular participant to ensure data can be matched and 
Completing 3 questionnaires – 25 minutes 
Short task– 10 minutes 
Short task – 10 minutes 
Reading participant information sheet – 5 minutes 
Completing consent form – 5 minutes 
Debrief – 5 minutes 
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analysed accurately. Any information you provide will be made anonymous at the 
point of collection. 
Any information gathered will only be used for the purposes of this study.  
 
What will happen if I don’t want to continue taking part? 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason and 
there will be no adverse consequences. In this case, any information collected from 
you will not be used in the research and will be destroyed. 
 
What will happen when the study ends? 
All information gathered will be analysed and the results will be written up into a 
research study report. No identifying data will be used in the written report. This 
means that it will not be possible to trace any of the information you provide back to 
you personally. 
This report will be used as part of a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology thesis. All 
information will be stored securely at Cardiff University for a minimum of 12 months 
before being destroyed. Only the anonymous data may be kept indefinitely. There is 
a possibility that the report may be used in future published articles.  
 
Who is carrying out and funding the study? 
The study is being conducted by Louise Fermandel (Trainee Clinical Psychologist) 
as part of a Doctorate thesis. The Doctorate course is funded by the National Health 
Service (NHS) and accredited by Cardiff University. The study is being supervised by 
Dr Andrew Vidgen (Consultant Clinical Psychologist). 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed and approved by an ethics committee panel at Cardiff 
University.  
 
What if there is a problem or I have any concerns about the study? 
If you have any problems or concerns about any aspect of the study, you can speak 
directly to the researcher or research supervisor or contact them on the details 
below. 
 
Who can I contact for further information? 
If you would like any further information or have any queries please contact: 
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Researcher: Louise Fermandel (Trainee Clinical Psychologist/Post graduate student) 
Email: Louise.fermandel@wales.nhs.uk 
Tel:  029 2087058 
 
   
Research Supervisor: Dr Andrew Vidgen (Consultant Clinical Psychologist) 
Email: andrew.vidgen@wales.nhs.uk 
Tel:     029 20870582 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet.  
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Appendix 8 Participant Consent Form 
 
CONSENT FORM 
If you have read the participant information sheet and would like to participate in the 
study, please read each statement below. If you agree with the statement, please 
tick the corresponding box. 
 I confirm that I have received, read and understood the participant information 
sheet for the study. 
 
 
 I have been given the opportunity to consider the information provided and to 
ask any questions I had. 
 
 
 Any questions I had have been answered satisfactorily. 
 
 
 I understand that I am free to ask further questions at any time. 
 
 I understand that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving reason. 
 
 
 I understand that should I choose to withdraw from the study there will be no 
adverse consequences. 
 
 
 I understand that my participation is anonymous; I do not have to provide my 
name when completing the questionnaires and my responses will be recorded 
without any identifiable information. 
 
 
 I give permission to the researcher to use any data collected from the study in 
a written report and possibly within a published article. 
 
 
 I _________________ (NAME) consent to participate in the study conducted 
by Louise Fermandel (Trainee Clinical Psychologist, School of Psychology, 
Cardiff University), under the supervision of Andrew Vidgen (Clinical 
Psychologist/Core staff member of the South Wales Doctorate in Clinical 
Psychology, School of Psychology, Cardiff University). 
 
 
Signed: 
Date: 
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Appendix 9 Participant Debrief Sheet 
 
DEBRIEF SHEET 
 
Thank you for taking part in this study.   
 
This debriefing sheet will give you further information about the purpose of the 
research. Please feel free to ask any questions that you may have.  
 
What were the aims of the study? 
 
This study aimed to explore the impact of priming values on perfectionist behaviour. 
This study also aimed to explore the impact of discrepancies within values on self-
reported anxiety and depression. 
 
What are the details about the tasks completed? 
 
The Perceived Values Questionnaire (PVQ) measures the values that an individual 
holds most strongly.  The other questionnaires you completed at the start of the 
study were used to measure perfectionism, anxiety and depression. These 
questionnaires would not be used to diagnose a psychological condition but might be 
used in clinical settings to help gather information about thoughts, behaviours and 
feelings. A high score on these questionnaires does not provide the basis for the 
existence of a particular condition as we would expect to see a large range of scores 
within the general population. 
 
After completing the questionnaires, you will have been assigned to one of three 
groups. If you were in an experimental group, you will have been asked to complete 
a task providing reasons why certain values are important to you. The task was 
administered as a priming task to bring certain values to mind.  There were two 
different versions of this task; you will have been administered only one of these 
versions depending upon the group that you were randomly assigned to. If you were 
in the control group, you will have been asked to complete a neutral task regarding 
beverages. 
 
The second task you were asked to complete involved searching for and identifying 
a specific letter in an array of different letters and numbers. Your performance on this 
task was measured through accuracy and speed. Your checking behaviour was also 
measured; we recorded whether you took up or declined the offer of checking your 
work and we timed any checking behaviour. 
 
It was important that some mild deception was used in the study so that we could 
gain results as true to life as possible.  Being aware of everything that was being 
measured could have had an effect on some of the answers that you provided and 
the way that you completed the tasks. 
 
What are the research hypotheses?  
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We hypothesise that perfectionism may be linked to certain values and that when 
these values are activated; behaviour linked with perfectionism will be increased. We 
also hypothesised that when opposing values are activated; behaviour linked with 
perfectionism will be decreased. 
 
We hypothesise that discrepancies within a person’s values may be linked to the 
amount of anxiety and depression they report. 
 
 
Relevant reading 
 
For further information related to this research you may wish to read the following 
articles: 
 
Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., Beierlein, C., 
Ramos, A., Verkasalo, M., Lönnqvist, J-E., Demirutku, K., Dirilen-Gumus, O., Konty, 
M. (2012). Refining the theory of basic individual values. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 103, 4, 663-688. 
 
Maio, G. R. (2010). Mental Representations of Social Values. In Zanna, M. P. (2010) 
Eds. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 42, Burlington: Academic 
Press, 1-43. 
 
 
Contact Details 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research then please contact us on 
the details below. You can also contact us if you would like a summary of the project 
findings. 
 
 
Researcher: Louise Fermandel (Trainee Clinical Psychologist/Post graduate student) 
Email: Louise.fermandel@wales.nhs.uk 
Tel:  029 2087058 
 
   
Research Supervisor: Dr Andrew Vidgen (Consultant Clinical Psychologist) 
Email: andrew.vidgen@wales.nhs.uk 
Tel:     029 2087058 
 
Secretary of the Ethics Committee: 
School of Psychology  
Cardiff University 
Tower Building 
Park Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3AT 
Email: psychethics@cardiff.ac.uk 
Tel: 029 2087 0360 
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Appendix 10 Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Please indicate your ethnic group by choosing ONE section (A,B,C,D,E or F) and then ticking the 
appropriate circle or writing in the space provided. You may choose to not state your ethnic group. 
 
A. Asian or Asian British 
o Indian 
o Pakistani 
o Bangladeshi 
Any other Asian background, please state....................................................... 
 
B. Black or Black British 
o Caribbean 
o African 
Any other Asian background, please state....................................................... 
 
C. Chinese or Chinese British 
o Chinese 
Any other Chinese background, please state.................................................... 
 
D. Mixed 
o White and Asian Indian 
o White and Asian Pakistani 
o White and Asian Bangladeshi 
o White and Black Caribbean 
o White and Black African 
o White and Chinese 
Any other Mixed background, please state........................................................ 
 
E. Other ethnic group 
Any other background, please state................................................................... 
 
F. White 
o British 
o Irish 
Any other White background, please state......................................................... 
 
 
 
o Ethnic group not stated 
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Appendix 11 Adapted Portrait Values Questionnaire 40 Item Version (PVQ-40) 
 
Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ): Male 
           
Question Answer 
1) Thinking up new ideas and being creative is 
important to him. He likes to do things in his own 
original way. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
2. It is important to him to be rich. He wants to 
have a lot of money and expensive things. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
3. He thinks it is important that every person in 
the world be treated equally. He believes 
everyone should have equal opportunities in life. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
Instructions: 
Here we briefly describe some people.  Please read each description and think about how much each person:  
 
(a) Is actually like you (e.g. has the beliefs and/or behaves as you actually do in reality). 
(b) Is ideally like you (e.g. has the beliefs and/or behaves as you would ideally wish to). 
(c) Is what you should be like (e.g. has the beliefs and/or behaves as you should do, but do not always do in 
reality) 
 
Put an X in the box to the right that shows how much the person in the description is like you. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers to these questions, so do not take too much time considering you 
answer to the question, just put a X in the box that applies best to you 
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4. It's very important to him to show his abilities. 
He wants people to admire what he does. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
5. It is important to him to live in secure 
surroundings. He avoids anything that might 
endanger his safety. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
6. He thinks it is important to do lots of different 
things in life. He always looks for new things to 
try. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
7. He believes that people should do what they're 
told. He thinks people should follow rules at all 
times, even when no-one is watching.                                                                                          
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
8. It is important to him to listen to people who 
are different from him. Even when he disagrees 
with them, he still wants to understand them. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
9. He thinks it's important not to ask for more 
than what you have. He believes that people 
should be satisfied with what they have. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
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a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
10. He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It 
is important to him to do things that give him 
pleasure. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
11) It is important to him to make his own 
decisions about what he does. He likes to be free 
to plan and to choose his activities for himself. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
12. It's very important to him to help the people 
around him.  He wants to care for their well-
being. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
 
13. Being very successful is important to him. He 
likes to impress other people. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very  Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
14. It is very important to him that his country be 
safe. He thinks the state must be on watch 
against threats from within and without. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
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15. He likes to take risks. He is always looking for 
adventures. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
16. It is important to him always to behave 
properly. He wants to avoid doing anything 
people would say is wrong. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3      4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
17. It is important to him to be in charge and tell 
others what to do. He wants people to do what he 
says. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
18) It is important to him to be loyal to his 
friends. He wants to devote himself to people 
close to him. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
19. He strongly believes that people should care 
for nature. Looking after the environment is 
important to him. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
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20. Religious belief is important to him. He tries 
hard to do what his religion requires. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
21. It is important to him that things be organized 
and clean. He really does not like things to be a 
mess. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
22) He thinks it's important to be interested in 
things. He likes to be curious and to try to 
understand all sorts of things. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
23) He believes all the worlds’ people should live 
in harmony. Promoting peace among all groups 
in the world is important to him. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
24. He thinks it is important to be ambitious. He 
wants to show how capable he is. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
25. He thinks it is best to do things in traditional 
ways. It is important to him to keep up the 
customs he has learned. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
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a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
26. Enjoying life’s pleasures is important to him. 
He likes to ‘spoil’ himself. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27. It is important to him to respond to the needs 
of others.  He tries to support those he knows. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
28. He believes he should always show respect 
to his parents and to older people. It is important 
to him to be obedient. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
29. He wants everyone to be treated justly, even 
people he doesn’t know. It is important to him to 
protect the weak in society. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
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c) How much should you be like this person?           
30.  He likes surprises. It is important to him to 
have an exciting life. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
31. He tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying 
healthy is very important to him. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
 
32. Getting ahead in life is important to him 
He strives to do better than others 
 
Not at all 
       1 
    
 
     2 
 
Somewhat 
       3 
      
 
   4       
Very  
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
33. Forgiving people who have hurt him is 
important to him. He tries to see what is good in 
them and not to hold a grudge. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
 
 
 
34. It is important to him to be independent. He 
likes to rely on himself. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
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c) How much should you be like this person?           
35. Having a stable government is important to 
him. He is concerned that the social order be 
protected. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
36. It is important to him to be polite to other 
people all the time. He tries never to disturb or 
irritate others. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like you is this person           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
37. He really wants to enjoy life. Having a good 
time is very important to him. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
38. It is important to him to be humble and 
modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
39. He always wants to be the one who makes the 
decisions. He likes to be the leader. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
40. It is important to him to adapt to nature and to 
fit into it. He believes that people should not 
change nature. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3      4 
Very      
Much  
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     5 
a) How much are you like this person?          
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?          
c) How much should you be like this person?           
 
Thank you for your participation in this research. 
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Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ): Female 
          
Question Answer 
1) Thinking up new ideas and being creative is 
important to her. She likes to do things in her 
own original way. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
2. It is important to her to be rich. She wants to 
have a lot of money and expensive things. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
3. She thinks it is important that every person in 
the world be treated equally. She believes 
everyone should have equal opportunities in life. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
4. It's very important to her to show her abilities. 
She wants people to admire what she does. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
Instructions: 
Here we briefly describe some people.  Please read each description and think about how much each person:  
 
(d) Is actually like you (e.g. has the beliefs and/or behaves as you actually do in reality). 
(e) Is ideally like you (e.g. has the beliefs and/or behaves as you would ideally wish to). 
(f) Is what you should be like (e.g. has the beliefs and/or behaves as you should do, but do not always do in 
reality) 
 
Put an X in the box to the right that shows how much the person in the description is like you. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers to these questions, so do not take too much time considering you 
answer to the question, just put a X in the box that applies best to you 
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     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
5. It is important to her to live in secure 
surroundings. She avoids anything that might 
endanger her safety. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
6. She thinks it is important to do lots of different 
things in life. She always looks for new things to 
try. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
7. She believes that people should do what 
they're told. She thinks people should follow 
rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.                                                                                          
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
8. It is important to her to listen to people who 
are different from her. Even when she disagrees 
with them, she still wants to understand them. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
9. She thinks it's important not to ask for more 
than what you have. She believes that people 
should be satisfied with what they have. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
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c) How much should you be like this person?           
10. She seeks every chance she can to have fun. 
It is important to her to do things that give her 
pleasure. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
11) It is important to her to make her own 
decisions about what she does. She likes to be 
free to plan and to choose her activities for 
herself. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
12. It's very important to her to help the people 
around her.  She wants to care for their well-
being. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
13. Being very successful is important to her. 
She likes to impress other people. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very  Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
14. It is very important to her that her country be 
safe. She thinks the state must be on watch 
against threats from within and without. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
15. She likes to take risks. She is always looking 
for adventures. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very Much  
     5 
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a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
16. It is important to her always to behave 
properly. She wants to avoid doing anything 
people would say is wrong. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3      4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
17. It is important to her to be in charge and tell 
others what to do. She wants people to do what 
she says. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
18) It is important to her to be loyal to her friends. 
She wants to devote herself to people close to 
her. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
19. She strongly believes that people should care 
for nature. Looking after the environment is 
important to her. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
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20. Religious belief is important to her. She tries 
hard to do what her religion requires. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
21. It is important to her that things be organized 
and clean. She really does not like things to be a 
mess. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
22) She thinks it's important to be interested in 
things. She likes to be curious and to try to 
understand all sorts of things. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
23) She believes all the worlds’ people should 
live in harmony. Promoting peace among all 
groups in the world is important to her. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
24. She thinks it is important to be ambitious. 
She wants to show how capable she is. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
25. She thinks it is best to do things in traditional 
ways. It is important to her to keep up the 
customs she has learned. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
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c) How much should you be like this person?           
26. Enjoying life’s pleasures is important to her. 
She likes to ‘spoil’ herself. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
 
 
 
 
27. It is important to her to respond to the needs 
of others.  She tries to support those she knows. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
28. She believes she should always show respect 
to her parents and to older people. It is important 
to her to be obedient. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
29. She wants everyone to be treated justly, even 
people she doesn’t know. It is important to her to 
protect the weak in society. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
30. She likes surprises. It is important to her to 
have an exciting life. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
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c) How much should you be like this person?           
31. She tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying 
healthy is very important to her. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
 
32. Getting ahead in life is important to her 
She strives to do better than others 
 
Not at all 
       1 
    
 
     2 
 
Somewhat 
       3 
      
 
   4       
Very  
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
33. Forgiving people who have hurt her is 
important to her. She tries to see what is good in 
them and not to hold a grudge. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
 
 
34. It is important to her to be independent. She 
likes to rely on herself. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
35. Having a stable government is important to 
her. She is concerned that the social order be 
protected. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
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36. It is important to her to be polite to other 
people all the time. She tries never to disturb or 
irritate others. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like you is this person           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
37. She really wants to enjoy life. Having a good 
time is very important to her. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
38. It is important to her to be humble and 
modest. She tries not to draw attention to herself 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
39. She always wants to be the one who makes 
the decisions. She likes to be the leader. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3    4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?           
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?           
c) How much should you be like this person?           
40. It is important to her to adapt to nature and to 
fit into it. She believes that people should not 
change nature. 
Not at all 
       1     2 
Somewhat 
       3      4 
Very      
Much  
     5 
a) How much are you like this person?          
b) Ideally, how much would you be like this person?          
c) How much should you be like this person?           
 
                           
                              Thank you for your participation in this research. 
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Appendix 12  Measure of Constructs Underlying Perfectionism (M-CUP) 
 
M-CUP 
 
Please read each of the following items carefully and mark the response that best corresponds to 
your agreement or disagreement using the following scale. Please circle the appropriate number. 
There are no right or wrong answers. 
 1  2  3  4  5 
       Strongly        Somewhat       Neutral            Somewhat        Strongly 
       Disagree           Disagree                                   Agree               Agree 
1. I am a person who sets high standards for myself  1 2 3 4 5 
2. I like things to be neat 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I expect others to excel at whatever they do  1 2 3 4 5 
4. I feel great when I do well at something  1 2 3 4 5 
5. I often don’t live up to my own standards  1 2 3 4 5 
6. I often feel that people make  excessive demands of me 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Neatness is of great importance to me  1 2 3 4 5 
8. I often check my work carefully to make sure there are no 
mistakes 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I feel great satisfaction when I feel I have perfected 
something  
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I rarely feel that what I have done is good enough  1 2 3 4 5 
11. Others expect me to be perfect  1 2 3 4 5 
12. I have very high goals  1 2 3 4 5 
13. Things should always be put away in their place  1 2 3 4 5 
14. I often check my work several times to find any mistakes 1 2 3 4 5 
15. It is important to me that the people I am close to are 
successful 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. After completing a task, I feel happy  1 2 3 4 5 
17. No matter how well I do, I still feel that I could have done 
better 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. When I make a mistake, I feel really bad 1 2 3 4 5 
19. People expect perfection of  me 1 2 3 4 5 
20.  I will not do something  if I cannot do it perfectly 1 2 3 4 5 
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21.  I want things to always be in order  1 2 3 4 5 
22.  I really don’t like to see people close to me make mistakes  1 2 3 4 5 
23.  I get excited when I do a good job  1 2 3 4 5 
24.  It feels like my best is never good enough  1 2 3 4 5 
25. People expect me to succeed at everything I do  1 2 3 4 5 
26.  I have to do things perfectly-or I shouldn’t do them at all  1 2 3 4 5 
27. I tend to set very high standards for myself 1 2 3 4 5 
28. I like things to always be organized 1 2 3 4 5 
29.  I have high standards for the people who are important to 
me  
1 2 3 4 5 
30.  Doing a great job is really rewarding  1 2 3 4 5 
31. I become upset when I make a mistake 1 2 3 4 5 
32.  People expect high levels of performance from me  1 2 3 4 5 
33.  I won’t do things if I can’t do them perfectly  1 2 3 4 5 
34.  I definitely have high standards 1 2 3 4 5 
35.  I like to be orderly in the way I do things 1 2 3 4 5 
36.  It takes me a long time to do something because I check 
my work many times 
1 2 3 4 5 
37.  I always want high quality work from others 1 2 3 4 5 
38.  My performance rarely meets my standards  1 2 3 4 5 
39.  There’s no point in doing something if I cannot do it 
perfectly 
1 2 3 4 5 
40.  I expect high levels of performance from myself 1 2 3 4 5 
41. I try to be a very neat person 1 2 3 4 5 
42. I feel satisfied when I accomplish something  1 2 3 4 5 
43. I become very frustrated when I do not do something 
perfectly  
1 2 3 4 5 
44.  I set extremely high standards for myself 1 2 3 4 5 
45. I try to always be very organized 1 2 3 4 5 
46.  When I look over something, I often check over the small 
details  
1 2 3 4 5 
47. I expect a lot from my friends  1 2 3 4 5 
48. I experience positive feelings after I achieve something  1 2 3 4 5 
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49.  I feel I often fall short of the kind of person I want to be 1 2 3 4 5 
50.  I feel crushed after I make a mistake  1 2 3 4 5 
51.  If one thing goes wrong, I feel that I cannot do anything 
right 
1 2 3 4 5 
52. I feel that I am an organized person 1 2 3 4 5 
53. I may check my work several times to make sure the 
details are correct 
1 2 3 4 5 
54.  I feel pleasure when I complete tasks 1 2 3 4 5 
55. I often feel dissatisfied with my work/performance  1 2 3 4 5 
56. I feel like my best is never good enough for other people  1 2 3 4 5 
57.  I feel like a complete failure if I do not do something 
perfectly  
1 2 3 4 5 
58. I feel satisfied with my work after I do something well  1 2 3 4 5 
59. People expect a lot from me  1 2 3 4 5 
60. If I notice I made a mistake in my work, I feel like I failed 
the whole task  
1 2 3 4 5 
61. I always feel like there is something wrong in my 
work/performance  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Scoring: 
No items are reverse scored.  
Order: 2, 7, 13, 21, 28, 35, 41, 45, 52 
Satisfaction: 4, 9, 16, 23, 30, 42, 48, 54, 58 
Details and Checking: 8, 14, 36, 46, 53 
Perfectionism toward Others: 3, 15, 22, 29, 37, 47 
High Standards: 1, 12, 27, 34, 40, 44 
Black and White Thinking about Tasks and Activities: 20, 26, 33, 39 
Perceived Pressure from Others: 6, 11, 19, 25, 32, 59 
Dissatisfaction: 5, 10, 17, 24, 38, 49, 55, 56, 61 
Reactivity to Mistakes: 18, 31, 43, 50, 51, 57, 60 
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Appendix 13 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS)  
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Appendix 14 Priming Task A 
 
Importance of values –Group 1     Gender:  M / F    Age:           Participant No: 
 
List as many reasons as you can as to why: 
 
It is important to be successful 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to be ambitious 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to be capable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to be influential 
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Appendix 15 Priming Task B 
 
Importance of values –Group 2 Gender:  M / F    Age: Participant No: 
List as many reasons as you can as to why: 
 
It is important to be helpful 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to be forgiving 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to be loyal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is important to be responsible 
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Appendix 16 Neutral Task 
 
Importance of values – Group 3 Gender:  M / F     Age: Participant No: 
 
List as many reasons as you can as to why: 
 
People drink coffee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People drink tea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People drink cola 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People drink milk 
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Appendix 17 Behavioural Task 
 
3 E F C 3  T S E F C V E B 
J 2 N G V C E F Z P F W E 
F H B E F F P U Y T F C U 
H N 8 O I U K H 3 T H U F 
F C V B Y E S Z U P G B E 
F F E D C F U G N U F C S 
Q O P K U 2 N Y E F B V E 
F F T U G B 7 E F C S F P 
O U E K L U T F B N H 3 T 
F L H T 8 F V P O I K L J 
T G H N  E F E V  T H E F H 
V U B E J U N G 8 C E F Z 
P F U 8 B E F F P U Y T F 
C V U H N J O I U K H P T 
H 7 D F C V B Y E S F F P 
8 B E F F E D 1 V 5 G N U 
F C S Q L P K F 4 N Y E F 
B V E F F T U G B J E F C 
S F P O U E K L U T F B N 
H U T F G H T R F V P O I 
K 2 J T F H 9 P E F C H T 
H E F C V E B L U N G V F 
C E F Z P F U H B E F F P 
4 Y T F C V U H N 9 8 I U 
K H P T H U D F C V B Y E 
S 3 F P G B E F F E D C F 
F G N U F C S Q 3 P K S G 
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R T F H U I B V G O L N H 
F N H D G S T Y E B N C K 
I F G A H Y F E V D B C F 
S E O K H A P Q L N F B C 
Y F F B A H S F E T 8 G F 
3 4 5 F G H Y E 2 1 C F I 
O K U F G H N J U T R D F 
P O K H E E F B H T F R Y 
H U F H G D E A R C G R T 
E X C V B H U T G H J I U 
Y T O P L F 9 8 G F 5 D 4 
3 H 7 6 J N C F 3 E F G T 
F P O L I U N C H F F U G 
F H E V C B S G E T 3 7 H 
D B C U T Y 9 1 J D N C H 
E P L K F H E V A X U G F 
N C I U 8 1 E X 1 N D J O 
U T H F P I N A K U F E 3 
G E K H B U Y F C V F P L 
O I K N H 3 6 G V B A C G 
F R E V P O L I U F H I U 
N J K M N H V G D F 6 5 4 
3 L P F H N B F D E Q P O 
U N I P O P L O U H G N F 
B V C 6 3 D E E L U I K F 
1 E H 1 I 9 K P F 9 N K R 
L D F K A T F I H N L E A 
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Appendix 18  Behavioural Form 
 
Task Time: 
 
Would you like to check your answers?  
Yes/No 
 
Check Time: 
 
 
Task Accuracy: 
Check Accuracy: 
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Appendix 19 - Box Plots for Outliers (HADS, PVQ, MCUP) 
 
HADS Scores 
HADS Anxiety Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HADS Depression Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCUP Scores 
MCUP Order subscale scores 
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MCUP satisfaction subscale scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCUP details and checking subscale scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCUP perfection towards others subscale scores 
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MCUP high standards subscale scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCUP black and white thinking subscale scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCUP perceived pressure subscale scores 
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MCUP dissatisfaction subscale scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCUP Reactivity subscale scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCUP total scores 
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MCUP factor 1 scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MCUP factor 2 scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PVQ scores 
Power Value – Actual scores 
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Power Value – Ideal scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Power Value – Ought scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Power Value – Actual/Ideal Discrepancy scores 
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Power Value – Actual/Ought Discrepancy scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Achievement Value – Actual scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Achievement Value – Ideal scores 
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Achievement Value – Ought scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Achievement Value – Actual/Ideal Discrepancy scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Achievement Value – Actual/Ought Discrepancy scores 
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Hedonism Value – Actual scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hedonism Value – Ideal scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hedonism Value – Ought scores 
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Hedonism Value – Actual/Ideal Discrepancy scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hedonism Value – Actual/Ought Discrepancy scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stimulation Value – Actual scores 
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Stimulation Value – Ideal scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stimulation Value – Ought scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stimulation Value – Actual/Ideal Discrepancy scores 
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Stimulation Value – Actual/Ought Discrepancy scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-direction Value – Actual scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-direction Value – Ideal scores 
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Self-direction Value – Ought scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-Direction Value – Actual/Ideal Discrepancy scores 
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Universalism Value – Actual scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Universalism Value – Ideal scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Universalism Value – Ought scores 
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Universalism Value – Actual/Ideal Discrepancy scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Universalism Value – Actual/Ought Discrepancy scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benevolence Value – Actual Scores 
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Benevolence Value –Ideal Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benevolence Value – Ought Scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benevolence Value – Actual/Ideal Discrepancy scores 
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Benevolence Value – Actual/Ought Discrepancy scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tradition Value – Actual scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tradition Value –Ideal scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 295 of 335 
 
Tradition Value –Ought scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tradition Value – Actual/Ideal Discrepancy scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tradition Value – Actual/Ought Discrepancy scores 
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Conformity Value – Actual scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conformity Value – Ideal scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conformity Value – Ought scores 
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Conformity Value – Actual/Ideal Discrepancy scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conformity Value – Actual/Ought Discrepancy scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security value – Actual scores 
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Security value – Ideal scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security value – Ought scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security Value – Actual/Ideal Discrepancy scores 
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Security Value – Actual/Ought Discrepancy scores 
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Appendix 20 - Box Plots for Outliers (Behaviour Measures) 
 
Task Completion Times                                                     Task Accuracy 
 
 
 
Checking Time                                                                   Checking Accuracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 21 Tests of normality  
 
HADS – Total sample 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
HADS Anxiety Score .134 90 .000 .968 90 .026 
HADS Depression Score .190 90 .000 .885 90 .000 
HADS Total .131 90 .001 .944 90 .001 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
 
HADS – Between groups 
Tests of Normality 
 Priming Group Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
HADS Anxiety Score 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .133 30 .187 .933 30 .058 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .120 30 .200
*
 .964 30 .395 
Group 3 - Control .197 30 .004 .925 30 .037 
HADS Depression Score 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .253 30 .000 .860 30 .001 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .184 30 .011 .944 30 .113 
Group 3 - Control .210 30 .002 .826 30 .000 
HADS Total 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .182 30 .012 .913 30 .018 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .125 30 .200
*
 .963 30 .364 
Group 3 - Control .188 30 .008 .880 30 .003 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
MCUP – Total sample 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
MEAN.MCUP.ORDER .100 90 .027 .975 90 .078 
MEAN.MCUP.SATISFACTI
ON 
.137 90 .000 .927 90 .000 
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MEAN.MCUP.DETAILSAND
CHECKING 
.107 90 .013 .974 90 .067 
MEAN.MCUP.PERFECTTO
WARDOTHER 
.078 90 .200
*
 .975 90 .078 
MEAN.MCUP.HIGHSTAND
ARDS 
.109 90 .011 .922 90 .000 
MEAN.MCUP.BLACKAND
WHITE 
.160 90 .000 .880 90 .000 
MEAN.MCUP.PERCEIVED
PRESSURE 
.132 90 .001 .963 90 .011 
MEAN.MCUP.DISSATISFA
CTION 
.118 90 .004 .976 90 .091 
MEAN.MCUP.REACTIVITY
MISTAKES 
.143 90 .000 .949 90 .001 
MEAN.MCUP.TOTAL .097 90 .034 .977 90 .119 
MEAN.MCUP.FACTOR1 .060 90 .200
*
 .987 90 .542 
MEAN.MCUP.FACTOR2 .107 90 .013 .956 90 .004 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
MCUP – Between groups 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Priming Group Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
MEAN.MCUP.ORDER 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .187 30 .009 .962 30 .339 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .077 30 .200
*
 .983 30 .894 
Group 3 - Control .111 30 .200
*
 .942 30 .101 
MEAN.MCUP.SATISFACTIO
N 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .212 30 .001 .889 30 .005 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .133 30 .187 .923 30 .032 
Group 3 - Control .141 30 .133 .918 30 .025 
MEAN.MCUP.DETAILSANDC
HECKING 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .195 30 .005 .938 30 .079 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .116 30 .200
*
 .963 30 .368 
Group 3 - Control .097 30 .200
*
 .982 30 .865 
MEAN.MCUP.PERFECTTOW
ARDOTHER 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .110 30 .200
*
 .966 30 .448 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .123 30 .200
*
 .953 30 .200 
Group 3 - Control .078 30 .200
*
 .974 30 .642 
MEAN.MCUP.HIGHSTANDA
RDS 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .175 30 .019 .926 30 .037 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .123 30 .200
*
 .922 30 .030 
Group 3 - Control .145 30 .110 .895 30 .007 
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MEAN.MCUP.BLACKANDW
HITE 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .140 30 .141 .919 30 .026 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .233 30 .000 .836 30 .000 
Group 3 - Control .209 30 .002 .851 30 .001 
MEAN.MCUP.PERCEIVEDP
RESSURE 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .129 30 .200
*
 .968 30 .487 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .160 30 .049 .946 30 .136 
Group 3 - Control .129 30 .200
*
 .949 30 .160 
MEAN.MCUP.DISSATISFAC
TION 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .102 30 .200
*
 .984 30 .927 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .133 30 .189 .967 30 .470 
Group 3 - Control .127 30 .200
*
 .954 30 .216 
MEAN.MCUP.REACTIVITYMI
STAKES 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .147 30 .096 .934 30 .064 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .154 30 .067 .948 30 .150 
Group 3 - Control .177 30 .017 .951 30 .175 
MEAN.MCUP.TOTAL 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .156 30 .060 .951 30 .176 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .122 30 .200
*
 .953 30 .200 
Group 3 - Control .139 30 .143 .984 30 .911 
MEAN.MCUP.FACTOR1 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .147 30 .098 .971 30 .555 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .081 30 .200
*
 .966 30 .437 
Group 3 - Control .133 30 .183 .956 30 .245 
MEAN.MCUP.FACTOR2 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .125 30 .200
*
 .943 30 .112 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .104 30 .200
*
 .939 30 .086 
Group 3 - Control .191 30 .007 .934 30 .064 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
PVQ – Total sample 
 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Power Value- Actual .099 90 .028 .966 90 .018 
Power Value- Ideal .117 90 .004 .958 90 .005 
Power Value - Ought .120 90 .003 .957 90 .004 
Power Value - Actual/Ideal 
Discrepancy (no direction) 
.217 90 .000 .888 90 .000 
Power Value - Actual/Ought 
Discrepancy (no direction) 
.225 90 .000 .895 90 .000 
Achievement Value - Actual .123 90 .002 .957 90 .005 
Achievement Value - Ideal .099 90 .031 .974 90 .068 
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Achievement Value - Ought .142 90 .000 .968 90 .027 
Achievement Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.210 90 .000 .868 90 .000 
Achievement Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.206 90 .000 .873 90 .000 
Hedonism Value - Actual .120 90 .003 .953 90 .003 
Hedonism Value - Ideal .133 90 .000 .953 90 .003 
Hedonism Value - Ought .171 90 .000 .953 90 .003 
Hedonism Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.215 90 .000 .896 90 .000 
Hedomism Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.147 90 .000 .887 90 .000 
Stimulation Value - Actual .123 90 .002 .959 90 .006 
Stimulation Value - Ideal .160 90 .000 .923 90 .000 
Stimulation Value - Ought .149 90 .000 .951 90 .002 
Stimulation Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.224 90 .000 .899 90 .000 
Stimulation Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.282 90 .000 .852 90 .000 
Self-direction Value - Actual .107 90 .012 .976 90 .097 
Self-direction Value - Ideal .157 90 .000 .933 90 .000 
Self-direction Value - Ought .140 90 .000 .955 90 .003 
Self-direction Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.164 90 .000 .940 90 .000 
Self-direction Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.186 90 .000 .905 90 .000 
Universalism Value - Actual .118 90 .003 .972 90 .048 
Universalism Value - Ideal .175 90 .000 .927 90 .000 
Universalism Value - Ought .188 90 .000 .875 90 .000 
Universalism Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.143 90 .000 .968 90 .027 
Universalism Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.123 90 .002 .958 90 .006 
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Benevolence Value - Actual .142 90 .000 .963 90 .011 
Benevolence Value - Ideal .155 90 .000 .835 90 .000 
Benevolence Value - Ought .171 90 .000 .899 90 .000 
Benevolence Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.171 90 .000 .918 90 .000 
Benevolence Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.142 90 .000 .946 90 .001 
Tradition Value - Actual .100 90 .027 .980 90 .175 
Tradition Value - Ideal .149 90 .000 .967 90 .022 
Tradition Value - Ought .115 90 .005 .967 90 .022 
Tradition Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.185 90 .000 .922 90 .000 
Tradition Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.132 90 .001 .933 90 .000 
Conformity Value - Actual .104 90 .018 .977 90 .111 
Conformity Value - Ideal .103 90 .020 .974 90 .067 
Conformity Value - Ought .102 90 .021 .963 90 .012 
Conformity Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.209 90 .000 .871 90 .000 
Conformity Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.176 90 .000 .897 90 .000 
Security Value - Actual .081 90 .195 .984 90 .330 
Security Value - Ideal .093 90 .052 .983 90 .308 
Security Value - Ought .103 90 .019 .974 90 .064 
Security Value - Actual/Ideal 
Discrepancy (no direction) 
.140 90 .000 .882 90 .000 
Security Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
.139 90 .000 .929 90 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
 
 
PVQ – Between groups 
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Tests of Normality 
 Priming Group Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Power Value- Actual 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .166 30 .034 .939 30 .085 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .123 30 .200
*
 .964 30 .394 
Group 3 - Control .154 30 .067 .936 30 .073 
Power Value- Ideal 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .145 30 .105 .924 30 .035 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .116 30 .200
*
 .967 30 .452 
Group 3 - Control .174 30 .021 .934 30 .064 
Power Value - Ought 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .144 30 .117 .943 30 .110 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .141 30 .131 .925 30 .036 
Group 3 - Control .212 30 .001 .935 30 .066 
Power Value - Actual/Ideal 
Discrepancy (no direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .195 30 .005 .906 30 .012 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .260 30 .000 .814 30 .000 
Group 3 - Control .187 30 .009 .887 30 .004 
Power Value - Actual/Ought 
Discrepancy (no direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .213 30 .001 .885 30 .004 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .272 30 .000 .876 30 .002 
Group 3 - Control .198 30 .004 .893 30 .006 
Achievement Value - Actual 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .159 30 .050 .945 30 .126 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .141 30 .130 .948 30 .153 
Group 3 - Control .123 30 .200
*
 .948 30 .154 
Achievement Value - Ideal 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .149 30 .086 .956 30 .239 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .166 30 .033 .945 30 .121 
Group 3 - Control .084 30 .200
*
 .974 30 .662 
Achievement Value - Ought 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .133 30 .188 .964 30 .389 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .150 30 .084 .944 30 .118 
Group 3 - Control .175 30 .020 .944 30 .118 
Achievement Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .202 30 .003 .846 30 .001 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .227 30 .000 .843 30 .000 
Group 3 - Control .239 30 .000 .909 30 .014 
Achievement Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .175 30 .020 .906 30 .012 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .218 30 .001 .809 30 .000 
Group 3 - Control .285 30 .000 .845 30 .000 
Hedonism Value - Actual 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .151 30 .080 .922 30 .031 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .142 30 .127 .947 30 .139 
Group 3 - Control .166 30 .034 .940 30 .090 
Hedonism Value - Ideal 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .154 30 .067 .958 30 .270 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .154 30 .067 .952 30 .188 
Group 3 - Control .191 30 .007 .939 30 .087 
Hedonism Value - Ought 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .173 30 .022 .948 30 .148 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .151 30 .077 .950 30 .170 
Group 3 - Control .192 30 .006 .936 30 .073 
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Hedonism Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .213 30 .001 .873 30 .002 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .197 30 .004 .872 30 .002 
Group 3 - Control .271 30 .000 .881 30 .003 
Hedomism Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .179 30 .015 .919 30 .026 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .192 30 .006 .920 30 .026 
Group 3 - Control .153 30 .071 .845 30 .000 
Stimulation Value - Actual 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .161 30 .046 .930 30 .050 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .181 30 .013 .952 30 .192 
Group 3 - Control .158 30 .054 .948 30 .147 
Stimulation Value - Ideal 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .172 30 .023 .911 30 .015 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .212 30 .001 .917 30 .022 
Group 3 - Control .137 30 .157 .924 30 .033 
Stimulation Value - Ought 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .153 30 .071 .942 30 .105 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .156 30 .062 .940 30 .090 
Group 3 - Control .189 30 .008 .939 30 .087 
Stimulation Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .174 30 .021 .911 30 .016 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .308 30 .000 .846 30 .001 
Group 3 - Control .188 30 .009 .872 30 .002 
Stimulation Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .263 30 .000 .878 30 .003 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .315 30 .000 .810 30 .000 
Group 3 - Control .265 30 .000 .852 30 .001 
Self-direction Value - Actual 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .120 30 .200
*
 .971 30 .555 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .135 30 .169 .960 30 .314 
Group 3 - Control .118 30 .200
*
 .970 30 .547 
Self-direction Value - Ideal 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .203 30 .003 .928 30 .044 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .185 30 .010 .911 30 .016 
Group 3 - Control .141 30 .135 .935 30 .069 
Self-direction Value - Ought 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .177 30 .017 .942 30 .106 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .190 30 .007 .918 30 .024 
Group 3 - Control .152 30 .075 .925 30 .036 
Self-direction Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .180 30 .014 .909 30 .014 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .187 30 .009 .918 30 .024 
Group 3 - Control .149 30 .088 .934 30 .064 
Self-direction Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .174 30 .021 .893 30 .006 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .181 30 .014 .926 30 .039 
Group 3 - Control .206 30 .002 .877 30 .002 
Universalism Value - Actual 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .179 30 .015 .924 30 .034 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .124 30 .200
*
 .979 30 .797 
Group 3 - Control .168 30 .031 .963 30 .363 
Universalism Value - Ideal 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .209 30 .002 .940 30 .094 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .169 30 .029 .902 30 .009 
Group 3 - Control .216 30 .001 .885 30 .004 
Universalism Value - Ought Group 1 - Prime Achievement .210 30 .002 .803 30 .000 
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Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .206 30 .002 .872 30 .002 
Group 3 - Control .194 30 .005 .899 30 .008 
Universalism Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .130 30 .200
*
 .946 30 .128 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .127 30 .200
*
 .972 30 .605 
Group 3 - Control .182 30 .012 .941 30 .094 
Universalism Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .125 30 .200
*
 .934 30 .064 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .098 30 .200
*
 .966 30 .434 
Group 3 - Control .212 30 .001 .917 30 .023 
Benevolence Value - Actual 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .154 30 .068 .944 30 .120 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .094 30 .200
*
 .975 30 .696 
Group 3 - Control .235 30 .000 .895 30 .006 
Benevolence Value - Ideal 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .162 30 .043 .886 30 .004 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .189 30 .008 .806 30 .000 
Group 3 - Control .153 30 .072 .880 30 .003 
Benevolence Value - Ought 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .181 30 .013 .921 30 .029 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .195 30 .005 .897 30 .007 
Group 3 - Control .179 30 .015 .867 30 .001 
Benevolence Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .222 30 .001 .905 30 .011 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .167 30 .033 .928 30 .044 
Group 3 - Control .180 30 .014 .878 30 .003 
Benevolence Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .169 30 .028 .932 30 .056 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .161 30 .045 .954 30 .221 
Group 3 - Control .144 30 .113 .911 30 .016 
Tradition Value - Actual 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .102 30 .200
*
 .966 30 .442 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .150 30 .083 .959 30 .291 
Group 3 - Control .216 30 .001 .931 30 .053 
Tradition Value - Ideal 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .140 30 .136 .973 30 .622 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .184 30 .011 .920 30 .027 
Group 3 - Control .157 30 .056 .965 30 .419 
Tradition Value - Ought 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .113 30 .200
*
 .962 30 .357 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .229 30 .000 .917 30 .023 
Group 3 - Control .129 30 .200
*
 .977 30 .740 
Tradition Value - Actual/Ideal 
Discrepancy (no direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .195 30 .005 .924 30 .035 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .181 30 .013 .902 30 .009 
Group 3 - Control .171 30 .025 .912 30 .016 
Tradition Value - Actual/Ought 
Discrepancy (no direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .194 30 .006 .932 30 .056 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .226 30 .000 .907 30 .012 
Group 3 - Control .147 30 .099 .905 30 .011 
Conformity Value - Actual 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .141 30 .135 .937 30 .075 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .107 30 .200
*
 .976 30 .712 
Group 3 - Control .130 30 .200
*
 .957 30 .261 
Conformity Value - Ideal 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .126 30 .200
*
 .956 30 .248 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .155 30 .062 .957 30 .252 
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Group 3 - Control .125 30 .200
*
 .936 30 .070 
Conformity Value - Ought 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .128 30 .200
*
 .960 30 .316 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .114 30 .200
*
 .973 30 .631 
Group 3 - Control .133 30 .184 .944 30 .116 
Conformity Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .215 30 .001 .868 30 .001 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .215 30 .001 .840 30 .000 
Group 3 - Control .187 30 .009 .883 30 .003 
Conformity Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .154 30 .067 .903 30 .010 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .214 30 .001 .829 30 .000 
Group 3 - Control .204 30 .003 .921 30 .028 
Security Value - Actual 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .114 30 .200
*
 .984 30 .927 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .119 30 .200
*
 .961 30 .332 
Group 3 - Control .095 30 .200
*
 .967 30 .470 
Security Value - Ideal 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .141 30 .133 .977 30 .745 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .168 30 .030 .951 30 .176 
Group 3 - Control .099 30 .200
*
 .969 30 .520 
Security Value - Ought 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .148 30 .092 .912 30 .017 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .145 30 .106 .954 30 .217 
Group 3 - Control .124 30 .200
*
 .952 30 .194 
Security Value - Actual/Ideal 
Discrepancy (no direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .125 30 .200
*
 .939 30 .086 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .145 30 .106 .924 30 .034 
Group 3 - Control .202 30 .003 .799 30 .000 
Security Value - Actual/Ought 
Discrepancy (no direction) 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .131 30 .200
*
 .933 30 .059 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .188 30 .008 .908 30 .013 
Group 3 - Control .173 30 .023 .875 30 .002 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
Behavioural Measures – Total sample 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
.158 52 .002 .719 52 .000 
Task Accuracy .231 52 .000 .810 52 .000 
Checking Time in Seconds .153 52 .004 .945 52 .018 
Checking Accuracy .259 52 .000 .729 52 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Behavioural Measures – Between groups 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Priming Group Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .118 22 .200
*
 .963 22 .551 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .178 17 .157 .874 17 .025 
Group 3 - Control .261 13 .016 .731 13 .001 
Task Accuracy 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .177 22 .070 .903 22 .034 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .249 17 .006 .845 17 .009 
Group 3 - Control .291 13 .004 .797 13 .006 
Checking Time in Seconds 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .129 22 .200
*
 .957 22 .425 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .178 17 .158 .888 17 .042 
Group 3 - Control .227 13 .064 .908 13 .173 
Checking Accuracy 
Group 1 - Prime Achievement .253 22 .001 .678 22 .000 
Group 2 - Prime Benevolence .272 17 .002 .811 17 .003 
Group 3 - Control .364 13 .000 .722 13 .001 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Appendix 22 Tests of homogeneity  
 
HADS 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variance 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
HADS Anxiety Score Based on Mean .
a
    
HADS Total 
Based on Mean 2.461 2 87 .091 
Based on Median 1.813 2 87 .169 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.813 2 73.272 .170 
Based on trimmed mean 2.063 2 87 .133 
a. There are not enough unique spread/level pairs to compute the Levene statistic. 
 
 
MCUP 
 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variance 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
MEAN.MCUP.ORDER 
Based on Mean .695 2 87 .502 
Based on Median .609 2 87 .546 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.609 2 75.129 .547 
Based on trimmed mean .636 2 87 .532 
MEAN.MCUP.SATISFACTI
ON 
Based on Mean .102 2 87 .903 
Based on Median .097 2 87 .908 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.097 2 73.050 .908 
Based on trimmed mean .091 2 87 .913 
MEAN.MCUP.DETAILSAND
CHECKING 
Based on Mean .685 2 87 .507 
Based on Median .180 2 87 .836 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.180 2 78.677 .836 
Based on trimmed mean .583 2 87 .560 
MEAN.MCUP.PERFECTTO
WARDOTHER 
Based on Mean .355 2 87 .702 
Based on Median .327 2 87 .722 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.327 2 80.614 .722 
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Based on trimmed mean .350 2 87 .706 
MEAN.MCUP.HIGHSTAND
ARDS 
Based on Mean 3.678 2 87 .029 
Based on Median 3.060 2 87 .052 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
3.060 2 63.768 .054 
Based on trimmed mean 3.310 2 87 .041 
MEAN.MCUP.BLACKANDW
HITE 
Based on Mean .886 2 87 .416 
Based on Median .721 2 87 .489 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.721 2 83.147 .489 
Based on trimmed mean .886 2 87 .416 
MEAN.MCUP.PERCEIVEDP
RESSURE 
Based on Mean .519 2 87 .597 
Based on Median .542 2 87 .583 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.542 2 82.334 .583 
Based on trimmed mean .525 2 87 .593 
MEAN.MCUP.DISSATISFA
CTION 
Based on Mean 1.349 2 87 .265 
Based on Median 1.223 2 87 .299 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.223 2 81.729 .300 
Based on trimmed mean 1.279 2 87 .283 
MEAN.MCUP.REACTIVITY
MISTAKES 
Based on Mean .013 2 87 .987 
Based on Median .045 2 87 .956 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.045 2 84.216 .956 
Based on trimmed mean .015 2 87 .985 
MEAN.MCUP.TOTAL 
Based on Mean 1.797 2 87 .172 
Based on Median 1.763 2 87 .178 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.763 2 84.850 .178 
Based on trimmed mean 1.790 2 87 .173 
MEAN.MCUP.FACTOR1 
Based on Mean 1.685 2 87 .191 
Based on Median 1.443 2 87 .242 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.443 2 83.539 .242 
Based on trimmed mean 1.625 2 87 .203 
MEAN.MCUP.FACTOR2 
Based on Mean 1.034 2 87 .360 
Based on Median .940 2 87 .395 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.940 2 85.992 .395 
Based on trimmed mean 1.031 2 87 .361 
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PVQ 
 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variance 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Power Value- Actual 
Based on Mean .032 2 87 .968 
Based on Median .074 2 87 .929 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.074 2 86.417 .929 
Based on trimmed mean .040 2 87 .961 
Power Value- Ideal 
Based on Mean .566 2 87 .570 
Based on Median .696 2 87 .501 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.696 2 83.883 .501 
Based on trimmed mean .621 2 87 .540 
Power Value - Ought 
Based on Mean .061 2 87 .940 
Based on Median .132 2 87 .877 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.132 2 74.603 .877 
Based on trimmed mean .043 2 87 .958 
Achievement Value - Actual 
Based on Mean .195 2 87 .823 
Based on Median .180 2 87 .836 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.180 2 81.445 .836 
Based on trimmed mean .311 2 87 .734 
Achievement Value - Ideal 
Based on Mean .562 2 87 .572 
Based on Median .403 2 87 .670 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.403 2 78.562 .670 
Based on trimmed mean .509 2 87 .603 
Achievement Value - Ought 
Based on Mean .439 2 87 .646 
Based on Median .498 2 87 .610 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.498 2 81.956 .610 
Based on trimmed mean .477 2 87 .622 
Hedonism Value - Actual 
Based on Mean .153 2 87 .858 
Based on Median .094 2 87 .910 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.094 2 75.469 .910 
Based on trimmed mean .114 2 87 .892 
Hedonism Value - Ideal 
Based on Mean .796 2 87 .454 
Based on Median .481 2 87 .620 
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Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.481 2 75.748 .620 
Based on trimmed mean .731 2 87 .484 
Hedonism Value - Ought 
Based on Mean .540 2 87 .585 
Based on Median .353 2 87 .703 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.353 2 86.408 .703 
Based on trimmed mean .506 2 87 .605 
Stimulation Value - Actual 
Based on Mean .416 2 87 .661 
Based on Median .490 2 87 .614 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.490 2 86.459 .614 
Based on trimmed mean .441 2 87 .645 
Stimulation Value - Ideal 
Based on Mean 3.146 2 87 .048 
Based on Median 2.789 2 87 .067 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
2.789 2 57.891 .070 
Based on trimmed mean 3.195 2 87 .046 
Stimulation Value - Ought 
Based on Mean .131 2 87 .878 
Based on Median .194 2 87 .824 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.194 2 85.529 .824 
Based on trimmed mean .117 2 87 .890 
Self-direction Value - Actual 
Based on Mean .104 2 87 .901 
Based on Median .164 2 87 .849 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.164 2 85.035 .849 
Based on trimmed mean .116 2 87 .891 
Self-direction Value - Ideal 
Based on Mean 1.541 2 87 .220 
Based on Median 1.489 2 87 .231 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.489 2 82.641 .232 
Based on trimmed mean 1.512 2 87 .226 
Self-direction Value - Ought 
Based on Mean .144 2 87 .866 
Based on Median .077 2 87 .926 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.077 2 86.761 .926 
Based on trimmed mean .090 2 87 .914 
Self-direction Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Based on Mean .
a
 
   
Universalism Value - Actual 
Based on Mean 1.668 2 87 .195 
Based on Median .718 2 87 .491 
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Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.718 2 77.912 .491 
Based on trimmed mean 1.424 2 87 .246 
Universalism Value - Ideal 
Based on Mean .204 2 87 .816 
Based on Median .131 2 87 .878 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.131 2 83.745 .878 
Based on trimmed mean .188 2 87 .829 
Universalism Value - Ought 
Based on Mean 1.197 2 87 .307 
Based on Median .921 2 87 .402 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.921 2 86.518 .402 
Based on trimmed mean 1.218 2 87 .301 
Universalism Value - 
Actual/Ideal Discrepancy (no 
direction) 
Based on Mean .
a
 
   
Universalism Value - 
Actual/Ought Discrepancy 
(no direction) 
Based on Mean .814 1 58 .371 
Based on Median .444 1 58 .508 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.444 1 51.056 .508 
Based on trimmed mean .733 1 58 .396 
Benevolence Value - Actual 
Based on Mean .074 2 87 .929 
Based on Median .061 2 87 .941 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.061 2 77.620 .941 
Based on trimmed mean .047 2 87 .954 
Benevolence Value - Ideal 
Based on Mean 1.048 2 87 .355 
Based on Median 1.043 2 87 .357 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.043 2 52.433 .360 
Based on trimmed mean 1.005 2 87 .370 
Benevolence Value - Ought 
Based on Mean .377 2 87 .687 
Based on Median .321 2 87 .726 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.321 2 81.571 .727 
Based on trimmed mean .363 2 87 .697 
Tradition Value - Actual 
Based on Mean 2.694 2 87 .073 
Based on Median 1.978 2 87 .145 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.978 2 75.500 .145 
Based on trimmed mean 2.593 2 87 .081 
Tradition Value - Ideal 
Based on Mean .990 2 87 .376 
Based on Median .882 2 87 .418 
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Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.882 2 81.646 .418 
Based on trimmed mean 1.017 2 87 .366 
Tradition Value - Ought 
Based on Mean .490 2 87 .615 
Based on Median .353 2 87 .703 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.353 2 86.575 .703 
Based on trimmed mean .489 2 87 .615 
Conformity Value - Actual 
Based on Mean 2.513 2 87 .087 
Based on Median 1.732 2 87 .183 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.732 2 76.810 .184 
Based on trimmed mean 2.258 2 87 .111 
Conformity Value - Ideal 
Based on Mean .946 2 87 .392 
Based on Median .825 2 87 .442 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.825 2 65.654 .443 
Based on trimmed mean .854 2 87 .429 
Conformity Value - Ought 
Based on Mean 1.906 2 87 .155 
Based on Median 1.974 2 87 .145 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.974 2 86.115 .145 
Based on trimmed mean 1.943 2 87 .149 
Security Value - Actual 
Based on Mean .207 2 87 .814 
Based on Median .203 2 87 .816 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.203 2 86.690 .816 
Based on trimmed mean .190 2 87 .827 
Security Value - Ideal 
Based on Mean .344 2 87 .710 
Based on Median .363 2 87 .697 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.363 2 85.766 .697 
Based on trimmed mean .343 2 87 .710 
Security Value - Ought 
Based on Mean 4.116 2 87 .020 
Based on Median 4.036 2 87 .021 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
4.036 2 86.275 .021 
Based on trimmed mean 3.988 2 87 .022 
a. There are not enough unique spread/level pairs to compute the Levene statistic. 
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Behavioural Measures 
 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variance 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
Based on Mean .559 2 87 .574 
Based on Median .287 2 87 .751 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
.287 2 74.931 .751 
Based on trimmed mean .522 2 87 .595 
Task Accuracy 
Based on Mean 6.980 2 87 .002 
Based on Median 2.014 2 87 .140 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
2.014 2 69.790 .141 
Based on trimmed mean 6.142 2 87 .003 
 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variance 
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Checking Time in Seconds 
Based on Mean 2.824 2 49 .069 
Based on Median 1.555 2 49 .221 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
1.555 2 29.668 .228 
Based on trimmed mean 2.330 2 49 .108 
Checking Accuracy 
Based on Mean 6.068 2 49 .004 
Based on Median 3.822 2 49 .029 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
3.822 2 46.112 .029 
Based on trimmed mean 5.802 2 49 .005 
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Appendix 23  One way ANOVA’s  
 
Age 
 
ANOVA 
Age 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 38.689 2 19.344 .364 .696 
Within Groups 4623.767 87 53.147   
Total 4662.456 89    
 
Gender 
 
ANOVA 
Gender 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .022 2 .011 .100 .905 
Within Groups 9.633 87 .111   
Total 9.656 89    
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Appendix 24  Chi Square (Ethnicity) 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.900
a
 10 .103 
Likelihood Ratio 18.026 10 .055 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.140 1 .042 
N of Valid Cases 90   
a. 15 cells (83.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .33. 
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Appendix 25 One way ANOVA’s  
 
Anxiety 
 
 
ANOVA 
HADS.ANXIETY.NEW 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 42.022 2 21.011 1.404 .251 
Within Groups 1302.300 87 14.969   
Total 1344.322 89    
 
 
Depression 
 
ANOVA 
HADS.DEPRESSION.NEW 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.067 2 .533 .066 .937 
Within Groups 707.333 87 8.130   
Total 708.400 89    
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Appendix 26  One way ANOVA’s  
 
MCUP TOTAL 
ANOVA 
MEAN.MCUP.TOTAL 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 5.154 2 2.577 .135 .874 
Within Groups 1663.377 87 19.119   
Total 1668.530 89    
 
 
MCUP FACTOR 1 
 
ANOVA 
MEAN.MCUP.FACTOR1 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .159 2 .079 .400 .672 
Within Groups 17.237 87 .198   
Total 17.396 89    
 
 
MCUP FACTOR 2 
 
ANOVA 
MEAN.MCUP.FACTOR2 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .832 2 .416 .694 .502 
Within Groups 52.187 87 .600   
Total 53.020 89    
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Appendix 27 One way ANOVA’s  
 
ACTUAL VALUES 
 
 
ANOVA 
Power Value- Actual 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 3.119 2 1.560 2.167 .121 
Within Groups 62.601 87 .720   
Total 65.720 89    
 
 
 
ANOVA 
Achievement Value - Actual 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.851 2 .926 1.150 .322 
Within Groups 70.054 87 .805   
Total 71.906 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Hedonism Value - Actual 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.287 2 .644 1.035 .359 
Within Groups 54.070 87 .621   
Total 55.358 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Stimulation Value - Actual 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .072 2 .036 .038 .962 
Within Groups 81.708 87 .939   
Total 81.781 89    
 
 
 
ANOVA 
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Self-direction Value - Actual 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .195 2 .097 .257 .774 
Within Groups 32.929 87 .378   
Total 33.124 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Universalism Value - Actual 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .152 2 .076 .222 .801 
Within Groups 29.845 87 .343   
Total 29.998 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Benevolence Value - Actual 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .372 2 .186 .409 .665 
Within Groups 39.548 87 .455   
Total 39.920 89    
 
 
 
ANOVA 
Tradition Value - Actual 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.004 2 .502 1.466 .237 
Within Groups 29.802 87 .343   
Total 30.806 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Conformity Value - Actual 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.067 2 .533 1.162 .318 
Within Groups 39.940 87 .459   
Total 41.006 89    
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ANOVA 
Security Value - Actual 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .150 2 .075 .166 .848 
Within Groups 39.441 87 .453   
Total 39.592 89    
 
 
IDEAL VALUES 
 
ANOVA 
Power Value- Ideal 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .522 2 .261 .614 .544 
Within Groups 37.022 87 .426   
Total 37.545 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Achievement Value - Ideal 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.101 2 .551 .928 .399 
Within Groups 51.635 87 .594   
Total 52.737 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Hedonism Value - Ideal 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .803 2 .401 1.091 .341 
Within Groups 32.019 87 .368   
Total 32.822 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Stimulation Value - Ideal 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 2.439 2 1.219 2.410 .096 
Within Groups 44.017 87 .506   
Total 46.456 89    
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ANOVA 
Self-direction Value - Ideal 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .412 2 .206 1.828 .167 
Within Groups 9.795 87 .113   
Total 10.206 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Universalism Value - Ideal 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .051 2 .025 .115 .892 
Within Groups 19.301 87 .222   
Total 19.352 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Benevolence Value - Ideal 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .404 2 .202 .908 .407 
Within Groups 19.371 87 .223   
Total 19.775 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Tradition Value - Ideal 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .339 2 .169 .354 .703 
Within Groups 41.640 87 .479   
Total 41.978 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Conformity Value - Ideal 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .385 2 .192 .443 .644 
Within Groups 37.779 87 .434   
Total 38.164 89    
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ANOVA 
Security Value - Ideal 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .289 2 .144 .504 .606 
Within Groups 24.929 87 .287   
Total 25.218 89    
 
 
OUGHT VALUES 
 
ANOVA 
Power Value - Ought 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .484 2 .242 .663 .518 
Within Groups 31.767 87 .365   
Total 32.251 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Achievement Value - Ought 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .379 2 .190 .328 .722 
Within Groups 50.346 87 .579   
Total 50.725 89    
 
 
 
ANOVA 
Hedonism Value - Ought 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .029 2 .015 .033 .967 
Within Groups 38.370 87 .441   
Total 38.399 89    
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ANOVA 
Stimulation Value - Ought 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.939 2 .969 2.173 .120 
Within Groups 38.808 87 .446   
Total 40.747 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Self-direction Value - Ought 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .398 2 .199 .968 .384 
Within Groups 17.904 87 .206   
Total 18.302 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Universalism Value - Ought 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .603 2 .301 1.501 .229 
Within Groups 17.467 87 .201   
Total 18.070 89    
 
 
ANOVA 
Benevolence Value - Ought 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .151 2 .076 .379 .686 
Within Groups 17.377 87 .200   
Total 17.528 89    
 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
Tradition Value - Ought 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .360 2 .180 .344 .710 
Within Groups 45.554 87 .524   
Total 45.914 89    
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ANOVA 
Conformity Value - Ought 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.176 2 .588 1.382 .257 
Within Groups 37.029 87 .426   
Total 38.206 89    
 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
Security Value - Ought 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 1.041 2 .520 1.705 .188 
Within Groups 26.551 87 .305   
Total 27.592 89    
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Appendix 28 Independent T-Tests 
 
Checking Time: Group 1 x Group 2 
Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Checking 
Time in 
Seconds 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
3.680 .063 2.227 37 .032 28.34738 12.72612 2.56181 54.13294 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
2.300 36.991 .027 28.34738 12.32399 3.37640 53.31835 
 
 
Checking Time Group 1 x Group 3 
Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Checking 
Time in 
Seconds 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.019 .892 1.842 34 .074 28.52305 15.48167 -2.93949 59.98560 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
1.796 25.496 .084 28.52305 15.88356 -4.15753 61.20363 
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Checking Time: Group 2 x Group 3 
Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Checking 
Time in 
Seconds 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
1.599 .216 .012 29 .991 .17567 14.77908 -30.05094 30.40228 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
.011 22.544 .991 .17567 15.30148 -31.51335 31.86470 
 
Checking Option: Group 1 x 2 
Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Checking 
Option 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
6.176 .016 
-
1.351 
58 .182 -.167 .123 -.414 .080 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-
1.351 
57.264 .182 -.167 .123 -.414 .080 
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Checking Option: Group 1 x 3 
Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Checking 
Option 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
7.552 .008 
-
2.154 
58 .035 -.267 .124 -.514 -.019 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-
2.154 
57.177 .035 -.267 .124 -.515 -.019 
 
Checking Option: Group 2 x 3 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Checking 
Option 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.236 .629 
-
.766 
58 .447 -.100 .131 -.361 .161 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-
.766 
57.997 .447 -.100 .131 -.361 .161 
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Appendix 29 MANOVA’s 
 
MANOVA – Task Time and Accuracy 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept 
Pillai's Trace .999 51251.260
b
 2.000 86.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .001 51251.260
b
 2.000 86.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace 1191.890 51251.260
b
 2.000 86.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root 1191.890 51251.260
b
 2.000 86.000 .000 
Group 
Pillai's Trace .044 .976 4.000 174.000 .422 
Wilks' Lambda .956 .975
b
 4.000 172.000 .422 
Hotelling's Trace .046 .974 4.000 170.000 .423 
Roy's Largest Root .045 1.958
c
 2.000 87.000 .147 
a. Design: Intercept + Group 
b. Exact statistic 
c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
8551.623
a
 2 4275.812 1.212 .303 
Task Accuracy 32.067
b
 2 16.033 1.662 .196 
Intercept 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
3525366.875 1 3525366.875 999.483 .000 
Task Accuracy 851472.400 1 851472.400 88237.234 .000 
Group 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
8551.623 2 4275.812 1.212 .303 
Task Accuracy 32.067 2 16.033 1.662 .196 
Error 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
306865.453 87 3527.189 
  
Task Accuracy 839.533 87 9.650   
Total 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
3840783.951 90 
   
Task Accuracy 852344.000 90    
Corrected Total 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
315417.076 89 
   
Task Accuracy 871.600 89    
a. R Squared = .027 (Adjusted R Squared = .005) 
b. R Squared = .037 (Adjusted R Squared = .015) 
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MANOVA – Task Time and Accuracy – Age Covarite 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept 
Pillai's Trace .991 4826.355
b
 2.000 85.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .009 4826.355
b
 2.000 85.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace 113.561 4826.355
b
 2.000 85.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root 113.561 4826.355
b
 2.000 85.000 .000 
Age 
Pillai's Trace .058 2.596
b
 2.000 85.000 .080 
Wilks' Lambda .942 2.596
b
 2.000 85.000 .080 
Hotelling's Trace .061 2.596
b
 2.000 85.000 .080 
Roy's Largest Root .061 2.596
b
 2.000 85.000 .080 
Group 
Pillai's Trace .041 .899 4.000 172.000 .466 
Wilks' Lambda .959 .898
b
 4.000 170.000 .466 
Hotelling's Trace .043 .897 4.000 168.000 .467 
Roy's Largest Root .042 1.824
c
 2.000 86.000 .168 
a. Design: Intercept + Age + Group 
b. Exact statistic 
c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
26128.717
a
 3 8709.572 2.589 .058 
Task Accuracy 40.276
b
 3 13.425 1.389 .252 
Intercept 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
205826.442 1 205826.442 61.188 .000 
Task Accuracy 79642.717 1 79642.717 8238.999 .000 
Age 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
17577.094 1 17577.094 5.225 .025 
Task Accuracy 8.210 1 8.210 .849 .359 
Group 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
7155.357 2 3577.678 1.064 .350 
Task Accuracy 30.442 2 15.221 1.575 .213 
Error 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
289288.359 86 3363.818 
  
Task Accuracy 831.324 86 9.667   
Total 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
3840783.951 90 
   
Task Accuracy 852344.000 90    
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Corrected Total 
Task Completion time in 
Seconds 
315417.076 89 
   
Task Accuracy 871.600 89    
a. R Squared = .083 (Adjusted R Squared = .051) 
b. R Squared = .046 (Adjusted R Squared = .013) 
 
 
MANOVA – Check Time and Accuracy 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept 
Pillai's Trace 1.000 87618.766
b
 2.000 48.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .000 87618.766
b
 2.000 48.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace 3650.782 87618.766
b
 2.000 48.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root 3650.782 87618.766
b
 2.000 48.000 .000 
Group 
Pillai's Trace .170 2.271 4.000 98.000 .067 
Wilks' Lambda .837 2.229
b
 4.000 96.000 .071 
Hotelling's Trace .186 2.187 4.000 94.000 .076 
Roy's Largest Root .113 2.770
c
 2.000 49.000 .072 
a. Design: Intercept + Group 
b. Exact statistic 
c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 
Checking Time in Seconds 9353.558
a
 2 4676.779 2.662 .080 
Checking Accuracy 10.866
b
 2 5.433 1.990 .148 
Intercept 
Checking Time in Seconds 425159.855 1 425159.855 242.012 .000 
Checking Accuracy 484324.868 1 484324.868 177359.765 .000 
Group 
Checking Time in Seconds 9353.558 2 4676.779 2.662 .080 
Checking Accuracy 10.866 2 5.433 1.990 .148 
Error 
Checking Time in Seconds 86081.921 49 1756.774   
Checking Accuracy 133.807 49 2.731   
Total 
Checking Time in Seconds 562905.666 52    
Checking Accuracy 506831.000 52    
Corrected Total 
Checking Time in Seconds 95435.479 51    
Checking Accuracy 144.673 51    
a. R Squared = .098 (Adjusted R Squared = .061) 
b. R Squared = .075 (Adjusted R Squared = .037) 
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MANOVA – Check Time and Accuracy with Age Covariate 
Multivariate Tests
a
 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept 
Pillai's Trace .965 651.141
b
 2.000 47.000 .000 
Wilks' Lambda .035 651.141
b
 2.000 47.000 .000 
Hotelling's Trace 27.708 651.141
b
 2.000 47.000 .000 
Roy's Largest Root 27.708 651.141
b
 2.000 47.000 .000 
Age 
Pillai's Trace .075 1.914
b
 2.000 47.000 .159 
Wilks' Lambda .925 1.914
b
 2.000 47.000 .159 
Hotelling's Trace .081 1.914
b
 2.000 47.000 .159 
Roy's Largest Root .081 1.914
b
 2.000 47.000 .159 
Group 
Pillai's Trace .180 2.377 4.000 96.000 .057 
Wilks' Lambda .828 2.332
b
 4.000 94.000 .061 
Hotelling's Trace .199 2.288 4.000 92.000 .066 
Roy's Largest Root .121 2.910
c
 2.000 48.000 .064 
a. Design: Intercept + Age + Group 
b. Exact statistic 
c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 
Checking Time in Seconds 15795.148
a
 3 5265.049 3.173 .032 
Checking Accuracy 10.891
b
 3 3.630 1.303 .284 
Intercept 
Checking Time in Seconds 546.470 1 546.470 .329 .569 
Checking Accuracy 3627.986 1 3627.986 1301.693 .000 
Age 
Checking Time in Seconds 6441.590 1 6441.590 3.882 .055 
Checking Accuracy .025 1 .025 .009 .926 
Group 
Checking Time in Seconds 9654.124 2 4827.062 2.909 .064 
Checking Accuracy 10.541 2 5.271 1.891 .162 
Error 
Checking Time in Seconds 79640.331 48 1659.174   
Checking Accuracy 133.782 48 2.787   
Total 
Checking Time in Seconds 562905.666 52    
Checking Accuracy 506831.000 52    
Corrected Total 
Checking Time in Seconds 95435.479 51    
Checking Accuracy 144.673 51    
a. R Squared = .166 (Adjusted R Squared = .113) 
b. R Squared = .075 (Adjusted R Squared = .017) 
 
